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The crisis that shook the world 
Ursula J. van Beek 
 
Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; 
And I am not sure about the universe. 
Albert Einstein 
Introduction 
This book is a cautionary tale about the September 2008 financial ‘earth-
quake’ and the global tsunami that followed. The worst of the panic might be 
over, but does this mean it is back to business as usual? Hardly. The earth-
quake exposed fault lines we can afford to ignore only at our own peril. In 
fact, the need to understand what happened, why it happened and what the 
possible long-term consequences could be, have turned into the most burning 
questions of our time, and certainly not only for economists.  
The earthquake 
At the epicentre of the global earthquake was the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008. This initial seismic event sent out shockwaves 
that triggered the global financial and economic crisis and plunged the world 
into the turmoil of the Great Recession. Since the originating event, unem-
ployment rates in all the major liberal democracies, which were affected the 
most, are higher now than they were before 2008, and the level of their public 
debt has risen dramatically. Coupled with unwieldy budget deficits and poor 
growth prospects, the economies of these countries could well be weakened 
for years to come. The bleak reality is that the prospects for global economic 
growth predicted by most pundits in the midst of the short-lived burst in the 
market upswing in 2010 are very unlikely to be realised. The optimism that 
lulled governments, and the public, into believing the worst was over is now 
giving way to the realisation that the crisis is in fact not over, but has merely 
been delayed by stimulus packages and debt-shuffling from the private to the 
public sector on an unprecedented scale. 
The world is now seen as more unstable in many key areas than it has 
been for many decades. At the time of writing, in the US a state budget crisis 
is looming; in the Middle East the Arab Spring is breaking up calcified auto-
cratic orders, but the direction of political change is far from certain; and in 
Europe the profoundly serious situation in Greece and the shaky state of eco-
nomic affairs in other peripheral, especially Southern European, countries 
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raises the likelihood that the euro might not survive in its current form. There 
is even the possibility that the European Union project as a whole could be 
undermined and a more fragmented Europe will be less able to deal with the 
mounting global challenges.  
The drama unfolding since 2008 ended the unquestioned supremacy of 
the model adopted by the rich developed democracies and firmly embedded 
after the Cold War; their seemingly ever-progressing economic development, 
which was the envy of the rest of the word, has now lost its shine. Economic 
progress has given way to a sustained decline in the trajectory of affluence, 
ending thereby the strong popular conviction that democracy and robust eco-
nomic development necessarily go hand in hand. And there is also the risk 
that confidence in democracy itself might start to erode.  
Against this trend, the economic strength of the more crisis-resistant 
emerging countries has been bolstered and has begun to crystallise into polit-
ical power, as illustrated, among other things, by the upgrading in the course 
of the crisis of the G20 to a venue for heads of state. The global earthquake 
tilted the political axis of the globe away from the centre, with the result that 
established liberal democracies lost their monopoly on influence in global af-
fairs. The question now is who will wield influence and in what way. The 
even more pertinent question is whether democratic principles can and will 
be applied, or whether different criteria will be used when deciding the fate 
of the world.  
So far the crisis has not proved to be the earth-shattering event that was 
feared originally. The experience of the Great Depression in the wake of the 
1929 stock market crash has not been repeated, nor has there been a similar 
degree of political upheaval: no young democracies have failed as yet, as was 
the case with many such fledgling democracies in the interwar period; nor 
has the economic downturn proved to be as deep as it had been in the 1930s.  
Nevertheless, the crisis has taken a heavy economic toll on most coun-
tries and has profoundly changed the world in ways we have yet to under-
stand. For one thing, a strong state is now believed to be better equipped than 
a weak one to sustain a fragile recovery, even as fiscal pressures force gov-
ernments to unwind their stimulus packages. But are all states, or even most 
of them, up to the task? Not according to the 2010 state capability index 
compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and based on 12 indica-
tors that were thought to capture the main conditions likely to show whether 
or not a particular state has the ability to deliver. Of the 163 countries sur-
veyed only 34 were classified as having highly capable states, and another 38 
were classed as moderately capable; more than half of the countries were 
found to have either weak or very weak states.  
At the same time polls show falling public support for capitalism, espe-
cially in the USA, the country that used to be the very epitome of free enter-
prise. And significantly, this is in sharp contrast to China, which has now 
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emerged as one of the strongest supporters of capitalism. These sentiments 
suggest a shifting relationship between political systems and the free market 
in a context in which the success of China’s state-capitalist model is becom-
ing an advertisement for many developing countries. 
Why and how? 
The search for answers to the question as to why a calamity occurred starts 
with an attempt to identify and understand its causes, with a view to hopeful-
ly help avoid similar such occurrences in the future. But the causes of far-
reaching events are inevitably multiple and hard to untangle. What triggered 
the downturn following the Wall Street crash on that fateful ‘Black Thurs-
day’ on 24 October 1929, for example, still remains a matter of much contro-
versy. Among many other specialist opinions, historians tend to emphasise 
structural factors such as massive bank failures and the crash itself, while 
economists point more often to monetary policies, especially the contraction 
of money reserves that resulted from policies adopted by the US Federal Re-
serve, or the decision by Britain to return to the Gold Standard at pre-World 
War I levels. While there will undoubtedly be prolonged and detailed future 
debates, it is already becoming quite clear that the most recent crisis, like the 
one before it, had many points of origin. The US Bipartisan Commission 
created in 2009 and the US Congressional Research Service between them 
identified no fewer than 26 different causes of the crisis, while according to 
the CEO of the ill-fated Bear Sterns ‘everybody messed up’: the government, 
the rating agencies, Wall Street, the commercial banks and the regulators.  
At a superficial level the common denominator of the two periods pre-
ceding the onset of both the 1929 and the 2008 financial meltdowns was a 
sense of ‘the good times’, especially in the United States, where both the cri-
ses originated. Rapid industrial/economic growth along with high consumer 
demand and elevated aspirations characterised both the ‘Roaring Twenties’ 
and the two ‘feel good’ decades of growing prosperity associated with the 
progress of globalisation after the end of the Cold War. There was ample evi-
dence of enormous wealth, excess, expanding credit and recklessness in 
speculation on the soaring stock markets in both instances when the world 
came tumbling down.  
But the devil, of course, is in the detail, as the respective chapters by Stan 
du Plessis and Dirk Berg-Schlosser aptly illustrate. While excess and greed 
played a role, so did the incentives that created the credit-fuelled bubble, in 
the US property markets in particular, and the concurrent gearing in the US 
financial sector that led highly geared banks first into a position of weakness 
and then into failure on so massive a scale that policy intervention became 
indispensable. The reason why the problem was not contained locally but 
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spread to the rest of the world was that the modern banking system relies on 
globally interlinked financial markets and that the world economy has be-
come tightly integrated not only into the financial system across the world 
but also into the flow of goods and services across boundaries.  
Some instructive comparisons have been made in this volume between 
the current crisis and the one that triggered the Great Depression. For exam-
ple, in contrast to the present situation, of the 15 European countries in the in-
ter-war period that could be described, albeit in some cases at a stretch, as 
parliamentary democracies only eight survived; the other seven fell victim to 
circumstance and turned to more authoritarian forms of rule, especially to 
fascism that set them on the slippery slope towards World War II. Reminis-
cent of the more current woes, international trade fell sharply during the 
Great Depression along with all major economic indicators, while unem-
ployment rose steeply. The severe budget cuts and other austerity measures, 
which most of the hapless governments of the day had implemented, did not 
prevent the crisis situation from deteriorating even further. Instead the meas-
ures were met with strong social and political responses as large numbers of 
people took to the streets in often peaceful, but sometimes also violent, pro-
test – a situation not dissimilar to the developments witnessed lately in 
Greece.  
The most significant positive difference between then and now has been 
the avoidance of the ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policy implemented by nearly all 
central banks in the 1930s. This policy, which put short-term domestic inter-
ests above longer-term considerations of international cooperation and sta-
bility, can be contrasted with the current efforts to coordinate, at the regional 
and global levels, policies meant to counter the adverse effects of the crisis, 
even if the efficacy of these efforts is sometimes doubtful. There is also a ma-
jor difference between the young democracies of the inter-war period and the 
well established liberal democracies of today. In the 1930s other political al-
ternatives were at hand in the form of ‘anti-system parties’ spread across the 
political spectrum from left to right. They posed a real threat to the democra-
cies that were as yet not fully consolidated, because they carried the consi-
derable potential for non-democratic or anti-democratic alternatives to 
emerge, and emerge they did. In contrast, no coherent extremist social and 
political forces or reactions have so far materialised in the developed demo-
cracies of today, while the general structural and political-cultural conditions 
continue to favour the persistence of democracy. But the situation is less 
clear in the case of the younger ‘Third Wave’ democracies. As Berg-
Schlosser notes, their continuing democratic future could be more dependent 
on policy and actor effects, and this makes them more comparable to the un-
consolidated democracies of the 1930s.  
For this very reason the democracies of the Third Wave are of particular 
interest in this book as its aim is not only to come to grips with how the crisis 
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happened and how it was handled in the short term, but also to hypothesise 
about its possible long-term consequences, especially with regards to the fu-
ture of democracy. One of the speculative questions posed in this volume is 
therefore whether the global crisis and its aftermath might bring on the rever-
sal or further expansion of the Third Wave of democracy.  
Political systems and the economy  
The Great Recession accentuated the emerging global division into democrat-
ic and authoritarian capitalisms. China’s economic success, in particular, 
started to undermine the once almost unshakable belief in political science 
that democracy and economic progress went together, whereas an autocratic 
regime was more likely to show poor economic performance. It is now also 
far less clear whether democracy increases the probability of economic suc-
cess, or rather – and this is more likely – produces an improvement in the liv-
ing standards of broad segments of a society, but only when good economic 
performance is already in place. And this leads to the question of whether the 
model of authoritarian capitalism might become a more attractive alternative 
to liberal democracy of the Western type, which is combined with a market 
economy, but is also ‘encumbered’ by the whole package of civic values such 
as human rights, the role of an individual in society, etc.  
The first answers to the various questions emerge from the chapters by 
Ursula Hofmann-Lange and Philip Mohr. They both pursue the topic of the 
complex relationship between political systems and the economy, but look at 
this through the different lenses of their respective disciplines of political 
science and economics. What becomes evident from the political science 
perspective is that the democratic system requires a careful balancing of the 
concepts of liberty and equality. The in-built tension springs from the mod-
el’s essential need for a market economy, which per se implies inequalities of 
wealth, and the concurrent necessity to ensure the equality of its citizens not 
only in terms of political rights, but also in terms of the responsibility of 
democratic governments to reduce socioeconomic disparities. This contradic-
tion is democracy’s inherent weakness. The strength of a democratic dispen-
sation is greater political flexibility, whereby inefficient governments can be 
voted out of power without the threat of a decline in regime legitimacy and 
the possible consequent risks of political instability. In that sense democra-
cies are generally better equipped than authoritarian political systems to 
weather economic crises.  
But are democracies also better at guaranteeing economic success? The 
recent revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya showed once again how au-
thoritarian leaders tend to exploit their political power to amass private for-
tunes in collusion with large private enterprises. Since neither side of the pact 
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has an interest in ending the mutually profitable relationship, the ousting of 
the old leadership alone will not suffice. And if the old networks are left in 
place, while there is no legal framework of market regulation needed for a 
properly functioning market economy and the tradition of the rule of law is 
weak, then there can be no development of a competitive and successful 
market economy, despite democratisation. On the other hand, some authorita-
rian governments, notably China, promote the liberalisation of their national 
markets and stimulate economic success without democratising their political 
system. Market liberalisation and the consequent improvement of living con-
ditions may in turn contribute to stabilising authoritarian political systems, at 
least in the short run.  
Seen through the eyes of an economist, further complexities emerge. 
First, there is the fact that all economic systems are mixed systems, even if a 
particular form of ownership (collective: socialism or private: capitalism) 
usually dominates, or particular coordinating mechanisms such as tradition, 
command and the market prevail. Each type of ownership and each mechan-
ism has its strengths and weaknesses, and each form of economic system has 
its adherents among economists. The dividing line lies between those who 
believe, as John Maynard Keynes did, that market economies are inherently 
unstable as they are subject to business cycles in the form of booms and re-
cessions, and therefore governments have a role to play. Classical econo-
mists, conversely, are of the opinion that markets are inherently stable and 
that it is in fact governments that are responsible for creating business cycles. 
They advocate a hands-off approach. The recent crisis gave Keynesianism a 
massive boost when, after two decades of market fundamentalism, the urgent 
need for discretionary monetary and fiscal intervention became essential.  
The two schools of economic thought are only part of the story. The oth-
er part deals with the specifics that impact on economic performance and can 
determine its success or failure, such as factor endowment, politics, history, 
geography, culture and attitudes of people in a particular country. Although 
some economists think that universal economic laws cut through time and 
space, there are others, such as Mohr, who devote attention to path depen-
dence, recognising that a country’s current and expected performance is 
shaped by the route it had followed to arrive where it is today. The Chinese 
economic success, for example, which confounds many economists, would 
be hard to understand without taking into account the salient features of the 
Chinese people and their history. Equally, there is a wider range of develop-
ing countries, particularly the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and Chi-
na) from whose perceived success one can also distil lessons to look for 
guidelines.  
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Responses to crisis 
At the core of the global crisis has been finance. The trigger was the liberali-
sation of the capital market that opened the door to a free flow of speculative 
money as from the 1990s. This dynamic has been unfolding largely beyond 
the effective control of national governments, which nevertheless had little 
option but to step in when the inevitable crunch came. Ironically, while the 
measures governments instituted staved off the worst scenarios, the faulty 
global financial architecture remained essentially unchanged, and in time 
much of critical popular sentiment turned from global to local: from hostility 
towards banks and speculators to apportioning blame to individual govern-
ments.  
The financial ‘earthquake’ of September 2008 sent flood waves first and 
foremost across the most developed democracies, so much so that some have 
dubbed the problem a crisis of the rich nations. But the troubled waters did 
not stop there as the ripple effects spilled over to the rest of the globe. Given 
the uneven stages and severity of the contagion, responses varied widely over 
time, space and political systems, while counter-measures have been sought 
at both national and international levels. The wide variation of measures try-
ing to cope with the crisis as well as an assessment of the results this has pro-
duced have been captured in this volume by Laurence Whitehead and the co-
authors Sang-jin Han and Peng Lü. They unveil, respectively, the democratic 
mechanism employed by the leading old democracies, and the responsive 
policies deployed by the authoritarian Chinese regime.  
At the national level democracies have an in-built safety-valve mechan-
ism to address citizen discontent in the form of democratic alternation. This 
allows for a peaceful change of leadership that helps both renew public au-
thority and bolster political responsiveness to economic challenges at a time 
of economic stress. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the two 
countries most accountable for the crisis, democratic alternation did take 
place and proved to be a powerful mechanism of political accountability. But 
in both cases the alteration had limited effectiveness as an error-correcting 
mechanism to help redress past errors by holding failed officeholders to ac-
count, or to institute improvements to economic policy-making to guard 
against similar relapses in the future. This is because the concentration of po-
litical energies on a corrective agenda is harder to sustain in the long run. 
Once the worst of a crisis is over, other issues distract the attention, while 
competing parties and lobbyists are likely to dilute the initially strong reform 
impulse by highjacking it to suit their own particular interests.  
In the absence of the safety-valve mechanism democracies have at their 
disposal, the immediate response to the crisis by the authoritarian Chinese re-
gime was to implement a policy of extreme Keynesianism. Even though the 
Chinese economy was far less affected by the crisis than were the economies 
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of the developed countries, in November 2008 the Chinese government 
launched the rollout of the largest (as a share of GDP) stimulus package in 
the world, amounting to some US$586 billion; six months later well over half 
of the budget was already allocated. The giant scope of the project along with 
its swift implementation showed the strong capacity of a state unrestrained by 
electoral considerations. While the main aim of the package was to make up 
for the fall in exports by spurring domestic demand, the selective preferential 
targeting of recipients suggested a concurrent political aim, which was to 
mollify workers in the major sector of the Chinese economy to forestall any 
labour challenge to the regime.  
The tentative conclusion one could draw from the two analyses is that in 
the longer run China, its multiple internal problems notwithstanding, is likely 
to be much less affected by the crisis and might even benefit from it – not on-
ly because of the softer impact that the financial and economic crisis has had 
on its economy, but also because of the response policy, which might have 
initiated a correction of the hitherto unhealthy imbalance of the Chinese eco-
nomy in favour of exports. It is as yet hard to see if any long-term benefits 
might accrue to the developed liberal democracies in the wake of the crisis, 
given that much of the initial impetus to institute corrective reform has been 
lost.  
In the international arena, similarly, major global decision makers did 
what they thought was best to stabilise the immediate crisis situation. But, as 
Whitehead notes in this volume, “established interests in many countries had 
regained their confidence and veto power, and any potential coalition that 
might have existed in favour of major curbs to the dynamics of financial glo-
balisation had begun to splinter.” And so the concerted response to the crisis, 
so robust to begin with, has been left unfinished. Little wonder then that 
another international banking crisis is now moving to the fore of the interna-
tional agenda. And the insolvency of Greek banks is merely the tip of the 
iceberg as many banks in other euro zone countries are not only overly in-
debted, but have the transparency of their declared assets questioned. This 
situation gives rise to serious concerns about a new contagion spreading not 
only to more countries in the euro zone but also to areas well beyond the Eu-
ropean common currency. 
Quo vadis democracy? 
A financial crisis has much wider ramifications than just precipitating the 
need to put one’s fiscal house in order. The heavy impact on the economy 
and economic actors comes to mind first, but harmful knock-on effects put at 
risk social protection, public health, education programmes and food security, 
as well as affecting individual households; all these factors hold the potential 
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to set off destabilising social reactions. And then there is the feedback loop. 
This is because a financial crisis is not only a causative factor that sets off a 
damaging chain reaction, but it is also a symptom. It is a symptom of poor-
quality governance and regulation, and of profligacy, although this issue goes 
to the much deeper level of underlying values, attitudes and beliefs. These 
crucial elements are highlighted in this volume by Pierre du Toit.  
At the heart of the matter is the social and physical context within which 
the modern Western consumer-oriented lifestyle and liberal culture have 
evolved. The origins of this culture can be traced back to the post-World War 
II ‘baby boom’ generation, whose values were formed during – and found 
expression in – the counterculture movement of the 1960s, which coalesced 
around the issue of the US involvement in the Vietnam War. The denuncia-
tion of war was the particular focus, but with it came the rebellion against an 
established cultural code and the rejection of many norms of restraint. Toler-
ance became the hallmark; equality was extended from political rights to 
such areas as sexual orientation and gender relations, and progress came to be 
viewed as an increasing ‘quality of life’ trend.  
The wave of prosperity enjoyed by Western societies in the last 50 years 
served to entrench these values. A crisis-induced reversal of the trajectory of 
affluence could have far-reaching effects, not least in that it could undermine 
the liberal values of trust and tolerance that guard against ethnic nationalism 
with its concurrent attitudes of prejudice, racism and xenophobia. This ap-
plies especially to the integration of migrant populations into existing socie-
ties, which was already a problem prior to the crisis and not only in multi-
cultural societies, but even in such mono-cultural environments such as Ger-
many or the Netherlands. The deeply shocking images of the carnage perpe-
trated in Norway in the summer of 2011 is an uneasy illustration of the prob-
lem of waning tolerance, which could give rise to the emergence of illiberal 
democracies, and not just at the edges but at the very core of the liberal dem-
ocratic zone.  
At the global level the subject that warrants most attention is the rise of 
China. The phenomenon of this rise, already remarkable for its dynamic na-
ture before the crisis, moved to the centre of the world stage as the Great Re-
cession unfolded. One of the authors in this book and its co-editor, Edmund 
Wnuk-Lipinski, goes as far as to consider the possibility of a new global bi-
polarisation in the making, with China in one of the two key positions and the 
world divided into democratic and authoritarian capitalisms. When the earli-
er, ideologically defined, bipolar order ended in 1989 with the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc, liberal democracy was declared the ultimate winner set to con-
quer the whole world. But this was not to be. Looking at the world today, as 
Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski noted in this volume, it is safe to say that it was ca-
pitalism rather than liberal democracy that has won the day, as the whole of 
the global market economy is now capitalist, distinguished only by different 
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solutions to the various local economic problems, from liberal in the US, to 
welfare state capitalism in the EU, to a mixture of state and private capitalism 
in China. In this context the growing economic clout of the latter is being 
watched with increasing concern by some countries, especially the United 
States. But China’s evident prosperity is also being watched, and most likely 
with growing hope, by some formally democratic or authoritarian peripheral 
countries whose development paths have not been success stories either in 
economic or political terms. And China might become an example to follow 
not only for them, but also for some liberal democracies, particularly those 
that are relatively young and perform poorly economically. This possible 
adoption of the ‘Chinese model’ is the more pessimistic of the two scenarios 
offered in the conclusions to this volume. 
The question is whether China is part of the problem or part of the solu-
tion to the problem. A recent BBC survey revealed that China becoming 
more powerful is viewed with apprehension in all of the 27 countries sur-
veyed, and especially in the G7 countries. Also, negative popular perceptions 
in 2011 were up from 2005, when the last poll was conducted. The attitudes 
of European leaders belied these popular sentiments in June 2011, when red 
carpets were rolled out in European capitals to receive China’s Prime Minis-
ter, Wen Jiabao. This is in contrast to American leaders, who view China 
much more warily, but in the midst of the euro zone financial woes European 
leaders undoubtedly have a greater vested interest in Chinese investments 
than do their American counterparts. It could also be that they are better in-
formed about China and are thus less uneasy about letting China in.  
Bogeyman or saviour, China is here to stay and needs to be studied ob-
jectively to be understood better. In this volume a deeper knowledge of the 
country is sought via its history. China’s journey from being a proud ancient 
Empire, through colonial exploitation and the later ravages of revolutions and 
chaos, to a poor Third World country and then back to a position of power 
tells its own story: the story of survivors who adapt to changing circums-
tances. Therein lie many lessons, but two are particularly pertinent to the dis-
cussion in this book. The one is that there is much to be learnt from the Chi-
nese practice-based epistemology, which calls for distilling lessons from ex-
perimentation to feed innovation as the basis of progress. The other lesson is 
that learning selectively from China is very different from trying to imitate 
wholesale a culturally peculiar authoritarian form of governance. And among 
the countries most likely to try this would be those with the most to lose: 
poor defective democracies that would be unlikely to replicate China’s eco-
nomic success, but would be sure to destroy the last vestiges of democracy 
their citizens still have as their meagre means by which to keep some kind of 
check on their governments. 
The last, but certainly not least, important topic in this book focuses on 
the need and the possible ways in which we might begin to search for a dem-
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ocratic approach to a new world order. The global crisis has taken this urgent 
need to a new level. It has shown that it will not suffice to patch up the shaky 
financial architecture or to ride out the Great Recession with all its economic, 
political and social consequences, as pressing as all these issues are. It will 
also be necessary to take the much more difficult step and go beyond these 
immediate tasks to a change in mindset in at least two vital respects. The one 
is the idea that progress is boundlessly incremental and is not only possible 
but will occur as a matter of course. This misconception does not take into 
account the rapidly growing population of the planet or the ecocidal depletion 
of the earth’s natural resources by the economy. The other mindset that needs 
to change is the popular belief that values are defined by culture and we are 
therefore doomed to eternal miscommunication.  
The contributions by Christer Jönsson and Bernard Lategan consider 
these issues. The one shows the incredible obstacles that stand in the way of 
global democracy; the other offers some hope for communication across cul-
tural boundaries. Whether or not we will be able to muster the imagination 
and the necessary tenacity to institute change in managing global affairs in a 
new way remains an open question. What is beyond doubt is that in the long 
run there is no other alternative if we are to survive as a species. Only then 
we will be able to put to rest one of Einstein’s ‘infinite’ worries, that about 
human stupidity. 
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PART I 
Global economic crises and their 
political impact 
 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers marked a new phase of globalisation. 
Risk and uncertainty about the future were, of course, not unknown before 
that event; they were part and parcel of the combination of Third Wave de-
mocratisation and the emergence of the global financial market. But after the 
Lehman Brothers collapse the element of uncertainty left the exclusive do-
main of academic inquiry and expert knowledge and became the experience 
of ordinary people the world over. People have learnt that nothing lasts for-
ever, that a steady improvement of life conditions may suddenly be reversed, 
and that a lot depends less on their individual efforts or on local decisions and 
more on decisions taken by anonymous bodies in remote centres of the global 
financial game.  
Global and local media offered countless and often shallow and mutually 
contradictory analyses on how we should understand the financial catastro-
phe. How serious is the crisis? What caused it? Who should be held responsi-
ble? Can we avoid similar turmoil in the future? Very quickly the Great De-
pression of the 1930s became a reference point but, while some insights have 
been gained, the most important question in fact remained unanswered: how 
could it happen again? Was it a human factor, such as greed, miscalculation, 
mismanagement? Is there perhaps a systemic feature built into modern global 
capitalism that is to blame? Or is it both of these?  
In our view tentative answers to these fundamental questions should be 
the starting point for any serious inquiry into the possible influence of the 
Great Recession on the course of the Third Wave of democratisation. This is 
why in the first part of our book we offer our interpretation of what has hap-
pen and to what extent the events of the Great Recession coincide with or dif-
fer from those of the Great Depression.  
 

Collapse.  
The story of the international financial crisis, its 
causes and policy consequences 
Stan du Plessis 
Introduction 
The logic of the industrial revolution is specialisation with cooperation. In-
creased specialisation raises productivity, but requires a high degree of coop-
eration from the level of local firms and the local economy to national and in-
ternational levels. Adam Smith, the 18th-century moral philosopher and pio-
neer of political economy, realised at the outset that specialisation is held 
back by the scale and cost of cooperation, or in his words, by the “extent of 
the market” (Smith, 1776[1981], Book 1, Chapter 3). As the industrial revo-
lution gathered momentum over the following centuries, entrepreneurs dis-
covered new ways to specialise in an environment in which international 
trade was pushing the market outwards, while financiers were creating ever 
more efficient ways for savers and investors to cooperate profitably interna-
tionally.  
By the first decade of this century this cooperation reached the highest 
level and was accompanied by the fastest rise in prosperity ever known to 
humankind. But this would not last. During 2008 the financial side of this 
process collapsed with alarming speed as markets failed on a grand scale. 
The force of the collapse was such that not only the financial markets but also 
international trade and the production of industrial goods and services suf-
fered severe contractions, leading to what is now known as the Great Reces-
sion. Policy makers found themselves under immense pressure to act deci-
sively. Despite some blunders, many successful policies have been imple-
mented, but even those contributed to renewed pressure on international eco-
nomic and political cooperation. By October 2010 this tension erupted in 
what has been called the ‘currency wars’  
This chapter is the story of success and failure in the financial markets, the 
markets for goods and services, and in politics. It is a difficult story to tell be-
cause the crisis had many causes. The US Bipartisan Commission created in 
2009 to study the crisis identified 22 causes, while the US Congressional Re-
search Service found four more (Roberts, 2010). But probably the most concise 
summary of events was offered by the CEO of the ill-fated Bear Sterns who 
said: “We all [messed] up”. He meant government, rating agencies, Wall Street, 
commercial banks, regulators, in short, everybody (Roberts, 2010: 5). 
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To untangle the knot of causes in one short chapter means one can point 
out only the most important markers on the road to the crisis. This possibly 
controversial selection will focus on three main factors:  
 First, the incentives that contributed to a credit-fuelled bubble, especially 
in property markets;  
 Second, because the housing bubble alone cannot explain the subsequent 
events, the gearing in the financial sector which affected asset markets 
unrelated to sub-prime mortgages will be examined;  
 Finally, an answer will be sought to the question of how highly geared 
banks first became fragile and then failed with such dire consequences 
for the economy that massive policy intervention became essential.  
When incentives go astray 
The sub-prime market 
The story of the international financial crisis of 2008/09 starts with the issue 
of credit. The two principal actors involved in credit transactions are the 
lenders, who provide finance on profitable terms but subject to various risks, 
and the borrowers, who acquire finance at the cost of interest. To understand 
how the credit-fuelled housing bubble emerged, giving rise to the crisis, it is 
necessary to mention the incentives and opportunities available both to the 
financial institutions that provide credit and to the borrowers who obtain 
mortgages.  
Since the Great Depression mortgages on residential property in the 
United States have been supported by a set of state-owned institutions known 
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.1 These institutions do not originate mort-
gages, but buy them from financial institutions who deal directly with poten-
tial home owners, such as local savings and loans corporations and local 
banks. The mortgages Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acquire in this way are 
then packaged and sold as portfolios of property investment.2 This has been a 
useful service in a country where, for historical reasons, there is no single 
bank with a national branch network and where geographically uneven 
growth places severe limits on the ability of financial institutions to allocate 
savings efficiently to investments.  
Generally speaking, there are two types of mortgages. The one is the 
more traditional originate-and-hold model; the other is the originate-and-
distribute model. In the originate-and-hold model a bank that grants the 
                                                                          
1  Fannie Mae is short for the ‘Federal National Mortgage Association’ and Freddie Mac is 
short for the ‘Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation’.  
2  Such a portfolio is called a Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) and is an example of a broa-
der class of Asset Backed Securities (ABS). 
Collapse 27 
mortgage retains it as an asset on its balance sheet and is thus strongly moti-
vated to control the credit quality of the mortgages. Paying close attention to 
the size of the mortgage, the income and credit record of the applicant and 
the value of the property is the traditional way to control the credit risk asso-
ciated with the originate-and-hold model. 
In the originate-and-distribute model the incentives are different, because 
the object here is to persuade others that the assets are of suitably high qual-
ity. As is often the case in the financial sector, the prospective home owner 
and the financial institution have different information, a discrepancy that 
makes co-operation between lenders and borrowers difficult. Mortgage origi-
nators have to convince potential investors of the credit quality of the mort-
gages they are selling, a problem alleviated somewhat since the 1970s, when 
mortgage institutions started to use credit-rating agencies to close the infor-
mation gap (White, 2010).  
In the USA government-backed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac offered a 
special version of the credit-rating solution. They were willing to buy mort-
gages from mortgage originators and would then resell portfolios to other in-
vestors with the assurance that these investors would face no credit risk: both 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would buy back any mortgages should these 
default in the future. This process of securitisation – that is, creating Mort-
gage-Backed Securities (MBS) – transformed risky mortgages into risk-free 
portfolios and played the double role of providing a subsidy to home owner-
ship in the USA as well as serving an important political goal3 (Roberts, 
2010). But it left Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exposed to credit risk, a risk 
they controlled by using a set of strict guidelines for the mortgages they 
would be willing to securitise. Mortgages that satisfied these guidelines were 
known as standard conforming loans.  
Needless to say, insisting on ‘standard conforming loans’ restricted the 
class of potential home owners, a restriction politically unpopular because of its 
social cost. To sidestep this problem a series of reforms was instituted making 
possible a class of ‘sub-prime’ mortgages that did not adhere to these strict cri-
teria either by size, credit record, income or wealth of the applicant. The first 
step was to allow market-related and adjustable interest rates on mortgages.4 
With greater flexibility to reflect the increased credit risk of customers whose 
credit scores were below the standard requirements, mortgage originators were 
now able to deal in what became known as the sub-prime market.  
The second step was the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that pushed sub-prime 
to the fore by disallowing tax deductions for consumer credit, but retaining it 
                                                                          
3 Private sector banks can also buy mortgages from originators to form MBS for later resale 
to investors and did so on a large scale.  
4  This was achieved by the combined effect of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) in 1980 and Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity 
Act (AMTPA) two years later. 
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for mortgage debt on a primary and one additional home. Mortgage finance 
in general, including the sub-prime component, expanded substantially in the 
wake of this decision (Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006). Other 
factors, such as the long economic upswing of the 1990s and the stable mac-
roeconomic environment since the mid-1980s as well as political and social 
pressures, contributed to a dramatic expansion of mortgage lending in the 
USA over the last twenty years. In 1995 sub-prime mortgage originations 
amounted to $65 billion in a market of $639.4 billion mortgages. By 2003 
these numbers grew to $332 billion and $3.76 trillion respectively (Chomsis-
engphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006, Table 3). Easy credit financed a dra-
matic expansion in residential property, driving up prices on existing homes 
and fuelling new developments. During the height of the 2004 property boom 
in Las Vegas, for example, a new house went up on average every twenty 
minutes (Kunzig, 2011). Too much of this was financed with sub-prime 
mortgages, the cumulative total of which exceeded a trillion dollars by 2007, 
the year in which the sub-prime boom turned to bust (Lockhart, 2008).  
The rapid growth in the sub-prime market could only occur once the high 
costs associated with lending to this market had been overcome. Sub-prime 
mortgages are more expensive for both the lender and the mortgage origina-
tor, since the information asymmetry is more serious in this market segment 
and the likelihood of default is much greater. The application and appraisal 
fees are higher, as are interest rates and default insurance. Despite the inher-
ently high costs three factors combined to make sub-prime mortgages rela-
tively attractive over this period: monetary policy, financial regulation and 
politics. 
Monetary policy and the ‘great deviation’ 
What role, if any, did monetary policy play in creating the environment for 
the crisis and allowing it to unfold? Starting with the housing market, there 
seemed to have been acts of omission and commission especially by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board (Fed) and other central banks that either encouraged the 
housing boom or allowed it to run unchecked. Starting with acts of omission, 
there is little evidence that monetary authorities used policy instruments di-
rectly to contain the boom in residential property. In this the policy makers 
had implemented the modern consensus of responding to asset prices only to 
the extent that they affect general inflation or risk overheating the economy, 
leaving scope for strong policy action (or mopping-up) should an asset boom 
turn to bust (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999). But the severity of the episode has 
encouraged revision of this ‘mop-up-afterwards’ approach to asset bubbles 
and a finer distinction is now being drawn between types of asset price bub-
bles. The old consensus is still applicable for bubbles on the stock market, 
where bank credit plays a small part, but not for ‘credit bubbles’, where the 
provision of cheap credit by banks plays a central role (Mishkin, 2008).  
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Central banks are financial regulators and are therefore far better in-
formed about lending by banks, and potentially also about the prudence of 
that lending, than about fundamental support for stock market prices. And 
central banks have a range of regulatory powers that can be used to rein in 
credit lending that is fuelling an asset bubble. In other words, they have in-
struments at their disposal that can influence the behaviour of banks. But to 
act against credit bubbles requires an ex ante reading and there is not much 
evidence that either the Fed, or other major central banks, were able to do 
that with respect to the recent crisis. In fact, the former Fed Deputy Gover-
nor, Alan Blinder, when assessing the risks to various dimensions of US 
monetary policy in August 2005 while the credit bubble was well under way, 
stated there were moderate risks to inflation, employment and aggregate de-
mand and only a high risk of a supply-side shock. Crucially, he identified the 
level of risk for both the banking sector and credit risk to be low, stable and 
covered by strong risk management (Blinder, 2005: Table 1).  
The Fed did not use policy measures to prevent either the housing boom 
or the associated development in the derivative markets from accelerating, 
despite the Bernanke-Gertler consensus that requires monetary authorities to 
care about asset prices to the extent they affect the outlook for price stability 
and the business cycle. In fact, between 2002 and 2006 the policy interest 
rate in the United State deviated further from the benchmark ‘Taylor rule’ 
than at any point since the 1970s. The ‘Taylor rule’ is fundamentally a nor-
mative instrument used to calculate the appropriate level of the policy interest 
rate. It also describes the actual Federal Reserve Board policy since 1980 
with a high degree of accuracy, and in a modified version it is comparably 
accurate for other developed countries (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1997). At 
the same time, deviations from the rule can be interpreted as a measure of the 
discretion exercised by the Fed. In this sense the path that US monetary pol-
icy took between 2002 and 2006 can be interpreted as a substantial discre-
tionary departure from normal practice; Taylor has called it the ‘great devia-
tion’ and his argument is that the Federal Reserve board fuelled the housing 
boom, and the associated financial market gearing, by keeping interest rates 
too low for too long.  
There is empirical evidence (Leamer, 2007; Taylor, 2007; Ahrend, Cour-
nède and Price, 2008) to support the thesis that monetary policy decisions, 
whether reasonable or not, contributed to the credit-financed housing bubble 
in the US and elsewhere. But low interest rates had an additional unfortunate 
effect on the credit bubble that ultimately led to the collapse of key banks and 
financial institutions and the near collapse of many more internationally. In 
addition to encouraging lending, low interest rates also tend to change the in-
centives for banks as they tempt them into relatively more risky behaviour in 
the form of higher gearing on their balance sheets, which means expanding a 
bank’s balance sheets without a corresponding expansion of its capital base.  
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Theoretically there are two ways in which low interest rates could pro-
mote higher gearing at banks (Borio and Zhu, 2008; Adrian and Shin, 2009). 
First, the low nominal returns on cash might encourage financial firms to 
pursue higher-yielding but more risky investments, especially if they are con-
tracted to deliver a given nominal return. Second, the effect of low interest 
rates on asset prices and cash flows might allow financial firms to carry a 
greater proportion of unsafe investments, while their balance sheets will ap-
pear sound. Leonardo Gambacorta (2009) recently added empirical plausibil-
ity to these theoretical results by investigating the hypotheses for the current 
crisis with a database of 600 listed banks in the USA and Europe.  
Financial regulation and moral hazard 
The centrality of prices in market co-operation means that low interest rates 
typically play a large role in explaining asset bubbles, but low interest rates 
are not the only factor. Institutions, or ‘rules of the game’, as they are also 
called in economics (for example, North 1990) make it harder or easier to 
specialise and co-operate. These institutions affect a vast range of decisions 
and played a critical role in the financial decisions that led to the international 
financial crisis. This refers in particular to the rules of financial regulation.  
Traditionally there are three justifications for formal financial sector reg-
ulation (Goodhart, 2010). The first is to prevent the abuse of potential mono-
poly power by very large institutions; the second is to protect consumers 
from the asymmetrical distribution of information in many financial transac-
tions. But neither of these two roles had much impact in the run-up to the fi-
nancial crisis. Instead, it was the third role, the containment of spill-over ef-
fects from one institution to others that played a key role. These spill-over ef-
fects (or externalities) are caused by the interconnected nature of the modern 
financial system, where the value of the assets of one firm is closely linked to 
the assets of other financial firms. Stress on a large firm that results in 
downward pressure on asset prices can quickly spill over to other firms in 
this kind of network. Economists call this an externality, because individual 
banks do not typically factor in the risk they pose to the rest of the financial 
system in which they operate.  
The one way to contain potential spill-over effects is via changes to for-
mal institutions; the other ways include financial innovation and amendments 
to regulatory practice. While some important changes to financial regulation 
had indeed been introduced during the last forty years, these often followed 
in the wake of financial innovation and regulatory practice. Perhaps the most 
famous single decision that had a bearing on the crisis was the enactment of 
the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act in the USA at the end of the 1990s, which for-
mally removed the separation between commercial banks funded by insured 
deposits, and investment banks funded on the capital markets. The separation 
had been upheld since the 1930s by the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding 
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Company Acts. Following the Act, larger financial groups emerged providing 
a wider array of financial services in an increasingly complex corporate struc-
ture.  
The boundaries between commercial and investment banks had long 
since become blurred because financial innovations, such as money market 
mutual funds, allowed investment banks to compete with the formerly most 
profitable part of commercial banking (Kling, 2010), i.e. funding their in-
vestment activities by taking deposits on which they paid low interest rates. 
This, in turn, forced commercial banks to change their own behaviour. They 
became less dependent on deposits and started funding their investments on 
the capital markets, especially on the inter-bank and repo markets; since the 
1970s, to expand their balance sheets, commercial banks supplemented their 
intake of deposits by using wholesale money markets such as the eurodollar 
market (Goodhart, 2010). With commercial banks adopting the balance sheet 
operations of investment banks, while the latter offered products that com-
peted directly with commercial banks, the line between these two sectors had 
become blurred giving rise to a ‘shadow banking system’.  
The ‘shadow banking system’ is a term now used to describe a part of the 
non-commercial bank financial sector that competes with commercial banks 
to offer financial services, such as credit, to business enterprises. In the USA 
the shadow banking system became so large that by 2007 its lending ex-
ceeded that of the traditional banking system (Geithner, 2008). Although the 
shadow banking system operates outside the conventional system of bank 
regulation, it is deeply interconnected with the traditional banking system. 
Indeed, it is through the shadow banking system that the conventional bank-
ing system is now largely funded (Gorton, 2010; Goodhart, 2010).  
Loans extended by banks to their customers are typically long-term and 
are profitable assets for banks. But to conduct this business, banks need to fi-
nance the assets. Traditionally commercial banks obtained their funding by 
accepting retail deposits, which are potentially short-term liabilities for 
banks. The mismatch between the highly liquid but potentially short-term 
character of the liabilities and the longer-term but less liquid character of the 
assets exposed traditional banks to the risk of a bank run. This occurs when a 
large proportion of a bank’s depositors turn up to demand their deposits, 
which even a fundamentally solvent bank would be unable to satisfy because 
of the illiquidity of its assets. 
Modern banks by contrast extend credit and fund lending by combining 
loans in securitised portfolios (ABS) in which the portfolios of assets have 
been rearranged using structured finance.5 This is a set of techniques used to 
                                                                          
5  An example of structured finance that played an important role during the crisis are so-cal-
led Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), which are portfolios constructed by arranging 
the underlying portfolio into different ‘tranches’, each with a different priority claim on the 
income stream of the underlying assets. In this way the senior tranche of a CDO is much 
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combine and arrange portfolios of assets in such a way as to create portfolios 
of asset backed securities that have different risk profiles from the original 
assets. Not all ABSs were sold, though: during the crisis it emerged that 
banks held substantial portfolios of ABSs, which harmed their balance sheets 
once the underlying asset prices declined. There were two reasons for holding 
the risky ABSs on a bank’s balance sheet:  
 First, to satisfy the demand for another product that has become very im-
portant in the modern banking system, i.e. the wish to make risk-free 
highly-liquid deposits by institutional investors and other non-financial 
firms in the repo market (Gorton, 2010);  
 Second, the Basel II accord incentivised banks to use the highly rated 
senior tranches of ABS to fulfil their capital adequacy requirements.  
The shadow banking system emerged when the traditional funding mecha-
nism of banks via deposits became unprofitable. Since then securitisation of 
assets came to play a central role in the modern funding of banks, while secu-
ritised asset portfolios became critical collateral in the repo market. In this 
way the balance sheets of banks, non-bank financial firms and other large 
non-financial firms became closely intertwined. Large insurance companies 
also formed part of the same system; American International Group (AIG) in 
the USA, for example, offered insurance called Credit Default Swaps (CDS) 
on the securitised portfolios that allowed the portfolios to obtain attractive 
credit ratings.  
The modern banking system has become very dependent on extensive 
cooperation on globally interlinked financial markets. Banks need to finance 
their balance sheets on a daily basis (Blanchard, 2009), and a healthy capital 
ratio is the traditional method used by banks to show that they are credit-
worthy counterparties in such agreements.  
The Basel I and II accords on prudential bank regulation aimed to help 
banks ensure adequate capital ratios, though they did so in a fundamentally 
flawed manner. For example, the Basel I accord differentiated between assets 
on a risk-adjusted basis, but the design was faulty and ended up requiring 
banks to hold higher capital requirements for good loans. The regulation 
merely enticed banks to either sell the better loans or move them to their 
shadow banking counterparts. “Basel I”, as Goodhart (2010: 15) observed, 
“was threatening to turn ‘good’ banks into ‘bad’ banks”.  
                                                                                                                             
less risky than the underlying assets, though the risk attached to the senior tranche is greatly 
affected by the degree to which the risks of the underlying assets are correlated. The more 
risky junior tranches of different CDOs can in turn be combined in a new portfolio which 
can be re-arranged to yield new senior tranches with apparently low risk. When CDOs are 
combined in this way to create a second generation of CDOs (CDO2), their value is even 
more sensitive to the underlying assumptions than a CDO. Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2009) 
provide an accessible introduction to the role of structured finance in the financial crisis.  
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Basel II was meant to correct this unhappy feature and did so by giving 
much greater importance to the internal risk assessment of banks. It at-
tempted to extend regulation to assets and liabilities not on the bank’s own 
balance sheet. But Basel II’s capital requirements would become more ac-
commodating when asset prices were rising, thus fuelling a buoyant asset 
market. The opposite would happen when asset prices declined, at which 
point capital requirements would tighten, putting further downward pressure 
on an already fragile market (Goodhart, 2010). Put another way, under Basel 
II less capital was required when risks appeared small and more capital was 
needed when risks appeared larger. The unintended consequence of the regu-
lation was that banks were able to expand their balance sheets relative to their 
capital base in good times and still pass regulatory scrutiny, while they would 
be required to raise more capital precisely when they were under stress and 
least able to do so.  
For these reasons both banks and non-bank financial institutions became 
inclined to hold insufficient capital: commercial banks held too little to cover 
potential losses from bad loans; investment banks held too little to cover poten-
tial losses on securitised and other risky financial products; Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac held too little to cover the guarantees they had issued on MBS; 
and large insurance companies, such as AIG, held too little to cover guarantees 
they had issued to banks under Credit Default Swaps (Kling, 2009).  
In addition to the inadvertent incentives for risk taking created by finan-
cial regulation, governments introduced a moral hazard that strengthened this 
tendency. Governments and central banks have supported distressed financial 
institutions since the 19th century to avoid the spill-over effects of individual 
failures from disrupting the rest of the financial sector. It was the famous 
second editor of The Economist magazine, Walter Bagehot, who formulated 
the principle that a central bank should extend liquidity to distressed but fun-
damentally solvent financial firms that were experiencing difficulties with 
their short-term obligations.  
The underlying principle claiming that an appropriate and limited inter-
vention by a central bank could prevent larger social losses by forestalling the 
demise of otherwise solvent financial institutions has since been extended to 
protect the financial sector from losses that would undermine the firms in that 
sector collectively. In the extended form the Bagehot principle requires cen-
tral banks to support any financial firm regarded as systemically important, 
that is, a firm so large or important that its failure might cause the collapse of 
other solvent financial firms. The wave of bank defaults during the Great De-
pression, which saw the demise of thousands of banks in the US, demon-
strated the apparent worth of this principle. Central banks resolved not to 
make the same mistake again.  
In 1984 a large American bank, Continental Illinois, found itself in fi-
nancial distress. The Fed reasoned that this was a case fitting Bagehot’s ex-
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panded principle, since Continental Illinois was judged to be systemically 
important; banks such as Continental Illinois had become ‘too big to fail’, the 
title of a now famous book by Stern and Felman (2004). The subsequent 
bailout returned the full value of loans extended to Continental Illinois. To 
put it differently, the US government lowered dramatically the credit risk as-
sociated with loans to large banks such as Continental Illinois. This practice 
guided subsequent bailouts in the USA, with creditors hardly ever out of 
pocket, even when the financial firms they had lent to were insolvent: for ex-
ample, 99.7% of all deposits in the 1100 commercial banks that failed in the 
US during the 1980s were bailed out by government (Roberts, 2010: 10).  
Not everyone was bailed out though: shareholders often suffered substan-
tial losses when the share price of a distressed financial firm crashed. But 
these shareholders were still working in an institutional setting which had 
both the profit and loss aspects necessary for effective market allocation. 
Creditors in the financial sector were operating under a different set of rules, 
though. There profit and loss had been replaced by a system of profits and 
bailout, undermining the need to manage risk through prudent screening and 
expensive monitoring on the part of creditors or the retention of substantial 
capital in banks to guard against unexpected losses.  
Not just large banks, but countries too were perceived to be ‘too big to 
fail’. During the 1990s Mexico was the most notable case of a US govern-
ment bailout, which protected lenders to the Wall Street creditors of the Mex-
ican government (Roberts, 2010). This bailout and the IMF bailouts of East 
Asian governments in 1997 created the impression that creditors to large 
emerging market economies with substantial international debt would enjoy 
the same protection from credit risk as did the creditors of large banks in the 
developed world. Many investors in Russian debt acted on this belief in 1998 
by holding the debt of a state at the point of fiscal collapse. 
The decision not to bail out the Russian government in August of 1998 
sent shockwaves through the international system and worked to encourage 
more bailouts. At this point the bailout principle was expanded to cover 
hedge funds, a highly risky financial institution. A prominent hedge fund, 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), suffered massive losses during the 
crisis and the Fed was concerned about other hedge funds and investment 
banks that had large investments with LTCM. An insolvent LTCM would 
cause substantial losses for these creditors and in the heat of the crisis the Fed 
organised a private sector bailout of LTCM (Roberts, 2010). Once more the 
creditors who had enjoyed considerable up side from their investments in 
LTCM were protected from a credit risk associated with their investments. 
While the bailouts mentioned above created a moral hazard that made 
banks less prudent and creditors less concerned with the imprudence of the 
banks they were lending to, there were also other incentives working in the 
same direction. One of these, the culture of high salaries and bonuses on Wall 
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Street, has been widely discussed. The other, a change in the nature of mod-
ern banks’ finance via a shadow banking system based on the securitised as-
sets and repurchase agreements, has received much less attention.  
The salaries and especially large bonuses tied to short-run performance 
led to a public outcry in the wake of the bailouts. While it is true that the ex-
ecutives lost capital as the share prices of their firms and others declined dur-
ing the crisis, they did not, by any stretch of the imagination, face symmetri-
cal risks. The structure of their salaries and bonuses with rewards for short-
term profits and share options was such that they gained enormously from 
good results, while their downside risk was considerably smaller (Roberts, 
2010). Given this asymmetry, it is not really surprising the executives were 
keen to expand the more risky business which brought them handsome re-
turns while the boom lasted.  
Public incentives and the role of politics 
Politicians played a role in the run-up to the crisis especially through their 
support for bailouts. But their involvement in the housing market bears closer 
scrutiny. The account here focuses on the United States and concerns the 
specific ways in which home ownership was encouraged, creating incentives 
that ultimately fuelled the property bubble. Similar incentives were created 
elsewhere, but the particular policies differed from those in the US.  
After many decades of encouraging home ownership through tax breaks 
on mortgage interest and the sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
mortgage associations, the US government became much more aggressive in 
its promotion of home ownership during the 1990s. To give practical effect to 
the desire for expanded home ownership in the USA, politicians enacted new 
regulations for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 1993. The regulation not only 
weakened the prudential safeguards that prevented these companies from do-
ing business at the risky end of the mortgage market, but also required them 
to raise the proportion of loans they supported to families with incomes be-
low the medium for their areas to 40% by 1996 (from 30% for Freddie and 
34% for Fannie in 1993). This requirement was pushed up to 42% in 1999 
and 55% in 2007, as both firms expanded their business in these market seg-
ments in step with the rising targets (Roberts, 2010: 25).  
At the same time Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac expanded their business 
in mortgages with small down payments of less than 5% and eventually with 
no down payment at all. In the mid-1990s such mortgages accounted for a 
small fraction (4% or less) of the loans they purchased, but by 2007 almost a 
quarter of their loans had down payments of 5% or less6 (Roberts, 2010: Fi-
gure 8). In this way political pressure pushed mortgage associations to sup-
                                                                          
6  Fannie and Freddie bought a quarter of the 272 billion dollars worth of MBS sold in the 
first half of 2006 (Roberts, 2010: 23. 
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port a housing bubble that was becoming dangerously overheated and in a 
market segment where risks were poorly assessed. This is not to suggest that 
the housing bubble in the US and elsewhere was exclusively or even largely 
due to incentives of the kind created by politicians. It was not. The private fi-
nancial sector financed the bulk of the credit-fuelled property bubble and it is 
the private financial sector that increased its gearing dramatically over the 
last 20 years, thereby amplifying the potential consequences of mistakes in 
their investment strategies. But the political incentives meant that public offi-
cials had little interest in scrutinising an industry that had become not just 
wonderfully profitable but also politically expedient.  
Financial collapse 
The housing bubble fizzled out during the course of 2007 as balance sheets in 
the household and financial sectors became ever more stretched. An impor-
tant factor in this loss of momentum for the market was the reversal of the 
‘great deviation’ in US monetary policy, with the policy interest rate rising 
from a level of 1% in 2004 to 5.35% in 2006. Other central banks followed 
suit, leading to tighter monetary conditions internationally.  
The highly geared property market, where the worst-quality loans were 
predicated on the assumption of an uninterrupted rise in property prices, was 
vulnerable even to stagnation, let alone price declines. When house prices 
started to decline by early 2007, these loans were soon and predictably under 
water, though few at the time anticipated the force of the process that started 
to gather pace.  
Large banks, including investment banks and other financial institutions, 
started to report sub-prime mortgage-related losses during the first quarter of 
2007. At this time the US-based New Century Financial, a mortgage lending 
specialist of the sub-prime market, filed for bankruptcy. More disturbingly, 
the prominent investment bank Bear Sterns announced in June 2007 that two 
of its large hedge funds had suffered massive sub-prime-related losses; it be-
came clear that the losses would not be confined to one or even a few banks. 
Losses started to appear also in large European banks, such as BNP Paribas 
and the German Sachsen Landesbank in August 2007, and in the UK where 
in September of that year Northern Rock suffered the most serious traditional 
run on a British bank since the 19th century. Worse was to come.  
By late 2007 insurance companies providing bond insurance for Collat-
eral Debt Obligations (CDOs) were also suffering massive losses. The trou-
bled Bear Stearns finally succumbed in March 2008, though it was supported 
by the Fed until bought by the rival investment bank JP Morgan. This did not 
restore stability as the housing market continued to decline, causing the fail-
ure of another mortgage lender, IndyMac, in the USA by June 2007 in what 
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was the second largest bank failure in US history. While the US government 
had to support Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to prevent their collapse, the UK 
government nationalised another bank, Bradford and Bingly, to prevent its 
collapse.  
The financial market turmoil deteriorated further during September 2008: 
Lehman Brothers, a famous Wall Street investment bank, collapsed and, 
critically, was not bailed-out by the authorities.7 Instead it was purchased by 
its rival Merrill Lynch, which was also heading for collapse and would be 
bought by Bank of America by the end of the year. The crisis was no less 
acute in Europe. While Northern Rock had suffered from a traditional run on 
the bank a year earlier, large continental investment banks faced a modern 
bank run in the third quarter of 2008 (Blanchard, 2009). At the same time the 
Belgian government bailed out the insurance and banking giant Fortis, and 
large Icelandic banks were nearing collapse.  
As already mentioned, modern banks are not mainly financed by retail 
deposits and hence are not greatly exposed to the risk of a traditional bank 
run. Instead they are financed on the interbank and repo markets on a daily 
basis. These highly efficient markets allow banks to co-operate to an un-
precedented degree, as long as both parties to each transaction feel secure in 
the value of the assets traded. This trust collapsed in the third quarter of 2008, 
with banks unable to use their securities as collateral in the interbank market, 
because other banks could no longer judge their value. Banks were now 
forced to sell other assets, such as shares, corporate bonds and so on, in an at-
tempt to restore liquidity to their balance sheets and to meet the capital re-
quirements of Basel II.  
The result was a fire sale in many asset markets unrelated to the housing 
market. Globally, stock market wealth was halved during the first year of the 
crisis, a rate of decline steeper than at the onset of the Great Depression (Al-
munia, Bénétrix, Eichengree, O’Rourke and Rua, 2009). As asset markets 
declined the financial sector and corporate balance sheets deteriorated even 
further and companies were pushed towards bankruptcy.  
By the second half of 2008 much of the developed world had declined 
into recession and with a downward trajectory that suggested disquieting 
comparisons with the Great Depression of the 1930s. The economic historian 
                                                                          
7  From a risk perspective Lehman Brothers closely resembled Bear Sterns in early 2008: its 
highly leveraged balance sheet had a similar composition to that of Bear Sterns, though 
Lehman’s was many times the larger of the two. The failure of Bear Sterns in March 2008 
therefore raised the specter of similar trouble at Lehman’s and a declining Lehman’s share 
price reflected these concerns (Roberts, 2010). But the subsequent bailout of Bear Sterns 
put these fears to bed and five months later it was discovered that Lehman’s had done little 
to strengthen its precarious balance sheet. Only this time the expected bailout did not come. 
Credit risk, which commanded little attention after 20 years of bailouts, returned dramati-
cally, for the creditors (mainly other banks) and for insurance companies involved in secu-
ritising the debt contracts. 
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Barry Eichengreen and his co-authors showed these parallels empirically, 
both for the USA and for the world economy (Almunia, Bénétrix, Eichen-
gree, O’Rourke and Rua, 2009). For the sake of comparison they identified 
the peak of economic activity that preceded the Great Depression and the 
Great Recession as June 1929 and April 2008 respectively.  
While US industrial production in the recent crisis did not decline as fast 
as it did in 1929, at the global level the international economy was more frag-
ile and the decline in industrial output was as steep during the first year of the 
Great Recession as during the comparable period of the Great Depression. As 
production declined, unemployment rose to levels not seen in the developed 
world in many decades.  
Despite strong policy intervention financial conditions became much 
more restrictive in the private sectors of developed economies from this point 
onwards. While policy interest rate declined, the interest rates demanded on 
corporate debt were pushed higher, while other credit requirements such as 
higher down payments and increased credit-rating requirements also pushed 
up the cost of borrowing. The higher cost of credit reflects the kind of friction 
that emerges in financial markets during distress when monitoring costs and 
uncertainty rise sharply (Hall, 2010). More expensive credit and the massive 
shocks to aggregate demand were the main factors lowering output during the 
first months of the crisis.  
The world economy is extensively integrated not just financially but also 
in the flow of goods and services across boundaries. These transactions are 
another barometer of the extensive co-operation upon which modern econo-
mies are based. Each of these transactions requires a financial transaction, 
which is often a credit transaction. The turmoil on international financial 
markets, especially the tighter credit conditions in combination with the col-
lapse of demand for imported goods and services, and the fact that 70% of in-
ternational trade was in manufactured goods8 (compared with 44% in 1929) 
created a precipitous decline in international trade. Indeed, Almunia et al. 
(2009) showed that the contraction of international trade was notably steeper 
during the first year of the Great Contraction than at the start of the Great 
Depression.  
Policy makers to the rescue 
The trauma of the Great Depression lay not just in the rapidity of the eco-
nomic collapse, but in its persistence throughout the 1930s in countries such 
as the USA. During the first months of the Great Recession, though the 
                                                                          
8  Manufacturing production is a volatile component of total production and was particularly 
adversely affected in the Great Depression and the Great Recession (Almunia et al., 2009).  
Collapse 39 
downward trajectory of production in the developed world resembled that of 
the Great Depression, the policy response was dramatically different. Al-
though policy makers did not stand idly by during the early years of the Great 
Depression, there was far greater policy activism at the macroeconomic level 
in response to the Great Recession. The activism has been most evident in the 
monetary and fiscal policies pursued during the current crisis and the consid-
erable efforts to prevent the fragmentation of the global economy through 
beggar-thy-neighbour policy responses of the 1930s.  
There were undoubtedly many factors that pushed policy makers towards 
greater activism this time around, including the nature of the political system, 
a topic explored elsewhere in this book. But the two major economic factors 
were, first, the lessons learnt from the Great Depression, especially the role 
economists attributed to policy failures of that era and, second, the flexibility 
of the modern international financial system, which allowed policy makers to 
respond more dynamically to the pressures that emerged in their own econo-
mies.  
Since the early 1990s a durable and flexible international financial sys-
tem emerged in which most developed and emerging market economies have 
become integrated with global co-operation in the production of goods, ser-
vices and the investment of capital. By combining largely free capital flows 
with market-determined exchange rates, this system created scope for consid-
erable domestic discretion in monetary policy, which has mainly been exer-
cised in the direction of pursuing low and stable inflation and output stability. 
Explicit inflation targeting is the exemplar of this system, but many coun-
tries, including the USA, followed an implicit inflation targeting system that 
can hardly be distinguished in operational terms from explicit inflation target-
ing (Greenspan, 2004).  
At the start of the Great Depression the international financial system 
was ordered by the gold standard, a system with little scope for the kind of 
monetary activism seen in response to the Great Recession (Almunia et al., 
2009). The post-War Bretton Woods system was an explicit attempt to design 
an international financial order that served both the ends of stability and pol-
icy flexibility. But it was inherently unstable and collapsed barely 13 years 
after the European economies joined it (Rose, 2006; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2004).  
The system that emerged after the collapse of Bretton Woods is un-
planned and is not maintained by any central direction, authority, or a refer-
ence point such as gold convertibility. It is a spontaneous order resulting 
from a rules-based system of international trade and investment with flexible 
currency markets. The system proved durable and flexible (Rose, 2006), 
though the aftermath of the Great Recession has put it under unexpected 
pressure. Yet its flexibility created scope for policy makers to intervene as 
the extent of the crisis became obvious in the course of 2008.  
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In the light of the unnerving parallels with the early months of the Great 
Depression, monetary authorities were unlikely to repeat the inadvertent error 
of their predecessors by tightening monetary policy in the midst of a financial 
crisis; according to the standard interpretation of those unhappy events by 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), the monetary contraction between 1929 and 
1932 in the United States was to a large extent to blame for the depth and 
persistence of the Great Depression.  
The Fed and the Bank of England reduced their policy interest rate ag-
gressively as the crisis became more serious in late 2008. Money supply data 
also testify to the accommodating stance of monetary authorities as the crisis 
deepened, with the narrow stock of money expanding briskly despite the fi-
nancial crisis, because of the introduction by central banks of large quantities 
of liquidity to prevent a repetition of the monetary contraction that exacer-
bated the Great Depression (Almunia et al., 2009: Figures 9 and 10). In con-
ventional terms, then, that is, using a policy interest rate to measure the 
stance of monetary policy, monetary authorities responded quickly and 
sharply to the unfolding crisis. But there is a limit to interest policy, as it is 
not possible to implement a negative nominal interest rate.  
Despite the prominence of interest rate policy, central banks have other 
policy instruments at their disposal. They can alter broader monetary or other 
asset market conditions directly by changing the size, composition and risk 
profile of their balance sheet. These policy actions are collectively called 
‘balance sheet operations’ and have been an important part of the policy re-
sponse to the Great Recession (Borio and Disyatat, 2009). To give an indica-
tion of the size of these balance sheet operations, it will suffice to say that the 
total assets on the Fed’s balance sheet expanded from $880 billion to $2.3 
trillion between July 2007 and December 2010, including $1 trillion of mort-
gage-backed securities bought from the financial sector by the Fed to shore 
up private sector balance sheets. In late 2010 Fed Chairman, Ben S. Ber-
nanke, announced that there would be a further round of balance sheets ques-
tions, which has become known as Quantitative Easing 2 (QE2) and would 
amount to a further $600 billion expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet. In ad-
dition, fiscal authorities responded vigorously to the crisis with highly ac-
commodating discretionary policies, including bailouts for large financial and 
non-financial firms, tax rebates and tax cuts for households. 
Have these policies been a success? It is difficult to say. For a start, the 
question is not whether the policies have been successful in some ultimate 
sense, but whether they have been better than the alternatives. For each coun-
try the appropriate evaluation is a comparison with the outcomes of particular 
forms of monetary and fiscal interventions with counterfactual outcomes un-
der alternative policy regimes. Those counterfactuals, however, can never ob-
served. Two additional problems contribute to the difficulty of evaluating the 
policy initiatives. First, outcomes cannot be associated on a one-to-one basis 
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with policy decisions given the complex and dynamic interactions in the 
economy; and, secondly, ‘other’, that is non-policy, factors impact continu-
ously on the economy with far-reaching effects on the outcomes generated 
under any policy regime.  
Because of such evaluation difficulties, there is still no consensus on what 
role policy played in the eventual recovery from the Great Depression. In an in-
fluential paper Romer (1992) claimed that the reversal of monetary policy from 
contractionary to expansionary in the 1930s did far more to turn the economic 
corner than did fiscal policy. But behind this claim lies the observation that fis-
cal deficits were not very large during the 1930s; the historical record cannot 
tell us what would have happened had the fiscal authorities adopted policies 
during the Great Depression as expansionary as their successors did in 2009.  
There are two reasons for expecting policies of recent years to have been 
more important than during the Great Depression. First, the power of fiscal 
policy rises relative to conventional monetary policy, when the latter nears 
zero bound on nominal interest rates (see, for example, IMF (2009), but also 
Keynes (1936)). Second, there is evidence that the fiscal policies of the 
1930s, modest though they were, still had a positive impact on the recovery 
(Almunia et al., 2009). This time around the fiscal authorities have been 
much more active, and if the transmission mechanism has remained ap-
proximately the same, the impact on output has been powerfully enhanced.  
The evaluation of monetary policy is no less difficult. The rapid interest 
rate response by monetary authorities avoided the inadvertent mistakes of the 
1930s and after some months the various credit markets returned to stability. 
But it is very difficult to determine whether stability returned because of or in 
spite of the extensive balance sheet operations used by central banks. A fur-
ther complication emerged in the course of 2010, with the inadvertent but 
unwelcome impact of expansionary monetary policies, especially in the USA, 
on the exchange rates of developing countries such as Brazil just as these 
economies were starting to recover from the recession.  
Consequences of policy activism 
Policy makers around the world, as well as the IMF, supported the active 
monetary and fiscal policy interventions of 2008 and 2009, and committed 
themselves to maintaining an open and integrated global economy. They 
were going to avoid the beggar-they-neighbour policies that featured so 
prominently and cost the world so dearly in the 1930s. On the whole they 
succeeded. There were only sporadic protectionist responses to the crisis and 
international co-operation was sustained.  
But in the course of 2010 the spill-over effects in developing countries of 
the policies pursued by developed countries cast a shadow over continued in-
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ternational co-operation. The Fed’s move towards a further large round of 
quantitative easing in September and October 2010 pushed the issue to break-
ing point. “We’re in the midst of an international currency war, a general 
weakening of currency,” claimed an alarmed Guido Mantega, the Brazilian 
Finance Minister in September 2010. This war, he continued, “threatens us 
because it takes away our competitiveness”. The problem, according to Min-
ister Mantega, was the influence of US monetary policy on the international 
value of the dollar, which implied appreciating currencies for developing 
countries like Brazil and South Africa. According to Minister Mantega, the 
US monetary policy had, in effect, become another example of the beggar-
they-neighbour policies by which a government tries to gain an economic ad-
vantage by manipulating the international price of goods and services.  
Minister Mantega is not right. The depreciation of the dollar has not been 
the intention of the US monetary authorities, nor it is not inappropriate given 
the imbalances in trade and capital flows internationally. A substantial depre-
ciation of the dollar had long been expected because of the said imbalances 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2005). But Minister Mantega was not wrong to argue 
that beggar-they-neighbour policies have been disrupting the global econ-
omy; it is the Chinese government that has manipulated currency market out-
comes in its favour on an unprecedented scale over the last decade (Wolf, 
2010a).  
The accumulation of approximately $2.5 trillion in foreign currency re-
serves, a third of all such reserves internationally and equal to half the annual 
size of the Chinese economy, is major evidence of currency manipulation. It 
is the combination of reserve accumulation with tight controls on the inflow 
of capital into China that creates the scope for this kind of market distortion. 
By preventing a rise in domestic demand and a real appreciation of the Chi-
nese currency, its government is subsidising Chinese exports internationally. 
Since the Chinese economy is now the largest exporter in the world, this kind 
of distortion matters (Wolf, 2010b).  
While the Chinese government had, in the past, denied that its currency 
was undervalued, it has lately offered a different explanation: a rapid appre-
ciation of the Chinese currency would undermine the profitability of Chinese 
exporters and risk social unrest which would, in the words of Premier Wen 
Jiabao, “be a disaster for the world” (Beattie, Chaffin and Brown, 2010). This 
argument is not very persuasive outside China; it merely suggests that Chi-
nese export firms might be competitive only on account of the undervalued 
currency.  
While international trade has the potential to leave all parties better off, 
that will only happen if the goods and services are produced internationally 
where there is comparative (cost) advantage to do so. The rules-based system 
for international trade, maintained by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
has been designed to ensure open international co-operation that is beneficial 
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for all parties concerned. The asymmetrical manner in which the Chinese 
economy has entered this system over the last decade, exporting capital on an 
unprecedented scale while restricting capital inflows to China and maintain-
ing an undervalued Chinese currency, has put tremendous strain on interna-
tional co-operation.  
The strain became visible with the retreat from co-operation by countries 
such as Brazil, Russia, Thailand and others as they re-imposed various capital 
controls. Consequently the currency war was high on the agenda when the 
G20 heads of state met in South Korea in November 2010. In Seoul the 
American delegation proposed a three-point plan to untangle the currency 
wars by, first, putting numerical limits on current account imbalances with 
policy commitments to keep them effective; second, a stronger role for the 
IMF to monitor behaviour relative to these limits; and, third, sufficient ex-
change rate flexibility and openness to ensure an orderly rebalancing of the 
world economy. These suggestions along with that of World Bank chief 
Robert Zoellick (2010), who recommended a return to a form of a gold stan-
dard, are meant to reduce the tensions in international economic co-operation 
by designing a new and more co-operative international order. But the in-
flexibility of the former gold standard and the instability of the Bretton 
Woods system suggest that these are not promising ideas. Nor did the G20 
heads of state find them attractive in Seoul, preferring the much watered-
down ‘indicative guidelines’ on international balances. At the time of writing 
the pressures created by the policy responses during the Great Recession re-
main a substantial threat to the open rules-based international order.  
Another, and potentially more disruptive, consequence of the policy re-
sponse to the financial crisis has since emerged in the form of fiscal crises in 
Europe (and potentially in the United States and Japan). Concerns about the 
solvency of these governments have disrupted financial markets, caused pol-
icy anxiety and later policy action, followed by public protest (in Greece, but 
also the United Kingdom), where the fiscal adjustments asked too much from 
the public.  
Greece is the most afflicted of the countries currently in distress because 
the roots of its fiscal demise lie much deeper than the financial crisis. Years of 
fiscal mismanagement, an inefficient tax structure and revenue service as well 
as a bloated public sector, left the government, by mid-2011, unable to finance 
current expenditure and service existing debt, while investors were charging 
ever higher interest rates to buy new debt. In contrast, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain (as well as the UK and USA) are facing the fiscal consequences of the fi-
nancial crisis and the policy responses described above. It is not just that activ-
ist fiscal measures added to government debt; implicit fiscal guarantees emerge 
during a crisis and the loss of government revenue due to the economic con-
traction contributed even more to the fiscal strain. International experience 
since 1800 shows an average rise of 85% in public debt during or immediately 
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following a systemic financial crisis (Reinhardt and Rogoff, 2010) and the cur-
rent experience seems consistent with the historical average.  
These fiscal pressures raise fundamental challenges in democratic socie-
ties. We have already seen the public resistance to fiscal consolidation in 
Greece (and even the UK), and the democracies of Europe are finding it pro-
foundly difficult to assist Greece to the extent now evidently required. In the 
United States, too, politicians have to date proved unable to find a sustainable 
outcome to the deteriorating fiscal position. While the Americans have time 
on their side, the Europeans do not. At the time of writing the continued exis-
tence of the euro zone with its present membership is in serious doubt. The 
history of a century does not suggest that fiscal consolidation is a major 
strength of democracy, but it is precisely what many established democracies 
will face in the decades to come.  
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The impact of the Great Depression on 
democracy 
Dirk Berg-Schlosser 
Should the Western world experience a major crisis, it is likely that national politics will vary 
along lines that stem from the past, much as they did during the 1930s. Political scientists of the 
future, who seek to explain events in the last quarter of the century, will undoubtedly find impor-
tant explanatory variables in earlier variations in the behaviour of the major political actors.  
S. M. Lipset 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the greatest global financial and economic crisis since the 
1930s political actors today are still haunted by the spectre of events that fol-
lowed the 1929 crash, which led to civil wars, a breakdown of democratic 
systems and the rule of law, and the opening of the door to World War II and 
the Holocaust. This chapter examines the conditions and factors that shaped 
events and outcomes then with a view to learning from those experiences to-
day. The analysis draws largely on the results of an international and inter-
disciplinary research project1 which examined closely a number of European 
countries during the inter-war years in Europe. Among them were eight dem-
ocratic survivor cases, which included Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, as well as seven major 
cases of democratic breakdown, such as occurred in Austria, Estonia, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Spain. Although the starting hypothe-
sis contained in the statement above by S.M. Lipset refers to the behaviour of 
major political actors, of interest here are also the wider historical, social, po-
litical and cultural background conditions in each of the countries mentioned.  
The inter-war experience 
The countries studied here shared many socio-economic and political-cultural 
characteristics during the period clearly demarcated by the two World Wars, 
which significantly altered the internal and external political landscape and 
set this period apart from earlier and later developments. All of the countries 
could be described as parliamentary democracies, although some were demo-
cratic more in form than in substance. All were affected by a common exter-
                                                                          
1  The project involved more than 20 historians, economists, sociologists and political scien-
tists from almost as many countries and has been fully documented in two comprehensive 
volumes (Berg-Schlosser/Mitchell 2000, 2002). 
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nal factor, the world economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Some 
survived as democracies, others turned to more authoritarian forms of rule, in 
particular, to fascism. 
Only five (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) were already well-established democracies before the First World 
War. Out of the ashes of the former Habsburg and Tsarist empires seven new 
countries emerged and in six others new democratic systems had been in-
stalled immediately after (as in Germany) or shortly before the war (as, for 
example, in Italy and Spain). The Great War had left its mark on daily eco-
nomic and political life in large parts of Europe, leading to a critical period of 
readjustment. But in spite of the considerable economic and political turmoil 
of the immediate post-war years, parliamentary democracy survived for a 
time in many of the countries, even if it was rather fragile in some cases. The 
exceptions were the ‘legal’ fascist takeover by Mussolini in Italy in 1923 and 
the more conventional military coups d’état by Primo de Rivera in Spain in 
1923, by Josef Pilsudski in Poland in 1926 and by Gomes da Costa in Por-
tugal in 1926. 
Following the immediate turbulence of the post-war period and the first 
democratic breakdowns in Italy, Poland and Portugal, things settled down 
somewhat in the majority of cases. In Germany hyperinflation had been 
brought to an end by the successful currency reform of November 1923. In 
April 1924, thanks to the Dawes Plan, more favourable terms were agreed upon 
for the German reparation payments imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and to 
pay French war debts. At the same time the treaty of Locarno in 1925 initiated 
a period of détente in French-German relations. In 1926 the League of Nations, 
of which Germany became a member, facilitated the ratification of the newly-
drawn post-war boundaries and the establishment of a collective international 
security system (Bracher 1953). Economically things also improved with an in-
crease in industrial production and per capita income, and inflation and unem-
ployment held at manageable levels. One ominous sign, however, was the neg-
ative balance of trade for most countries considered here, which to some extent 
was compensated for by the influx of American capital, mostly in the form of 
loans. The level of external debt also remained extremely high in a number of 
cases, for example, in France and Portugal. 
The political situation remained relatively calm, but the newly estab-
lished and surviving democracies could not yet be considered as having be-
come consolidated, especially in the case of Germany, Greece, Czechoslova-
kia and Finland, where the existence of relatively strong ‘anti-system parties’ 
from the right and left posed a threat. But even in the case of some of the old-
er democracies, such as Belgium and France, there was considerable potential 
for non-democratic or anti-democratic forces to emerge.  
This is the background against which the impact of the Great Depression 
as the common external denominator has to be seen. On 24 October 1929, 
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later referred to as ‘Black Thursday’, panic set in on the New York stock ex-
change. Shares were sold in record numbers and similar frantic sales fol-
lowed during the next weeks. The Dow Jones industrial average reached a 
low of 198 on 13 November, nearly half the value of 381 which had been 
noted as recently as 3 September. The crash, however, was not merely a fi-
nancial matter affecting banks and speculators. The ensuing liquidity panic 
quickly extended to mortgages, with the result that many homeowners who 
could not renew their due loans or mortgages faced foreclosure. The price of 
housing dropped sharply. Other commodity prices and imports similarly fell 
to record lows, while industrial production dropped by 10% within a mere 
two months (for a detailed account of the economic crisis see Kindleberger 
1973). 
Other countries quickly felt the crunch, too. By the end of December 
1929 share prices declined by one third in Canada and Belgium, and by 16% 
in Germany and Austria. However, the effects that were to be felt during the 
coming years proved to be even more devastating. International trade was re-
duced considerably, national products and per capita incomes declined, in-
dustrial production fell and unemployment rose sharply. This process gener-
ated its own internal dynamic and was further reinforced by severe budget 
cuts and other restrictive policies on the part of most governments. Similar 
effects were produced by the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies implemented 
by nearly all central banks, which put short-term domestic interests ahead of 
longer-term considerations of international cooperation and stability. 
It is not possible to discuss in detail here the economic and political 
causes of these events and the interactions between them. What will be at-
tempted instead is, first, to assess the overall economic impact of the crisis as 
it affected the cases under consideration and, second, to indicate the respec-
tive social and political reactions and their link to the final regime outcomes. 
In order to assess the overall impact of the world economic crisis in each 
case, the year 1928, i.e. the year before its sudden outbreak, is taken as a ba-
sis against which to note the percentage changes in each of the major eco-
nomic indicators (National Domestic Product, industrial production, em-
ployment, external trade and the cost of living) until its peak or bottom before 
the beginning of a recovery.  
There are data to show that the fall in per capita income at constant pric-
es was steepest in Romania, Germany and Austria. Industrial production de-
clined by more than half in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Belgium. Unem-
ployment rose most dramatically in Ireland, the Netherlands and Czechoslo-
vakia. It reached its highest absolute peaks of more than 30% of the working 
population (including the level of unemployment prevailing before 1928) in 
Ireland, Austria, the Netherlands and Germany. Exports fell most sharply in 
Germany (to 16%(!) of the figure for the reference year) and levelled out at 
around one third in countries such as the Netherlands, France, Czechoslova-
50 Dirk Berg-Schlosser 
kia, Austria and Estonia. Since both survivor and breakdown cases can be 
found among the most seriously affected countries, it follows that the final 
regime outcome cannot be explained in terms of the impact of the economic 
crisis alone, but must be seen in its broader social and political context. In 
particular, the simplistic notion, still held by many, that it was the high level 
of unemployment that brought Hitler to power in Germany has to be refuted 
as a mono-causal explanation; the fact is that the increase in unemployment 
was higher in countries such as Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands, where 
democracy nevertheless survived. 
The sobering economic figures just cited indicate severe suffering and 
outright misery for millions of families and individuals affected by the crisis. 
Even in the more highly industrialised countries, publicly supported social 
security systems were often weak. In countries where unemployment benefits 
and similar measures were guaranteed by legislation, the respective institu-
tions and their budgets were quickly stretched to their limits as the crisis 
lasted much longer than anyone had originally expected. Falling incomes and 
rising unemployment also led to strong social and political reactions in the 
face of what seemed to be a continuously deteriorating situation, which those 
in political office appeared to be unable to cope with. Large numbers of 
people took to the streets in what were often peaceful but sometimes also vio-
lent demonstrations in which participants clashed with either the forces of 
law and order or with the militants of opposing political camps. Strikes, how-
ever, generally decreased in number, since those who were still gainfully em-
ployed did not want to put their employment at further risk. The organisa-
tional power of the unions also declined as a result of their losing a consider-
able percentage of their membership. 
Public violence was often reinforced by uniformed armed militias of the 
extreme right and left, or by the so-called ‘veterans’ movements, as in Esto-
nia, for example. These groups sought to achieve their political ends by non-
democratic means and increasingly called into question the existing parlia-
mentary system. At the electoral level growing polarisation could be ob-
served in many cases, which strengthened the anti-system parties on both the 
right and the left. Depending on the type of electoral system and the timing 
and frequency of elections, this often brought strong and sometimes even ma-
joritarian, albeit not united, anti-system forces into parliament. The consensus 
of those in favour of parliamentary procedures and democratic values was put 
to a severe test. In some cases it cracked, for example in Germany, where the 
last democratically elected grand coalition government consisting of the lib-
eral and centrist parties and the social democrats fell apart in March 1930 
over the issue of maintaining social security benefits. 
The overall anti-system reactions were strongest in Germany and Spain, 
followed by Greece, Austria, Estonia and Finland. In Germany in the last free 
elections in 1932 the anti-system parties on the left (communists) increased 
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their share of the vote by 6%, while the party on the extreme right (National 
Socialists) reached a peak of 37.3%, an increase of 26%. In total, the anti-
system forces reached a (disunited!) majority of 60.5% of the electorate. 
Among the cases with the strongest social reactions, only Finland emerged as 
a democratic survivor, albeit with some restrictions.  
Economic policy and the impact of some of the major actors and their re-
spective moves also warrant attention. The principal measures adopted by 
most governments to combat the crisis consisted of conventional austerity 
policies. The main task of such policies was to attempt to balance the public 
budget at times of shrinking revenues by cutting down public employment, 
social welfare benefits and other expenditures as much as possible. At the 
monetary level many countries pursued high-interest and tight credit policies 
in order to maintain international credit and the convertibility of their curren-
cy at fixed exchange rates. With the advantage of hindsight it is obvious that 
most of these measures were counterproductive and served only to aggravate 
the crisis even further. 
But these social and political background conditions in the context of the 
post-war crisis, the impact of the Great Depression, the social and electoral 
reactions to the crisis and the economic policies pursued were in themselves 
not enough to determine whether or not democracy survived or broke down 
in a given country. In addition, there were many real actors whose decisive 
moves at critical turning points must also be considered. Persons such as 
Hindenburg, von Papen and Hitler in Germany, Masaryk in Czechoslovakia, 
Svinhufvud in Finland and Päts in Estonia, to name but a few, obviously had 
a hand in what finally transpired in their respective countries.  
It is helpful to visualise the interrelationship between the structure- and 
the actor-oriented perspective as a coastline threatened by a tsunami. The ex-
isting topography of the seashore shaped by geology, the elements and by 
man-made structures such as dykes plays a crucial role when disaster strikes. 
The landscape can be conceived of as the respective historical and structural 
conditions determining the situation in each case prior to the onslaught of the 
tsunami and other secondary consequences triggered by a quake with their 
potential to further exacerbate the devastating impact. In this scenario the 
shape of the coastline as well as individual groups and actors who man the 
dykes and the specific actions they take come into play in a crisis situation 
and determine the success or failure of their efforts. All these factors are 
shown graphically in Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1: Survival cases 
 
 
The strength of the initial quake, in this case the impact of the Great Depres-
sion, is represented by the first (dotted) bar. The topography of the seashore 
shaped by the two previous periods, that is, the immediate post-war crisis and 
the intermediate period before the Great Depression, is shown by the next 
two (shaded) bars. The impact of these forces is measured against the 
strength and the height of the existing dikes as an expression of the basic 
background conditions that are either favourable or unfavourable for democ-
racy and are represented here by vertically lined bars. The actual tidal wave 
reflecting the social and electoral reactions in each country is indicated by the 
fourth (dark) bar. Finally, the figure shows the impact of particular actors 
who either improved the efficiency of the embankments or weakened them 
against the flood; this is indicated by the last darkly shaded bar for each case. 
The positive values in the figure can be conceived of as a reef that had with-
stood previous floods and continues to serve as a protection for the coast, 
while negative values indicate the existence of a trough created by earlier 
floods that now facilitates the onslaught of the new force.  
Looking at the survivor cases, and in particular at the patterns exhibited 
in the right-hand side of Figure 1 above representing the solid democracies of 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, one can conclude that in 
these three countries the impact of the various crisis factors over time did not 
much affect the final outcome; the dykes remained consistently high and sta-
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ble, and did not require any specific intervention by any relevant actor. In 
Ireland the crises factors were also relatively insignificant, although the dyke 
in this rather poor Catholic country with no previous experience of indepen-
dent statehood and democracy was somewhat lower. In this case, though, it 
was significantly reinforced by the supportive actions of Prime Minister de 
Valera and his Fianna Fáil followers after their election victory in 1932; this 
victory united the previous anti-Treaty forces on the issue that was the cause 
of the Irish civil war in 1922/23 between those who established the Free State 
in December 1922 and supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the Republican 
opposition for whom the Treaty represented a betrayal of the Irish Republic. 
The situation in Belgium and France, in contrast, was much more critical. 
In Belgium the anti-democratic forces represented mainly by the (franco-
phone) Rexists and the Vlaamsch Nationaal Verband and Verdinaso on the 
Flemish side gained considerable strength. Even though the dyke in this high-
ly industrialised early democracy was very high, the crisis situation in 1937 
when Rexist leader Degrelle put forward his major challenge was serious. 
But the tension was considerably relieved by the positive intervention of 
Cardinal van Roey and by the formation of a broader-based democratic coali-
tion under Prime Minister van Zeeland. In France, similarly, the anti-system 
forces represented by right-wing groups, such as Action Française, the Ligues 
and in particular the Croix-de-Feux headed by Colonel de la Rogue, gained 
considerable strength and reached almost the top of the dyke. But following 
the failed coup attempt in February 1934 and the formation of a Popular 
Front government under Léon Blum in 1936, which included for the first 
time the Communist Party as part of a democratic coalition, the situation be-
came somewhat more consolidated. Yet the parliamentary governments re-
mained shaky until the German invasion and the establishment of the Vichy 
regime in 1940. 
The Czech and, especially, the Finnish cases exhibit a pattern where the 
ultimate flood wave reinforced by the post-war and intermediate periods 
would have gone over the dike had it not been for the determined pro-
democratic interventions by President Masaryk in Czechoslovakia and Presi-
dent Svinhufvud in Finland. The latter first outlawed the Communist Party, 
whose strong links with Moscow posed a threat from the extreme left, and 
two years later, in 1932, put down the revolt by the fascist ‘Lapua’ movement 
at Mäntsälä by making use of the military. The establishment in 1936 of a 
broad-based red-green socialist-agrarian coalition consolidated the situation. 
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Figure 2:  Breakdown cases 
 
 
The discernible patterns among the observed breakdown cases represented in 
Figure 2 are equally revealing. In countries such as Hungary, Romania and 
Spain the democratic dykes were very low or practically non-existent from 
the very beginning, while the anti-system forces maintained or regained their 
strength. In Hungary, in the quasi-monarchy or façade of democracy under 
the governorship of Admiral Horthy, certain variations of the conservative-
authoritarian forces maintained the upper hand until the regime finally gave 
way to the external pressures of fascist Germany during World War II. In 
Romania King Carol II himself established a royal dictatorship in 1938, 
which then paved the way for the Iron Guard and the dictatorship of Marshall 
Antonescu, who formed an alliance with Adolf Hitler in 1941. In Spain the 
civil war after 1936 sealed the fate of the second democratic republic and 
brought to power Generalissimo Franco and his authoritarian and Falange 
supporters. 
In Austria, Greece and Estonia the strength of anti-system forces was al-
so overwhelming and clearly too much for the existing dykes to withstand. In 
these cases the post-war crisis and, to some extent, the lack of political stabi-
lisation in the intermediate period also left their mark. Considerable internal 
turmoil undermined the democratic systems in Austria and Greece, giving 
way to authoritarian regimes under Dollfuss in 1934 in the former, and under 
Metaxas in 1936 in the latter. In Estonia the incumbent president, Konstantin 
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Päts, pre-empted a perceived fascist threat by the Veterans’ movement, ab-
olishing parliament and establishing an authoritarian regime in 1934. 
Germany remains the most intriguing case with by far the most wide-
ranging and, it seems, to some extent never-ending, repercussions. Within the 
set of cases discussed here, Germany was the one racked by the most turbulent 
events throughout the entire inter-war period. The effects of the post-war crisis 
in the form of army mutinies, local left-wing rebellions, right-wing coup at-
tempts and a period of hyperinflation were particularly strong and were not 
significantly alleviated during the intermediate period; the depth of the remain-
ing troughs is indicated by the second and third bars in the above diagram. The 
overwhelming effect of the Great Depression (as shown by the first bar) led to 
the collapse of an already very fragile democratic system, an unsurprising out-
come given that more than 60% of the electorate gave their active support to 
anti-system forces. This doubly reinforced wave ran with ease over the existing 
dyke. In fact, the presidential cabinets, which no longer enjoyed a parliamenta-
ry majority but were appointed by Hindenburg since 1930, can already be seen 
as representing the beginning of the end of the first experience of democracy in 
Germany (see also Winkler 1993; Bracher 1953). The tsunami merely pushed 
events in an anti-democratic, and ultimately fascist, direction when President 
Hindenburg and the former German Nationalist Chancellor von Papen handed 
over power to Hitler and his Nationalist Socialist Party on 30 January 1933. It 
is an open question whether any other intervention could still have saved the 
regime. At best, an authoritarian intervention, perhaps with strong support from 
the military along the lines of the Austrian and Estonian cases in 1934, might 
have still succeeded. The world might have then been spared one of its worst 
experiences, but the Weimar democracy would not have survived.  
Lessons for the present world economic crisis 
The above is just an outline of a systematic comparative political analysis and 
indicates the potential such a study holds for an understanding of similar cri-
sis situations. It highlights the fact that a comprehensive and meaningful 
analysis has to take into account longer-term structural conditions together 
with the varying impacts of the crisis, specific social and political reactions, 
and finally, the concrete moves, policies and speed of the reactions by major 
political actors.  
For the crisis of 2008-2009 we do not as yet have the necessary data to 
conduct such an analysis. Nevertheless some general conclusions can be 
drawn to at least outline the similarities and important differences between 
these two major crises. 
1. Even though the overall magnitude of the latest crisis and its fallout are 
considerable, the decline of GDP, industrial production and exports, as 
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well as the rise in unemployment, are all lower when compared with the 
figures for the 1930s.  
2. The 2008-2009 crisis has been truly global and not confined mostly to 
the Western world. 
3. The new important centres of the emerging markets of China, India, Bra-
zil and South Africa have been less affected by the crisis than were the 
countries of the developed world. 
4. The OECD countries and, in particular, the European Union member 
states are today much more intertwined. The 1930s policy of ‘beggar-
thy-neighbour’, the aim of which was to save one’s own country at the 
expense of other countries, is no longer feasible for them.  
5. There has been much greater coordination in devising counter-measures 
to the crisis within the EU, but also at the global level through the G8 
and G20 summits. And while individual national measures differ, they 
affect all of the closely linked economies. The German car wreck subsidy 
(cash for clunkers), for example, was used to buy not only German-made 
cars but also those produced in Italy, France, Portugal, etc.  
6. There are now better informed insights into the causes and mechanisms 
of the crisis; neo-Keynesianism has been accepted again on a much 
greater international scale. Nevertheless, there are still no effective inter-
national controls to avoid similar bubbles and excesses. 
7. The political effects of the 2008-2009 crisis have been far less severe, at 
least in the longer-established democracies. There have been no strong ex-
tremist social and political reactions in those countries and the general 
structural and political-cultural conditions favouring the persistence of de-
mocracy clearly prevail. The reasons for political disaffection in some of 
those countries have other roots that are mostly not related to the crisis. 
8. The modern welfare states now have built-in buffer effects, which cu-
shion the social and political impact of the crisis, at least for a while. 
9. The situation in the younger Third Wave democracies is shakier. There 
things depend more on policy and actor effects comparable to the inter-
war crisis. But the international situation and the political climate have 
also changed. External factors and international assistance, for example, 
the EU in Eastern Europe, now play a much greater role. 
10. So far there has been no sizeable reverse wave of democratisation. The 
few individual cases, such as Guinea, Honduras or Niger, for example, 
are not related to the world economic crisis. 
11. Oil- and mineral-exporting authoritarian rentier states have seemingly 
remained politically stable, but their exports have been affected by lower 
world market prices. This has been in part compensated by a greater de-
mand from the emerging markets. 
12. Capitalist democracies may no longer be the ‘only game in town’ for 
others to follow. For some countries China might possibly serve as a new 
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model combining a controlled market economy with authoritarian rule. 
This also provides more leeway for other authoritarian or rogue states, 
such as Angola or Sudan. Similarly, a new national-authoritarian model 
in Russia and in the other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
and neighbouring countries may follow this route. 
In the final analysis the epigraph by S.M. Lipset needs to be modified for to-
day’s conditions. We certainly can (and should!) learn from the past, but we 
also have to take into account in a coherent and systematic way the factors 
that have changed. What we know so far is that the global and financial crisis 
of 2008-2009 did not have any serious political repercussions. But we also 
know that in the age of globalisation things have become far more complex 
and that in this context we are still far from having established international 
regulations that would be able to avert similar crises in the future. 
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PART II 
The economy and democracy 
The free market can function without democracy, but democracy cannot do 
without the free market. This is because a free civil society forms the founda-
tion of a democratic system and as such needs economic resources indepen-
dent from the state to create the economic bases for unrestricted civic initia-
tives. And so far the marriage of democracy and capitalism has proved to be 
a peaceful and relatively efficient mode of economic development.  
However, the Great Recession put various models of democracy on trial. 
The violent social unrest in Greece in the summer of 2011 revealed that dur-
ing times of serious economic troubles the range of counter-measures availa-
ble to a democratic system is more limited than the measures open to an au-
thoritarian system. What is more, a free civil society may reject even a ra-
tional reform package, because it usually calls for a painful adjustment to a 
given habituated standard of living of the citizens. The democratic system 
must take into account the expected social responses to the implementation of 
counter-measures and ruling politicians are well aware that implementation 
of such measures under democratic conditions results more often than not in 
a withdrawal of political support and a subsequent loss of their power.  
Nevertheless, the following review of democratic responses to the Great 
Recession shows that, for the time being at least, democracies have proven to 
be stronger than the latest crisis. Even young democracies do not seem to 
have lost legitimacy, which may be interpreted as the efficient functioning of 
intra-systemic shock-absorbers such as alternation of power, the reorientation 
of economic policies as a result of public discourse and organised protests, 
etc. This, of course, does not mean that all democracies are equally success-
ful in coping with recession, but that generally there has as yet not been a se-
rious threat to the democratic system that could be linked to the Great Reces-
sion. In fact, the Arab Spring suggests the Great Recession undermined the 
stability of authoritarian capitalisms more than it has destabilised democratic 
capitalisms.  
 

The crisis: possible impacts on economic 
systems and policy 
Philip Mohr 
Introduction 
In the wake of the 2008-2009 global crisis there has been much speculation 
about its possible impact on the politico-economic systems and broad eco-
nomic policy strategies, particularly in developing countries. A widely-held 
view is that since China has apparently been affected less by the crisis than 
the major Western economies, there will be a tendency for developing coun-
tries to adopt all or part of the ‘Chinese model’ of market authoritarianism, 
instead of pursuing market fundamentalism in a democratic political envi-
ronment. Some observers prefer to focus on a broader range of developing 
countries, particularly the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), 
and to try to distil lessons and guidelines from their perceived success.  
In discussing the possible demonstration effect of the variable impact of 
the crisis it is necessary to first look at some key aspects of economic systems 
and economic performance to avoid the danger of becoming embroiled in pe-
ripheral issues, while neglecting or overlooking the fundamental ones. Also, 
a distinction should always be drawn between the impact of sustained high 
economic growth and the possible impact of the crisis as such. It could be ar-
gued, for example, that China already warranted extraordinary attention on 
account of its sustained growth performance irrespective of the crisis, which 
probably had only a marginal impact on the attractiveness of the Chinese 
model. In addition, there is also a need to differentiate between the impact of 
the crisis on advanced and developing countries. In contrast to other recent 
international economic crises, the latest crisis had its origin in the advanced 
economies. Moreover, the level of financial development and integration in 
the more advanced economies made them much more vulnerable to the crisis 
than developing countries with less developed financial sectors. As a result, 
the crisis has been labelled a rich world’s crisis. The focus in this chapter, 
however, is on developing rather than developed countries. 
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Economic growth in recent years 
Table 1 shows the annual rates of economic growth in selected countries 
prior to and during the crisis. The first two columns indicate average annual 
growth rates over a decade or so and the last two show the rates for 2008 and 
2009 respectively, with the latter reflecting the impact of the recession. 
 
Table 1: Economic growth in selected countries prior to and during the crisis 
Country Annual percentage change in real GDP 
 1990 – 2000 2000 – 2008 2008 2009 
Germany 1,8 1,2  1,3 -4,9 
Japan 1,1 1,6 -1,2 -5,2 
United Kingdom 2,8 2,5  0,5 -4,9 
United States 3,5 2,4  0,4 -2,4 
     
Australia 3,6 3,3  3,7  1,3 
South Korea 5,8 4,5 2,3  0,2 
     
Brazil  2,7  3,6 5.1 -0,2 
Russia -4,7  6,7 5,6 -7,9 
India  5,9  7,9 5,1  7,7 
China 10,6 10,4 9,6  9,1 
     
Greece 2,2 4,2  2,0 -2,0 
Ireland 7,4 5,0 -3,0 -6,0 
Poland 4,7 4,4  5,0  1,7 
     
Angola 1,6 13,5 13,2 0,2 
Mozambique 6,1 8,0 6,7 6,3 
Uganda 7,1 7,5 8,7 7,1 
     
Venezuela 1,6 5,2 4,8 -3,3 
     
South Africa 2,1 4,3 3,7 -1,8 
Sources: IMF, OECD, World Bank 
 
The first four countries in the Table are well established developed econo-
mies. Like most other advanced economies, each country in this group expe-
rienced significant economic decline in 2009. Note that all four, especially 
Germany and Japan, had not fared particularly well (on average) during the 
two decades prior to the crisis. Germany was struggling with the economic 
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impact of unification, while Japan had become a mature economy with an 
ageing population after decades of comparatively rapid economic growth. In 
the 1960s the Japanese economy grew at an average annual rate of 10%, 
much like China today and South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, but by the 
end of the 1980s growth had become lacklustre. Numerous subsequent efforts 
to revive the Japanese economy have proved singularly unsuccessful. Nowa-
days many observers regard the ‘Japanese model’ of stagnation and deflation 
as highly relevant for other advanced economies. They analyse the Japanese 
experience in detail in an attempt to ascertain what to do to avoid a similar 
experience. A fundamental question, however, is whether or not the mature 
advanced economies still have the potential to grow at rates approaching 
those experienced in the past. It may be argued, for example, that Japan’s 
demographics, especially its ageing population and declining labour force, is 
the main cause of the country’s economic woes. 
The next two countries in the Table are the only advanced economies in 
which positive, albeit low, real GDP growth was recorded in 2009. After 
decades of rapid growth, South Korea joined the ranks of the advanced econ-
omies in 1997, ironically at just about the time of the Asian economic crisis. 
Following Japan, South Korea also became a more mature economy in recent 
years and the average annual growth rates of 9% in the 1970s and 8% in the 
1980s will not be repeated in coming decades. Australia fared the best of all 
the advanced economies, largely because of its mineral wealth and close eco-
nomic ties with China and other Asian countries. 
The next four cases, the BRIC nations, are large countries that potentially 
constitute an important bloc in international economic and political affairs. 
Brazil, Russia, India and China all rank among the top nine countries in the 
world as far as land area, population and GDP are concerned, the latter on a 
purchasing power parity (PPP) basis. As a group they accounted for more 
than 25% of world territory, more than 40% of world population and about 
25% of world GDP in 2009 (World Bank, 2009). In 2011 South Africa was 
invited to join BRIC, which would then become BRICS, but for the purpose 
of this chapter the focus is on the original BRIC group, as identified by Jim 
O’Neill of Goldman Sachs in 2001. South Africa was probably invited to join 
to obtain a foothold in Africa, but from an economic point of view the coun-
try is a minnow compared to the other four countries. Moreover, there is 
nothing particularly interesting about South Africa’s economic performance 
prior to, during and after the crisis. 
Although the BRIC countries are undoubtedly the most important emerg-
ing market economies because of their size, they have not all performed par-
ticularly well economically. Following the collapse of communism, the Rus-
sian economy declined during the 1990s, particularly during the crisis of 
1998. It subsequently recovered, mainly due to the country’s oil and gas re-
sources, but collapsed again during the latest crisis. Brazil performed reason-
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ably steadily albeit not spectacularly, stagnated during the recession and has 
grown rapidly since then (not indicated in the Table). China and India, how-
ever, recorded consistently high economic growth prior to and during the cri-
sis and are therefore often regarded as role models for other developing coun-
tries to emulate. 
It should be emphasised, however, that the BRIC countries are still de-
veloping countries, with average living standards and levels of development 
that are substantially below those in the advanced economies. For example, 
in the 2010 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2010) Russia was ranked 
65th, Brazil 73rd, China 89th and India 119th of the 169 countries for which 
human development indices were estimated. A similar picture emerges when 
PPP-adjusted per capita income data are used. The BRIC countries also per-
form badly in international rankings of economic freedom, international 
competitiveness (except China) and corruption. There are also some serious 
reservations about the quality of economic data in the BRIC countries, espe-
cially China. 
In the next group in the Table are three European countries. The first 
two, Greece and Ireland, both members of the euro zone, are under severe 
fiscal strain and had to be bailed out during 2010. In contrast to most of the 
other countries in the Table, their economic decline continued into 2010. 
Ireland, in particular, suffered a severe economic collapse from 2008 on-
wards. After two decades of high growth during which Ireland was labelled 
the ‘Celtic Tiger’ and was often mooted as an example for other countries to 
follow, the Irish economy imploded quite spectacularly. The ‘Irish model’ of 
social pacts, wage moderation, tax cuts, the promotion of foreign direct in-
vestment and financial sector development has definitely lost its sheen. Some 
observers argue that the Irish boom was driven by special circumstances, 
such as the advantages (including massive subsidies) deriving from the coun-
try’s membership of the European Union, rather than by a particular approach 
to economic policy. The third country, Poland, is the only European country 
that did not experience negative growth during the crisis. This former com-
munist bloc country implemented a big-bang ‘move to the market’ in the 
1990s and, although it is still classified as a developing country, its perfor-
mance, especially relative to other former command economies, appears to 
indicate that the market system is not as inherently flawed as supporters of 
greater government intervention tend to suggest.  
Of the four African countries in the Table, the first three serve to remind 
us that some quite significant growth rates have been recorded in Africa, al-
beit off very low bases. In fact, most African countries recorded positive real 
GDP growth during the crisis, although the reliability of their data can also 
often be questioned. If the data are taken at face value, the Angolan figures il-
lustrate what can be achieved in a resource-rich country once a degree of po-
litical stability has been established. South Africa is included since it is by far 
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the most important and influential economy in Africa, a major commodity-
exporting country and a prospective member of BRICS. Although South 
Africa escaped most of the direct consequences of the financial collapse, its 
exports suffered as a result of the international meltdown, dragging the econ-
omy into its own recession. 
Venezuela is included since the ‘Venezuelan model’ of nationalisation 
and other forms of government intervention is often propagated by politicians 
in developing countries. The country was, however, hit quite hard by the cri-
sis. Venezuela’s economic decline continued into 2010 despite the recovery 
in the oil market, and at the time of writing the decline was projected to con-
tinue into 2011. The Venezuelan model has lost most of its appeal, except for 
economically uninformed, power-hungry politicians in some developing 
countries.  
Fundamentals 
Economic systems can be classified on the basis of the predominant form of 
ownership (i.e. according to property rights) or on the basis of the predomi-
nant coordinating mechanism. Property can be owned collectively or publi-
cally (as in socialism) or privately (as in capitalism) and there are fundamen-
tally three types of coordinating mechanism: tradition, command and the 
market. All economic systems are mixed systems, but a particular form of 
ownership and a particular coordinating mechanism usually dominate (as in 
market capitalism). 
Each form of ownership and each coordinating mechanism has its own 
particular strengths and weaknesses. There is consensus, for example, that the 
market system allocates scarce resources efficiently, but tends to generate or 
exacerbate inequality. Economists of a Keynesian persuasion also believe 
that market economies tend to be inherently cyclically unstable. In other 
words, they believe that business cycles (booms and recessions) are part and 
parcel of the way in which capitalist market economies operate, and that gov-
ernment should try to smooth these fluctuations as far as possible. Econo-
mists of a Classical persuasion, on the other hand, believe that a private mar-
ket economy is inherently stable and that business cycles are caused by inap-
propriate government intervention (e.g. to stimulate economic growth). They 
see no role for anti-cyclical policy and propagate a hands-off approach. The 
age-old ideological debate between these competing schools of thought is un-
likely to ever be settled and should always be borne in mind when consider-
ing different views on, or examining different analyses of, the Great Reces-
sion. 
Economic performance is shaped by a variety of determinants including 
factor endowment, economic systems, institutions, economic policy and vari-
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ous non-economic factors (such as politics, history, geography, culture and 
attitudes). The first thing to consider when examining the performance of a 
particular country is its factor endowment. Many differences in economic 
performance can be explained by considering the quantity and quality (prod-
uctivity) of each country’s factors of production (land, labour, capital, entre-
preneurship, technology). But other aspects can also be very important. For 
example, although certain schools of economic thought believe there are uni-
versal economic laws that cut through time and space, each country has its 
own geography, history, institutions and culture that impact on its economic 
system and performance. These influences are captured in the term ‘path de-
pendence’, which refers to the notion that a country’s current and expected 
performance is shaped by the path it followed to arrive where it is today. 
Analysts who emphasise path dependence sometimes trace the roots of cur-
rent institutions and performance to ancient history (e.g. Beattie, 2009).  
Economic policy can also be very important, but the first priority should 
be to avoid policy mistakes rather than to try to significantly improve eco-
nomic performance. Policy mistakes can be disastrous, while good policies 
will probably at best only generate marginal improvements in economic per-
formance. Classic examples are the populist economic policies implemented 
from time to time in developing countries and which resulted in harming the 
very groups whose interests the policies were supposed to serve. Policy mak-
ers should always be cognisant that their policies may have unintended con-
sequences.  
Experiences  
China 
The most notable feature of Table 1 is the sustained high rates of economic 
growth in China prior to and during the crisis. One of the themes of this book 
is that China’s high recorded growth rate during the recession may result in a 
strong demonstration effect on other developing countries, who may try to 
emulate the ‘Chinese model’ of authoritarian capitalism. However, to the ex-
tent that such a demonstration effect exists, it probably preceded the crisis 
and the latter possibly only had a marginal impact on the attractiveness of the 
‘Chinese model’. Long before the crisis many developing countries were 
probably already in awe of China’s continued high growth and contemplating 
ways and means of emulating that performance. The Chinese experience is 
particularly attractive to those leaders who believe that they too can create a 
dynamic economy without easing their grip on economic power. 
But is there a ‘Chinese model’? What are the real causes of the rapid 
economic growth in China? Do they lie in the Chinese economic system, the 
political system, the country’s factor endowment, its stage of economic de-
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velopment, Chinese culture, specific policy strategies or something else? And 
if there is such a model, is all or part of it for export? For background infor-
mation on these and similar issues, see the chapters by van Beek and by Han 
and Lü in this book. 
Some observers distinguish between the Washington Consensus, which 
is often regarded as the policy package emanating from market fundamental-
ism, and the Beijing Consensus, a more pragmatic approach to economic de-
velopment that is more appropriate to developing countries. The original 
Washington Consensus was formulated in 1989 by John Williamson to en-
capsulate the broad economic policies prescribed to developing countries by 
the IMF, the World Bank and the US government. The great irony, of course, 
is that the US itself did not adhere to a number of these policies.  
According to Williamson (1989), the Washington Consensus consists of 
ten elements or policy prescriptions: fiscal discipline, reprioritisation of pub-
lic expenditure, tax reform, market-determined positive real interest rates, 
stable competitive exchange rates, privatisation, deregulation, measures to 
secure property rights, promotion of trade and promotion of foreign direct in-
vestment. On closer examination, these measures do not amount to radical 
free-market fundamentalism. On the contrary, they would generally be re-
garded as necessary elements of any prudent economic policy strategy. The 
main problem with the Washington Consensus did not lie in its contents, but 
in the way in which it was thrust upon the developing countries that had been 
forced to approach one or more of the Washington institutions for financial 
support. In fact, many elements of the Consensus have been key elements of 
economic policy in successful developing countries. However, where the 
free-market approach does feature strongly in the Washington Consensus is 
in its ahistorical, apolitical, ‘one-size-fits-all’ nature. Not all the elements 
necessarily apply to the same extent in every situation or at each point in 
time, and those that do apply need not always have to be implemented to the 
same degree. In other words, a pragmatic approach is called for. 
This is precisely what the Beijing Consensus purports to be. The term 
was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former foreign editor of Time. He de-
scribed it as a pragmatic commitment to innovation and constant experimen-
tation, or “crossing the river by feeling the stones”, as the old Chinese saying 
goes. In contrast to the Washington Consensus, the Beijing Consensus thus 
does not consist of a set of rules. The key features are mixed ownership, basic 
property rights and heavy government intervention. However, in contrast to 
most other countries, government intervention in China is not primarily 
aimed at correcting potential market failure (e.g. rising inequality or envi-
ronmental problems), providing social security or serving the interests of 
groups other than the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCCCP). Government spending is devoted largely to investment spending to 
stimulate economic growth, with the ultimate aim of ensuring the legitimacy 
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of the regime. The pursuit of economic growth is also the goal of local gov-
ernments, who behave like private corporations, rather than being involved in 
matters of redistribution and social development.  
An examination of the evolution of economic policy in China since 1978 
yields evidence of most, if not all, the elements of the Washington Consen-
sus. In fact, if one compares China with the United States there is more evi-
dence of it being applied in the former than in the latter. But there was no 
‘big bang’. China started from its existing institutional base (unlike the for-
mer communist countries in Europe, who started with radically new institu-
tions) and applied the various measures in a piecemeal fashion, without an 
ideological commitment to any of them. This lack of ideology is arguably the 
main feature of the Beijing Consensus, or the Chinese approach to economic 
policy. The Chinese are notorious for their lack of respect for patents and 
copyright. Likewise, they will ‘import’ any element of Western economic 
policy and adapt it to Chinese circumstances, if necessary. By the same token 
they are not loath to discard certain elements, or to change direction as condi-
tions change. The Chinese approach may therefore perhaps be labelled an ec-
lectic approach to free markets. In 1998, for example, China embarked on 
one of the largest privatisation drives in history by privatising much of the 
country’s housing stock. This housing reform has been described as “the 
largest one-time transfer of wealth in the history of the world” (The Econo-
mist, 29 May 2010: 76). 
But what have been the main drivers of Chinese economic growth? In at-
tempting to answer this question, one must always remember that China was 
an extremely poor country before 1978 and that it is still a poor country (on a 
per capita basis). On a PPP basis per capita gross national income in China 
was only two thirds of the world average, less than 15% of that in the US and 
about 20% of that in Japan in 2009. To a large extent, therefore, China was 
and still is in the process of catching up with the developed world. It is al-
ways easier to grow fast off a very low base during the catch-up phase, but as 
the economy matures growth will inevitably decline. Some observers believe 
that to put things in the right perspective present-day China should be com-
pared with Europe at the time of the industrial revolution, the United States 
towards the end of the nineteenth century and Japan in the 1960s.  
There is also the questionable quality of Chinese data to be taken into ac-
count. China has a reputation for publishing dubious statistics about its econ-
omy. Even top Chinese leaders acknowledge that there are problems with the 
integrity of the data. One of the basic problems is an antiquated data-
collection system (Baumohl, 2009: 358-359). The National Bureau of Statis-
tics still collect data from local managers who have an incentive to lie to 
promote their own interests. The degree of fabrication and falsification is be-
lieved to have diminished, but question marks remain. While there is no 
doubt that the Chinese economy has grown spectacularly during the past 
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three decades, the level and, particularly, the steadiness of the growth rate are 
simply too good to be true. This has led one cynical observer to comment that 
China’s present is almost as murky as its future. One of the recent mysteries, 
for example, is how economic growth could have remained fairly steady dur-
ing the crisis despite millions upon millions of Chinese workers becoming 
unemployed. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that reliable quarterly GDP 
data are not published, along with the success of the massive stimulation 
package. Nevertheless, some lags between stimulation and job creation are 
inevitable and should have been reflected in the data. 
A key factor in Chinese economic growth has been, and remains, the 
massive amount of unemployed, underemployed or unproductive labour in 
the rural areas available for productive employment at low wages in the ci-
ties. In the 1950s W Arthur Lewis formulated a theory of economic devel-
opment for which he was awarded a Nobel Prize for Economics in 1979. In 
this theory of “economic development with unlimited supplies of labour” 
Lewis argued that development occurs when non-productive workers from 
the agricultural or traditional sector are shifted to the manufacturing or capi-
talist sector, where they are more productive. This is exactly what has hap-
pened in China and what is expected to continue to happen for quite some 
time since there are still tens, if not hundreds, of millions of unproductive 
Chinese in subsistence agriculture in the traditional interior regions available 
for transfer to the capitalist sector at low wages. The Chinese miracle is first 
and foremost a labour story. Without the availability of unlimited supplies of 
labour, it would not have occurred. 
However, while an adequate supply of labour may be regarded as a ne-
cessary condition for economic development to occur, it is by no means a 
sufficient condition. China has long had millions upon millions of unproduc-
tive citizens, but it did not experience extraordinary economic growth or de-
velopment prior to the 1980s. Other necessary conditions included the 
changes to the Chinese economic system introduced from 1978 onwards. 
Much attention is focused nowadays on the authoritarian nature of the Chi-
nese regime and on the possible advantages of authoritarianism for economic 
growth. But without the introduction and expansion of markets, property 
rights and most of the other elements of the Washington Consensus, the 
growth process would not have been set in motion or sustained at such high 
levels. In modern history there have been a few classic examples of the supe-
riority of a market system over a command system, including West versus 
East Germany, South versus North Korea and Taiwan versus China (prior to 
1978). The recent experience of China (in contrast to the situation prior to 
1978) can definitely be added to this list. Without adopting key elements of a 
free enterprise economy, the Chinese miracle would not have occurred. 
The command element of the Chinese variety of a mixed economy has, 
however, also been a significant factor in Chinese economic growth. In this 
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regard China was fortunate to have other Asian models to follow, including 
Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea, which all achieved economic develop-
ment under autocratic regimes. The important prerequisite, of course, is that 
economic growth should be at the top of the political agenda. In China eco-
nomic growth serves as the tool that the Communist Party uses to entrench its 
legitimacy and power. There are many complicating factors, including cor-
ruption, environmental destruction and, especially, growing inequality. The 
latter is particularly serious, since the government does not address income 
disparities through redistributive policies. There are no safety nets, no social 
security measures and in such a situation social and political stability hinges 
on a continuous rise in living standards. This growth imperative is an impor-
tant factor in the ‘Chinese miracle’. 
A key advantage of an authoritarian system is that economic policy can 
be formulated and implemented without having to consult an elected parlia-
ment. For example, when the recent crisis resulted in the loss of millions of 
jobs in the export sectors, the Chinese government immediately implemented 
a massive rescue package centred on the expansion of the country’s infra-
structure. This aspect is discussed in some detail in the chapter by Han and 
Lü. 
Other drivers of economic growth in China include a good infrastructure, 
an educated workforce, the absence of independent trade unions (only one 
state-controlled trade union is allowed), flexible labour markets, a high rate 
of savings, massive natural resources (China has the third-largest proven 
mineral resources in the world) and the advantages of playing catch-up in a 
large and growing world economy. As far as policy is concerned, many mis-
takes have been made but the economy is so large and the government so 
powerful that high economic growth is maintained, despite the unavoidable 
policy errors. 
From this brief discussion it should be clear that there is no simple ‘Chi-
nese model’ of market authoritarianism. In many respects it is a unique com-
bination of state control and rampant free-market capitalism. Anyone inter-
ested in learning from (or trying to emulate) the Chinese experience should 
also take note of Chinese culture and history.1 For much of recorded history 
China had the largest economy in the world and many technological break-
throughs originated in China. As recently as 1820, the Chinese GDP ac-
counted for 30 per cent of the world total. This was followed by a century of 
anarchy, rule by warlords, foreign suppression, civil war and conflict with 
Japan, By 1978, after three decades of communism, China was an extremely 
poor country. In many respects, however, the recent rise of the Chinese econ-
omy can be viewed as a move towards a return to a situation that existed cen-
turies ago. 
                                                                          
1  Discussed in detail in the chapter by van Beek in this volume.  
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Other BRIC countries 
Brazil has almost traditionally been regarded as a large country with a huge 
but largely unrealised economic potential. The Economist has on occasion re-
ferred to the country’s “infinite capacity to squander its obvious potential”. 
Brazil’s traditional drawbacks included a large and ineffective state and a 
high degree of political and economic instability, one of the symptoms of the 
latter being periodic bouts of high or hyperinflation. Matters have improved 
since the mid-1990s, but as indicated in Table 1 Brazil’s rate of growth did 
not threaten to reach Chinese proportions in the 1990s and 2000s.  
The Brazilian state is still large and by all accounts still tends to be inef-
fective, but a substantial degree of political and macroeconomic stability has 
been achieved. Among the most significant changes in the politico-economic 
sphere was the full or partial privatisation of the plethora of state-owned en-
terprises including Petrobras, the largest company in the Southern Hemis-
phere. Another was the pragmatic leadership of Lula, the popular former 
trade unionist who refrained from adopting a populist approach to economic 
policy. 
In a more stable political and economic environment Brazil has expe-
rienced commodities-driven economic growth, including a massive increase 
in the contribution of oil to GDP. The country has also benefited greatly from 
China’s industrialisation, particularly through exports of food and iron ore. 
This has boosted growth and eliminated the balance-of-payments problems 
that were often experienced in the past. Nevertheless, the country also expe-
rienced a recession (albeit brief) in 2009. As far as policy is concerned, there 
does not appear to be a unique ‘Brazilian model’ for other developing coun-
tries to follow. If anything, Brazil’s experience seems to support the Wash-
ington Consensus rather than any alternative approach. In the context of the 
BRIC countries, Gideon Rachman described Brazil as “less scary than China, 
less authoritarian than Russia and less chaotic than India” (Business Day, 29 
September 2010: 11). 
Russia’s membership of BRIC can be ascribed to its size, its massive 
natural resources and its international political influence. As far as economic 
systems, institutions and policies are concerned, there are no particular posi-
tive lessons for developing countries to be distilled from the Russian expe-
rience. What lessons there might be, relate to what to avoid rather than what 
to do. By and large the Russian economy has not fared particularly well and 
the booms that have been recorded were associated with its massive natural 
wealth, including gas and oil. Economic reforms have been limited and there 
are clear signs of a movement back towards an interventionist authoritarian 
state. 
According to Beattie (2009: 250-261), Russia’s politics and government 
have two specific characteristics that can be traced back to the medieval era: 
a dominant executive with little in the way of checks and balances, and the 
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absence of a clear dividing line between power and poverty. As a result, Rus-
sia was an ideal candidate for both monarchical autocracy and communism 
and is not really amenable to a market economy. As Putin (quoted by Beattie 
2009: 260) stated: “From the beginning, Russia was created as a supercentra-
lised state. That’s practically laid down in its genetic code, its traditions, and 
the mentality of its people”. Other communist countries (e.g. Poland) had dif-
ferent political and economic histories before the communist takeover and 
therefore had different attitudes and experiences that resurfaced once they 
were freed from communism.  
Another important aspect of recent Russian experience is that political 
reform (glasnost) preceded economic reform (perestroika). In contrast, China 
started with economic reform and instituted the reform in the existing institu-
tional framework, without destroying the framework itself. 
As indicated in Table 1, India recorded rapid economic growth during 
the past two decades. To a certain extent the economic rise of India and Chi-
na represents a return to the situation prior to 1800, when these two populous 
countries together accounted for half of the world economy. Their recent 
growth paths have differed, however. In particular, the Indian experience 
provides little or no support for authoritarianism or greater government in-
volvement in the economy. 
India and China are different in other fundamental respects. India has an 
English-speaking population, a tradition of democracy, a transparent legal 
system, a decentralised economy, a healthier and better capitalised banking 
system and a younger population. Whereas China is focused on the manufac-
turing sector, in India it is the service sector that traditionally leads the way. 
The dominant role of services is the result of both India’s factor endowment 
and a deliberate strategy to focus on its own unique comparative advantage, 
rather than compete head-on with China and other Asian countries. The com-
parative advantage includes a young educated English-speaking and often 
well-travelled labour force. As the largest English-speaking country in the 
world India has decisive advantages in areas such as telecommunication, 
business outsourcing, computer software, banking, insurance engineering, the 
media, film entertainment and medical diagnostics. 
But why did India not fare particularly well prior to the 1990s? The fol-
lowing are among the reasons that have been advanced: an anti-capitalist cul-
ture, a fatalistic caste system, overpopulation, hot and humid climate, corrup-
tion, central planning, nationalisation, import substitution and various bu-
reaucratic controls (inherited from the British), including rigid labour legisla-
tion. 
The change came in 1991 when a serious balance of payments crisis gave 
rise to sweeping political and economic reforms. Economic isolation and cen-
tral planning were abandoned, the economy was opened up to more imports, 
most price and exchange controls were eliminated, the rupee was allowed to 
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float more freely, industries were deregulated, state-owned firms were priva-
tised and taxes were cut. Many of the previous disadvantages remain, includ-
ing inadequate infrastructure, but the economy is growing in leaps and 
bounds. As far as manufacturing is concerned, the focus is on establishing a 
sophisticated industry rather than to try to compete with other low-wage 
Asian countries. 
As mentioned earlier, the Indian experience provides little or no support 
for authoritarianism or heavy government involvement in the economy. On 
the contrary, the Indian economy serves as an example of what can be 
achieved through market-related economic reforms. 
From this brief discussion of the BRIC countries it should be clear that 
there is no such thing as a BRIC model. Each country has arrived where it is 
along a different path, each has different factor endowments, different politi-
cal systems and different approaches to economic policy. Although all four 
have generally performed quite well economically, average living standards 
are still quite low and they all tend to rank poorly on a number of measures of 
institutional quality, including the rule of law, control of corruption and regu-
latory quality. All have implemented market-oriented reforms but in a gra-
dual piecemeal fashion, rather than the full market liberalisation propagated 
by the Washington institutions. For example, all BRIC countries still have a 
complex set of onerous legal and regulatory regimes that make it difficult for 
foreign companies to invest in them. 
Venezuela 
When examining individual countries’ experiences, one should try to identify 
both the positive and the negative aspects of these experiences. In matters of 
economic policy, for example, it is more important to know what to avoid 
than what to aim for. Venezuela is a case in point. Before the onset of the cri-
sis, economic growth in Venezuela was quite impressive and the ‘Venezuelan 
model’ of nationalisation and other forms of government intervention had 
many admirers in developing countries. In 1999 Hugo Chavez came to power 
in the country with the largest oil reserves outside of the Middle East. He be-
haved like a typical Latin American populist leader (e.g. Peron in Argentina), 
succeeding in cloaking authoritarianism in outwardly democratic forms. The 
Economist (15 May 2010: 13) described his approach as “a post-cold-war 
model of authoritarian rule which combines a democratic mandate, populist 
socialism and anti-Americanism, as well as resource nationalism and careful-
ly calibrated repression”. 
While oil prices were high and increasing, the Venezuelan economy 
grew quite rapidly as indicated in Table 1, but when oil prices plummeted the 
economy collapsed. Significantly, Venezuela’s economic decline continued 
despite the subsequent recovery in the oil market and at the time of writing 
Chavez, who announced in January 2010 that he was now a Marxist, was 
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very unpopular domestically. Prior to that Chavez had described his approach 
as “21st-century socialism” (The Economist, 2010) and regarded this as a vi-
able alternative to liberal democracy, citing Iran, Russia, Zimbabwe and Su-
dan as examples of other countries following this approach. 
The ‘Venezuelan model’, among others, involves the nationalisation of 
key natural resources, including the expropriation of land, price controls and 
exchange-rate controls. The state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezu-
ela, was placed under direct government control in 2003. Oil production 
dropped and domestic petrol shortages ensued. Electricity generation was na-
tionalised in 2007 and power outages became the norm. State-sanctioned land 
invasions led to the collapse of commercial agriculture, and price and ex-
change-rate controls gave rise to black markets. In short, Venezuela is paying 
the price for a decade of economic mismanagement. These events are, of 
course, also reminiscent of what happened in Zimbabwe, as well as in other 
Latin American countries under previous populist leaders. 
The Venezuelan experience clearly underlines the point that populism 
should be avoided. Nevertheless, the ‘Venezuelan model’ is still popular 
among aspiring populist leaders. This should come as no surprise because, as 
Tim Cohen a prominent South African journalist, stated, “populist messages 
are not susceptible to logical argument” (Business Day, 10 February 2011: 
11). One of the main traits of populists is that they tend to ignore the basic 
facts of economic life. 
Theory 
How has the crisis changed the way we think about the economy? At first 
blush, it should serve as a strong indictment of (if not death-knell for) clas-
sical, neo-classical, new classical, real business cycle and all other schools of 
thought that allow little or no scope for active macroeconomic stabilisation, 
apart from the adoption of rules for monetary and fiscal policy. Economics, 
however, is a faith-based discipline and much of economic theory is ideolog-
ical. As a result, the different schools of economic thought always try to find 
ways and means to reconcile their views with the empirical evidence and they 
steadfastly refuse to adjust their respective basic ideological stances.2 In this 
regard we need to look no further than the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Eight decades later the disciples of the different schools (or religions) still ar-
                                                                          
2  Referring to market fundamentalism, Hector Torres has stated that it is “a faith that is diffi-
cult to dispel, because its priests can always claim that its failures result not from theologi-
cal bankruptcy, but from insufficient orthodoxy” (Business Day, 22 April 2010: 11). In a 
similar vein, Gideon Rachman believes that “the Great Recession seems unlikely to dis-
suade many economists from the belief that there are predictive ‘laws’ out there, just wait-
ing to be discovered” (Business Day, 8 September 2010: 9). 
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gue about the real causes of, and appropriate policy responses to, the depres-
sion and there is no reason to believe that the reaction to the Great Recession 
will be any different. 
By and large, however, the recent crisis has given Keynesianism a mas-
sive boost. After having been effectively sidelined during the worldwide 
‘move to the market’ and the prolonged cyclical upswings during most of the 
past two decades, the urgent need for discretionary monetary and fiscal inter-
vention on an almost unprecedented scale reminded economists and policy-
makers of the basic tenets of Keynesian macroeconomics, as formulated by 
Keynes himself. The circumstances that developed from 2007 to 2009 left no 
scope for a laissez-faire approach and showed that the business cycle was still 
alive and kicking. Intervention was essential. The only real questions con-
cerned the types of intervention that were required and how drastic the inter-
vention had to be.3 
Despite the ongoing ideological battles, the crisis undoubtedly did have a 
lasting impact on economic policy. Likewise, the Great Recession has al-
ready had an impact, although it is uncertain how lasting the impact will be.  
The well-known economic commentator, Anatole Kaletsky, is one of 
those who believe that the financial crisis will have a lasting impact on eco-
nomic systems at least in the developed world. He distinguishes three varie-
ties of capitalism during the past two centuries. Capitalism 1.0 was the clas-
sical era of laissez-faire capitalism that originated during the Napoleonic 
wars. Capitalism 2.0 was the interventionist era that followed the Great De-
pression, and Capitalism 3.0 the free-market era following the stagflationary 
1970s. 
Kaletsky (2010) believes that the recent crisis will again alter the respec-
tive roles of government and the market, as well as the relationship between 
politics and economics. Capitalism 4.0 will differ significantly from That-
cherism, Reaganomics and pre-1970s Keynesianism. It will not be characte-
rised by a fundamental faith in either the role of government (2.0) or the 
market (3.0), but by experimentation. In some areas of the economy govern-
ment will become more involved, but in other areas it will retreat. In other 
words, he envisages a more pragmatic blend of market forces and govern-
ment intervention, along the lines of the Beijing Consensus referred to earli-
er. 
One of the areas in which government is set to retreat is the labour mar-
ket, where the trend is towards more flexibility. In international trade there 
will probably be some tendency towards greater nationalism and protection-
ism, but in a globalised world economy there are definite checks and bal-
ances in this regard. Currencies will also tend to be managed, although again 
there is extremely little scope for this, except in a country like China. There 
                                                                          
3  Nonetheless, there are economists who predict that the Great Recession will become the 
deathbed of Keynesian economics (Business Day, 24 February 2010: 6). 
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will tend to be greater regulation of financial markets, but care should be tak-
en not to strangle this sector. Although unregulated financial innovation 
caused immense problems, the evolution of credit has been as important as 
any technical advance in history. It is important, however, that models of the 
real economy incorporate the financial sector. One of the most serious draw-
backs of mainstream economic theory is a failure to account for the real eco-
nomic effects of developments in the financial markets. As Kaletsky said: 
“The dirty little secret of modern economics is that the models created by 
central banks and governments to manage the economy say almost nothing 
about finance” (Sunday Times, 2009).  
Concluding remarks 
The crisis of 2008-2009 and the Great Recession forcefully reopened the age-
old debate on the relative merits of the state and the market. According to 
Ecclesiastes 1:9, there is nothing new under the sun. This applies in econom-
ics as well. Over the years, the pendulum has swung forwards and backwards 
between state intervention and reliance on market forces. After two decades 
during which market fundamentalism generally prevailed, particularly in the 
advanced economies, a swing in the opposite direction was virtually inevita-
ble. But the market has not lost its place. Thirty years ago Arthur Okun, a 
prominent American economist at the time, stated that the market always has 
a place, but he immediately added that the market always has to be kept in its 
place. In the aftermath of the crisis there will be a greater emphasis on the lat-
ter in the form of more domestic and international regulation of financial and 
economic affairs, and a greater appreciation of the role of the state in the pur-
suit of goals such as job creation, which will assume greater prominence than 
before. With inflation under control (for the time being at least) there is al-
ready pressure on central banks to accord a higher priority to economic 
growth and employment creation, and as a result they have lost a measure of 
the independence they enjoyed prior to the crisis. 
The lure of free-market thinking will diminish somewhat, but it will not 
disappear. Market fundamentalists are still in charge in the advanced econo-
mies and the same models (incorporating notions such as rational expecta-
tions and efficient markets) are still used to analyse the economy and advise 
policymakers. Bad ideas die a slow death. 
But what about the developing countries and the attractiveness of the 
‘Chinese model’? Will China continue to spurt ahead and will an increasing 
number of developing countries try to emulate the ‘Chinese miracle’? High 
economic growth is set to continue in China, but it will not last forever. 
Whether or not the Chinese economy will eventually surpass that of the US, 
and whether or not it will become an advanced economy (on a per capita ba-
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sis) are by no means certain. For the time being, however, the ‘Chinese mod-
el’ will remain an attractive option for developing countries. One can only 
hope that potential emulators of this model pay heed to the salient features of 
Chinese history and society, and recognise the pragmatic, eclectic nature of 
the model. In particular it is important to realise that the ‘Chinese miracle’ 
would not have occurred without greater reliance on private initiative and 
market forces. 
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Democracy, error correction and the global 
economy 
Laurence Whitehead 
Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent global ‘sudden stop’ to 
trade and investment briefly elicited a broad international consensus that 
severe errors in the management of the world economy required concerted 
correctives. But that moment soon passed. The worst scenarios of sustained 
and cumulative economic disruption never materialised, and a cautious 
normalisation was provisionally restored. The existing institutions of inter-
national economic governance re-established much of their authority and 
restored an adequate level of public and market confidence, implementing 
various partial reforms.  
Even so, effects of the severe shock of 2008 linger on in various critical 
domains. Youth unemployment has ratcheted up in most of the world’s old 
democracies, while many welfare provisions and pension funds have been 
severely affected. Fiscal deficits widened and sovereign indebtedness also 
rose, creating a mismatch between what the compensating policies of states 
could afford to finance over the medium to long term, and what existing en-
titlement programmes were likely to cost. At the same time efforts to restore 
a (lightly reformed) version of the previous growth model required regaining 
the confidence of the very market participants whose indiscipline had precipi-
tated the original downturn. 
This chapter reflects on the concept of democracy as an ‘error-correc-
tion’ mechanism as it relates to the management of the 2008 downturn in the 
international economy. At the national level democratic procedures can pre-
cipitate a change of leadership (perhaps also accompanied by a change of 
policy, although that is more uncertain) that renews public authority and so 
reinvigorates political responsiveness to economic challenges. At the interna-
tional level democratic controls over policy choices are at best more diffuse. 
In hard times they may take the form of obstructions to needed international 
cooperation, rather than supports for constructive reform. On the assumption 
that the existing structure of international economic relationships is likely to 
remain intact for the time being, despite its failings, and that many leading 
states in the system will remain subject to the logic of democratic political 
competition, it becomes a matter of urgency to identify the conditions under 
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which democracy can function more as an error-correcting, rather than as an 
error-compounding, procedure. 
2008 in perspective 
It is easy to forget how dire the international economy seemed in the imme-
diate aftermath of the September 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. In a 
representative article published in July 2009 Randall Germain highlighted 
parallels with 1931 that seemed entirely plausible at the time, but that look 
far too negative two years later.1 No doubt it remains possible that a second 
phase of the same crisis could still erupt and so justify the initial gloom. But 
from the perspective of early 2011 it seems far more likely that 2008 will be 
judged to have been an abrupt global shock, but not the onset of a world de-
pression. Even if future developments are as negative as the most pessimistic 
analysts anticipate, the rebound of 2009-10 has driven a wedge between the 
first crisis and its potential sequels. It is easier to see parallels with 1982 
(when the Latin American debt crisis seemed briefly threatening to the world 
as a whole, before it settled down into a ‘lost decade’ for a single large re-
gion); or 1998, when the Russian and East Asian ‘sudden financial stops’ 
may have paved the way for the global imbalances of ten years later, but as-
sumed a classical U shape and were widely judged to have been successfully 
contained within a brief time-span. 
Whether or not the post-2008 recovery subsequently falters, this two-
year interval of apparent recovery makes a huge difference in political terms. 
Democratic time horizons are quite brief. When a financial or economic crisis 
proves sufficiently stark and severe, it can generate a concentrated demand 
for corrective action – typically involving some mixture of assigning blame, 
sanctioning those held responsible, and enacting reforms intended to prevent 
future relapses. But the momentum behind such responses is time limited. 
After a couple of years many of those initially singled out for criticism have 
often moved on, or stepped aside. Diagnosis of precisely who was to blame, 
and which failings require corrective action, becomes cloudier and the inter-
ested parties settle into their respective defences.  
As time passes, then, the initial concentration of political energies around 
a corrective agenda becomes harder to sustain, in part because competing 
parties and rival lobbyists are likely to try to appropriate the reform impulse 
for their own selective purposes, but also because other issues arise over time 
                                                                          
1  Germain, R. (2009). Financial order and world politics: crisis, change, and continuity. In-
ternational Affairs. 85(4). The author refers to stock market losses of 30-70 percent in 2008, 
year-on-year falls in industrial production of as much as 38 percent (in Japan) and “in sec-
tor after sector, across almost all industrialized and emerging economies credit markets 
have quite simply seized up” (p. 673).  
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that distract attention from the original point of convergence. Thus, the 2011 
resurgence of commodity prices (especially oil) and anxieties over energy se-
curity are tending to displace the hostility towards banks and financial specu-
lators that was so prevalent in 2009-10. Finally, and of central importance for 
the analysis undertaken here, within two or three years of a financial crisis 
the conventional electoral calendars that govern democratic life bring about 
either a replacement or a renewal of national political leadership in many of 
the affected countries. 
Since the 2008 crisis was global in impact, it is essential to examine the 
international as well as national levels of political responsiveness to such 
shocks. Here, too, the time lags are critical. In the initial phase of crisis man-
agement crucial decisions may be taken within days, or even hours, and 
therefore with very little opportunity for planning and coordination. The most 
powerful states and the most strategically placed institutions within them 
(typically central banks and finance ministries) will do what they consider 
necessary to stabilise the immediate situation, postponing consideration of 
the knock-on effects of their decisions. At this stage democratic accountabili-
ty is liable to be viewed as a luxury. 
But once emergency resources have been deployed and crucial commit-
ments to key players undertaken, there comes a second, more reflective, 
phase. This may take some months, since in the heat of a financial crisis the 
information asymmetries tend to become even more severe than usual, and 
those in charge of the levers of power are too busy – and too uncertain of 
their control over the situation – to take time off for broader deliberations. 
But in due course it becomes necessary to rebuild international cohesion, ad-
dress the concerns of those governments most adversely affected by the ini-
tial policy responses, and to sketch out an agenda for the restoration of inter-
national economic normality. Much of the international co-ordination in-
volved at this stage is likely to be dominated by the need to transmit messag-
es of confidence and reassurance to international markets. In the current 
global system policymakers, even in the most powerful and interventionist of 
states, are extremely keen to avoid adverse verdicts from private wealth-
holders and autonomous market participants, which may result in currency 
flight, bond market strikes and bank runs. Caught between the need to justify 
the emergency decisions taken at the height of the crisis, and the wish to 
present a confidence-enhancing united front to the financial markets, interna-
tional economic policymakers have limited scope for deep analysis or root-
and-branch reforms during the early post-panic months. At best they may 
recognise the case for commissions of enquiry and expert advisory reports, 
thus postponing for a year or so the more comprehensive re-thinking that the 
crisis is seen to demand from them.  
At a third stage, as confidence returns and more precise evidence and 
analysis become available to guide further cooperative deliberations, the 
82 Laurence Whitehead 
pressure for unified action is likely to dissipate. By then some of the key de-
cision-makers at the heart of the crisis will have left office. In any case, as the 
various governments involved reflect on how the crisis has impacted on their 
national economies, and how post-crisis realignments might reassign the 
costs and benefits of reform, they are likely to arrive at divergent conclu-
sions. In 2008, for example, an early assessment was that the prime source of 
the crisis was located within the USA, and that the main responsibility for 
tackling it rested with the Treasury and the Federal Reserve in Washington.  
Many developing countries initially supposed that they could ‘decouple’ 
themselves from an upheaval not of their making. The governments of the 
Eurozone were at first inclined to respond along similar lines (although Lon-
don could not escape its immediate involvement). However, by the time that 
the international community was ready for more in-depth analysis of what 
had hit them, it was already apparent that the crisis had much wider ramifica-
tions, and that policies designed to counter it were likely to impose substan-
tial further adjustment costs on all participants. The design of such policies, 
and the distribution of the associated costs, could not be farmed out to the ini-
tial originators of the crisis alone; nor could the first mover be relied upon to 
spontaneously promote diagnoses and prescriptions of the kind favoured by 
policymakers in the rest of the world. To take one example, Chinese policy-
makers generally considered that they were not responsible for the debacle of 
2008, and that the debacle confirmed their belief in the wisdom of their own 
approach to economic policymaking. However, once international delibera-
tions got underway concerning who was at fault, and what policy changes 
should be prioritised, the misalignment of China’s exchange rate soon 
emerged as a high priority issue in Western capitals. 
By the time the Group of Twenty, the Bank for International Settlements, 
the International Monetary Fund and a host of other intergovernmental bodies 
had buckled down to serious debate on how to respond to the crisis and even 
undertaken some significant policy coordination, the national priorities of 
most leading states had become strongly defined. It would be an overstate-
ment to argue that this eliminated all margin of choice at the supra-national 
level, but it surely imposed heavy constraints. Arguably, the main benefit of 
these collective deliberations was to discourage the adoption of directly 
harmful single-country initiatives – especially trade protectionism but also 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ financial innovations. Crafting positive collaborative 
responses to post-crisis economic dislocations was a more difficult, perhaps 
unattainable task. 
To summarise the temporal rhythms of national and international res-
ponses to the crisis, by the time it was possible to assess its overall contours 
and to reflect on appropriate longer-term remedies, much of the initial mo-
mentum in favour of reform had been lost. Established interests in many 
countries had regained their confidence and veto power, and any potential 
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coalition that might have existed in favour of major curbs to the dynamics of 
financial globalisation had begun to splinter. So long as the shock of the 
‘sudden stop’ continues to retreat over the horizon, and on the assumption 
that there is no second round of financial collapse that can be proven to repre-
sent a direct continuation of the first, it seems that existing democratic sys-
tems of deliberation are apparently incapable of generating a root-and-branch 
policy response. This was also what we witnessed after 1982 and 1998. The 
best that one can say of this structure of decision-making is that it may buy 
time until emerging economic and financial problems either cure themselves 
or can be managed below the danger threshold. For all the modesty of this 
‘muddling through’ claim, this has the merit of radically improving on the 
policy responses adopted internationally after 1929. 
The first section of this chapter looks more closely at the process of 
democratic alternation as a ‘shock absorber’ of economic stress, examining 
the dynamics of political responses within the leading old democracies. The 
second section addresses the scope and limit of international co-ordination 
insofar as this can be assessed at this relatively early stage. Section three re-
views some structural factors at work – on the assumption that if political 
management of the aftermath of the crisis is weak, then other deeper forces 
will shape the outcome and determine the prospects for longer-term econom-
ic stability. The conclusion returns to the theme of political control under 
broadly democratic conditions. How do our current democratic institutions 
measure up as ‘error-correcting’ rather than ‘error-compounding’ mechan-
isms? Is ‘muddling through’ an adequate remedy for the economic vulnera-
bility revealed in 2008? Only the most preliminary of answers can be at-
tempted here, but these are crucial questions for those concerned with the 
quality and effectiveness of current democratic political systems. 
Crisis and alternation in the established democracies 
Regular free and fair elections are the cornerstone of contemporary democrat-
ic politics. This rests on certain background assumptions that are, in fact, on-
ly quite recent and perhaps fairly contingent. The locus of modern democracy 
is assumed to be a territorially bounded and administratively integrated na-
tion-state (or state-nation). But it was not until the decolonisation of the 
1950s that such units became the norm in Western Europe; and by the 1990s 
many of these democracies were ceding a degree of national sovereignty to 
the European Community in Brussels, and the European Central Bank in 
Frankfurt. Elsewhere stable territorial boundaries and administrative integra-
tion are frequently no more than works in progress, and free and fair elections 
are often something of a novelty (if they exist at all). Even the more estab-
lished old democracies do not always satisfy other background assumptions 
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about national democracy. Regular elections empower voters mainly though 
offering real opportunities for choice between alternative parties (and perhaps 
alternative policy priorities); but for many decades the party systems of Italy 
and Japan, for instance, while meeting the institutional requirements for ge-
nuinely democratic elections, basically failed to offer genuine prospects for 
alternation (the same can be said of democratic South Africa). 
However, the United Kingdom and the United States do meet all the re-
quired conditions for electoral alternation at the national level. So regardless 
of any reservations about essentialising and universalising this model of de-
mocracy, it was available after 2008 in the two long-established democracies 
that were most clearly responsible for promoting the economic and financial 
practices that went awry during that year. Consequently, in November 2008, 
when the crisis was still at its most acute and unsettling, the US electorate 
transferred executive and full legislative authority from the Republican to the 
Democratic Party. Similarly, in May 2010 (in an election that had been de-
layed until the very last moment by a Labour government still trying to post-
pone the inevitable) the British electorate ousted the party that had been in 
charge for the previous thirteen years and replaced it with a Conservative-
Liberal ‘coalition’ that united around a five-year joint platform mainly con-
cerned with economic rectification. In both cases the course and outcome of 
the electoral contest was heavily shaped by views concerning the locus of re-
sponsibility for the economic debacle and the need for a fresh team in office 
to manage its consequences. Thus, at least in the core established democra-
cies most responsible for the crisis, democratic alternation intervened as a 
powerful mechanism of political accountability and (perhaps even) “error 
correction.” 
On a broader canvas, there were electoral alternations largely driven by 
the fall-out from the crisis in Greece, Ireland and Iceland. This list may not 
yet be complete, since several other severely affected democracies have elec-
tions pending. There are also some examples of competitive elections in 
countries affected by the crisis where alternation did not occur. In Brazil, for 
example, the PT retained the presidency in October 2010, at least in part be-
cause the voters judged that the outgoing administration had proved success-
ful in managing the impact of the crisis on their country. There are, at least as 
yet, no cases of established democracies that have been institutionally desta-
bilised by the socio-economic fallout from the crisis. This is in striking con-
trast with the experience of the 1930s, as shown by Dirk Berg-Schlosser in 
this volume, and also contradicts some fairly widespread expectations of po-
litical polarisation and even regime breakdown that were current in 2009.  
Thus, on the evidence available so far, it could be concluded that demo-
cratic procedures have offered a safety valve for citizen discontent, an oppor-
tunity for the peaceful renewal of political authorities, and perhaps even some 
scope for the termination of failed strategies of economic management and 
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their replacement by more promising approaches. National democracies seem 
to provide some structural opportunities for collective deliberation and les-
son-learning that might be harder to achieve under alternative political dis-
pensations. This is the basis for the assertion that they can work as a relative-
ly effective ‘error-correction’ mechanism. 
But it would be premature to close the discussion there. The longer-term 
political fall-out from the economic shocks of 2008 has yet to become clear. 
Moreover, it was the most established Anglo-Saxon democracies that allowed 
the conditions of crisis to develop before 2008, so we must also consider 
whether this form of electorally-driven short-term policymaking could be er-
ror compounding as much as error correcting. From that standpoint, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that not all the major states caught up in the crisis 
were governed according to the principles of electoral competition and alter-
nation. There is at least one alternative political model (the Chinese) that may 
prove competitive, and there is a wide range of democratic possibilities, some 
more error compounding and others more error correcting. Some of this di-
versity has been more closely examined in the literature on ‘varieties of capi-
talism’; for the purposes of this chapter it will suffice to mention some nar-
row political considerations drawn from the recent British and US expe-
riences. 
The precise timing of each election is highly significant when assessing 
its impact on political management of an economic crisis. By the time Presi-
dent Obama assumed office on 20 January 2009 the essential features of the 
US emergency response were firmly in place. From the very beginning of his 
term, therefore, he was heavily constrained by the situation and the policies 
he had inherited. At the same time, the ousted Republicans were immediately 
committed to shifting responsibility for the hardships that were bound to fol-
low onto the incoming administration. Whatever the merits of strong elector-
al competition, this was not a situation conducive to reflective deliberation, 
nuanced attribution of responsibility, and broad-based consensus-building on 
how to rectify the policy deficiencies that had been uncovered. In the ab-
stract, electoral alternation might seem relatively propitious for such purpos-
es, but time matters a great deal here. If the outgoing administration had re-
mained responsible for longer, it would have had to explain the realities more 
fully to its supporters. If control of the lower house of Congress (the crucial 
tax-and-spend branch under the Constitution) was not up for grabs every two 
years, a longer time horizon might have encouraged better debate. These de-
tails of the US democratic process may have damaged its potential as an er-
ror-correction mechanism. 
In the UK electoral timing was also a material consideration. Here, the 
opposite problem arose. By mid-2009 the nature and origins of the economic 
crisis facing the nation were reasonably clear to all informed observers. The 
shape of the ensuing policy responses was also fairly narrowly prescribed, 
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and economic and financial experts were generating something approaching a 
broad consensus on what needed – most urgently – to be done. But it turned 
out that there was no way of forcing a discredited administration into a 
prompt election it could be sure to lose. Instead, the logic of British demo-
cratic procedure dictated that something like a year must elapse between the 
recognition of the major issues to be tackled and the appointment of a new 
administration with a renovated mandate and a new parliamentary time hori-
zon. Moreover, given the eccentricities of the British electoral system and its 
lack of recent experience with two-party coalition governments, even after 
the election had finally cleared away the debris from the past, there was no 
unified and coordinated alternative waiting in the wings. Despite the long 
year of advance notice and preparation, when the alternative came, the joint 
victors in the election had to improvise in great haste and to renegotiate the 
terms of their policy proposals in accordance with the new distribution of 
power that suddenly became apparent. The electoral process proved a lost 
opportunity to educate the British public about the problems that a new gov-
ernment would have to face, and many electoral statements (including formal 
pledges) given by the victorious parties had to be nullified once alternation 
had occurred.  
In summary, therefore, although both US and the British post-crisis elec-
tions brought about clear-cut alternations of national political leadership, nei-
ther of these democratic processes unfolded in a manner favourable to the ef-
fective redress of past errors, of the holding to account of failed officehold-
ers, or the subsequent improvement of economic policymaking to guard 
against further relapses of the same kind in the future. 
International policy coordination and democratic error 
correction 
If there is any democratic influence or accountability at the international level 
of economic governance, it is extremely indirect. The only channels of repre-
sentation available to ordinary voters exist through their national govern-
ments and the (usually very thin) procedures by which they report back to 
their parliaments and express their public opinions on such issues. Since the 
end of the Cold War some academic analysts have waxed eloquent about the 
emergence of what they term an “international civil society,” a network of 
experts, non-governmental organisations and special interest lobbyists that 
aim to shape policymaking at the supra-national level. Although many such 
activists can be criticised as being self-appointed and unaccountable to any 
well-groomed constituency, there may be some areas of international deci-
sion-making where their activities are beginning to acquire a little plausibili-
ty.  
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But international economic coordination in the face of severe financial 
instability is not yet one of those areas. Here the non-governmental pressures 
that are brought to bear on inter-ministerial gatherings have a quite different 
structure. Financial conglomerates, transnational corporations, professional 
macro-economic analysts, bureaucrats from the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the network of central bankers are the only ones with a voice. By com-
mon consent these gatherings operate on the assumption that guidance of the 
world economy is a topic too esoteric and unintelligible to be subject to open 
democratic deliberation. The experts and specialists must meet behind closed 
doors, exchanging position papers and insider knowledge in the hope of 
reaching some degree of shared understanding, and perhaps even agreement, 
to co-ordinate aspects of international policy. It is only after such closed de-
liberation that political leaders attempt to transmit sound-bites about what 
was discussed and agreed on to the wider public. (In parenthesis, it should be 
noted that international economic crisis management is not unique in this re-
spect. Decisions to go to war may also be taken in a similarly opaque manner, 
even by long-established democracies, although in this case rather than con-
sulting with economic technicians, the consultations would be with military 
security experts). 
For the most part these simplified messages are designed to provide reas-
surance, deflect criticism and exaggerate the constructive achievements of the 
individual leaders presenting their reports. That leaves little scope for ge-
nuine clarification of the dilemmas and uncertainties under discussion. Not 
only do such communiqués generally fail to educate international public opi-
nion about the real issues at stake; they also encourage busy politicians to 
deceive themselves about what has been achieved. It is politically more at-
tractive to declare a victory over adversity than to confess to indecision or de-
feat. In short, there is little scope for democratic accountability or even hon-
est reporting back from G20 summits and other such conclaves. This also 
limits their utility as error-correction mechanisms and renders them vulnera-
ble to special interest pressure groups, and distortions arising from the insider 
bias of these deliberate processes. 
This is clearly a sub-optional structure of decision-making from a demo-
cratic standpoint. But it is a reflection of genuine difficulties that limit the 
scope for direct democratic accountability at this level; and it may be less 
damaging then the available alternatives. So the two questions that are briefly 
considered here are whether somewhat more open and responsive procedures 
could serve to improve policy responsiveness; and, if so, what practical scope 
may exist for promoting such democratising reforms. 
On the first question, the chapter by Christer Jönsson largely makes my 
case for me. As he concludes, “global governance arrangements in general, 
and those in global finance in particular, rate low on basic democratic crite-
ria.” Nevertheless, “the financial crisis has entailed a certain degree of demo-
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cratisation,” and there are some grounds to hope for small further incremental 
steps in that direction. These would be desirable, not only on the grounds of 
principle, but because under the present system “interest articulation is trun-
cated, and there is a relative lack of interest aggregation.”. I would only add 
that in view of the huge distributive consequences required by adjustment to 
the new global financial realities, it may be difficult to secure an adequate 
level of collective consent and cooperation in the absence of more solid and 
legitimate structures of decision-making. The present arrangements are quite 
vulnerable and precarious, because of the absence of public understanding 
and endorsement. They may be slightly better than in the past (they have at 
least kept the principles of international dialogue alive, in contrast to the 
1930s), but they lack democratic authorisation and may not prove robust 
enough to cope with eventual backlashes. 
Secondly, as Jönsson also says, the scope for further democratising 
measures in this area is highly constrained. Some of the principal obstacles 
are more or less insurmountable, at least in the near term. Not all the states 
participating in the G20 are democratic, and even those that are may have 
sharply clashing interests and perceptions. There is a deeply entrenched cul-
ture of closed expertise almost amounting to mystification among the insider 
professionals, which adds to the problems of communication between poli-
cymakers and the wider public. In reality, even the most well-informed and 
strategic of policymakers find themselves acting under conditions of extreme 
pressure and with imperfect and limited information at their disposal. The 
models and statistical tools they have been accustomed to relying on proved 
to be poor guidance at the time of the ‘sudden stop’, and may not work any 
better in its aftermath. The market forces unleashed by liberalisation and 
global economic integration are turning out to be almost as hard to track as 
they are to manage politically. Nevertheless, some incremental learning is 
possible, some broader deliberation could prove stabilising and democratic 
leaders will need the support of an informed public opinion if they are to con-
tain the pressures from unaccountable concentrations of economic financial 
power. 
Economic globalisation versus democratic political 
management 
Whether one considers democratic accountability to be lodged at the level of 
national governments (as in the first section) or to be pooled at the intergo-
vernmental level (as described in the second section), the underlying assump-
tion remains that political authorities, answerable in some way to their elec-
tors and their societies, must be in a position to regulate, supervise and autho-
rise the broad functioning of the economic system. After all, a market-related 
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system of resource allocation requires voluntary cooperation and some de-
gree of trust between buyers and sellers, and between producers, intermedia-
ries and consumers. So there has to be a framework of rules – laws, regula-
tions, structures and dispute-resolution mechanisms – to permit the non-
coercive exchange of goods and services.  
In a liberalised global economy these legitimate transactions within each 
national political unit have to be sealed up and harmonised so that they can 
also be conducted across state boundaries. The dividing line separating legi-
timate business from criminal transactions has to be clearly established and 
credibly patrolled, not only within but also between market economies. In 
summary, even on a narrowly ‘neo-liberal’ definition of the scope of political 
supervision, there is an indispensable role to be played by public authority in 
underpinning and promoting the market economy. Moreover, once voters be-
gin to exercise influence over the choice of their political masters, they are 
almost certain to make further demands on them beyond the bare essentials 
required for legitimate commerce. In practice, of course, some electorates add 
extensive welfare requirements that have to be balanced against the claims of 
the legitimate market. Others may be more concerned about issues of security 
or collective identity. In summary, the political leaders required to stabilise 
and promote a dynamic commercial society will also need to process other 
citizen demands not directly geared to the smooth functioning of a liberalised 
market economy. For this they raise tax revenues, lead complex state bureau-
cracies, and enforce elaborate structures of law and social restraint. At least 
that is how democratic politics were believed to operate throughout the twen-
tieth century, and this belief still shapes most democratic rhetoric and expec-
tations at this time. 
Nevertheless, there are good theoretical grounds for doubting how effec-
tively public authorities can be in controlling or supervising a liberalised 
market economy – and the crisis of 2008 showed that such doubts are not 
purely theoretical. After all, even in a closed economy the same voters and 
citizens who demand market accountability from their public officials are al-
so the consumers and borrowers who expect to enjoy the personal freedom 
and choice promised by deregulated markets. Furthermore, as liberalisation 
proceeds it transfers social and indeed market power to private producer in-
terests and to financial conglomerates and their media spokesmen, all of 
which become lobbyists for greater liberalisation. At best they may have an 
interest in ‘light touch’ forms of regulation, but they can be expected to ac-
tively resist any serious democratic pressure to restore political controls over 
market transactions, however scandalous the abuses that may arise. This is 
not so much a case of myopia or ill-will, but rather a reflection of the skewed 
distribution of social power that arises as a consequence of liberalisation. 
This would almost certainly have been the case even if liberalisation had 
been confined within closed national economies. 
90 Laurence Whitehead 
The dilation of democratic counterweights to market pressure is all the 
more extensive and irreversible when liberalisation is driven by global eco-
nomic integration. The successful private media conglomerates are no longer 
checked by effective public service broadcasting, so they have no incentive to 
exercise restraint in pursuit of their own interests. The civil servants, trade 
unionists, local authorities, cooperatives and mutual societies, etc. that may 
once have sustained a pluralist equilibrium restraining the excesses of private 
market power all lose traction as economic liberalisation rolls forward. 
Such a context transforms the market for votes and reduces the scope for 
political control over corporate vested interests. It might be thought that, even 
so, in an extreme crisis of the type briefly witnessed in 2008, power would 
shift back to the more market-critical sections of the political class as a result 
of a public opinion alarmed at the fiscal transfers and other privileges de-
manded by corporations deemed ‘too big to fail’. But as a broad and provi-
sional generalisation, the aftermath of 2008 does not appear to bear out such 
expectations. Few market-critical political elites remained in play by that 
stage and the support they could muster is proving to be ephemeral.  
Thus, even where left-of-centre governments did emerge from the crisis 
(as in the USA and Greece), the incoming administrations inherited such fis-
cal imbalances and such international economic vulnerabilities that any initial 
intentions they may have had to reassert democratic controls over the man-
agement of the economy were promptly countered by the importance of res-
toring ‘market confidence’. Moreover, such incoming left-of-centre demo-
cratic administrations are caught in a cross-fire. In addition to opposition 
from powerful business interests opposed to any political reform that would 
curb their privileges, they are equally challenged by dissent from their own 
national constituencies of support, as these sectors discover that the main 
burden of post-crisis austerity and pro-market adjustment is likely to fall on 
their communities. 
The underlying issue here is not which democratic electoral alternative is 
best placed to manage the political choices arising from the crisis (each op-
tion has its strengths as well as its limitations, and alternative experiments 
may be worth trying out in different national contexts). The broader issue is 
whether public authorities periodically selected through electoral contesta-
tion, whatever their initial programmes or bases of social support, possess the 
cohesion and leverage necessary to oversee and redirect the course of eco-
nomic events in the wake of the latest crisis of financial globalisation. The al-
ternative hypothesis would be that massive forces of economic and financial 
transformation will work their way through, under their own momentum, and 
with minimum guidance from the democratic authorities nominally in charge. 
Elected politicians and public authorities will still go through the motions of 
holding summits, writing budgets and appointing regulators, but most of this 
will be reactive or cosmetic, rather than directive.  
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A few illustrations appear to support this alternative view. Voters will 
want an early return to fairly full employment in all Western democracies. Is 
this something that their political leaders are in a position to deliver? Or, giv-
en that they need to maintain the illusion of authoritative leadership, will they 
not be driven to seek out scapegoats, or in others ways shift responsibility 
and disguise their relative impotence on this crucial matter? But if unem-
ployment remains intractable and elected politicians are unable to explain 
why, or to admit their powerlessness, then discontented electorates are un-
likely to welcome proposals for enhanced international cooperation that ap-
pear to place the interests of outsiders above the unheard voices of the na-
tionally enfranchised. Thus, whatever politicians might hope to agree to in 
the international area, they will be constrained by their lack of domestic legi-
timacy.  
There is no space here to elaborate on all the many possible variations on 
this theme. Consider politicians under pressure from ageing electorates who 
therefore cannot redress grave injustices in inter-generational equity (British 
tuition fees provide one illustration out of many); or consider huge resource 
transfers from welfare provision and local government infrastructure (key 
foundations of the social pact long established in most Western democracies) 
to insolvent financial institutions or deficit-ridden pension funds. Moreover, 
in an interdependent liberalised international economy many of these deep 
distributional conflicts and transfers also flow between nations as well as 
within them. Consequently, undocumented international migration, non-
transparent money transfers, migration to tax-sheltered jurisdictions, among 
other phenomena, further complicate the picture and accentuate the contrast 
between illusions of effective economic management by elected politicians 
and the realities of market-determined sauve-qui-peut. 
It is still too soon after the trauma of 2008 for a firm judgment to be 
made about the extent and limits of democratic political capacity to manage 
these forces in the aftermath of the crisis. Both on theoretical grounds and in 
the light of first-round indicators so far, it is reasonable to query whether the 
standard 20th-century model of democratic accountability will remain useable 
in the emerging globalised economy. Conventional theories about rational 
choice and institutional design may grossly over-estimate the precision and 
consistency of conventional top-down systems of public management of core 
economic variables. The alternative picture of market-determined economic 
forces overflowing the channels of restraint manned by weak and disoriented 
political authorities may be too drastic a corrective. But recent events crystal-
lise what were in any case growing doubts about the over-confident liberal 
international consensus of the early post-Cold War years. It is in this insecure 
and uncertain context that we locate our concluding reflections on democracy 
as an ‘error-correcting’ system. 
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Tentative conclusions about democracy and the global 
economy 
A central theme in democratic theory concerns whether democracy is to be 
commended as an ‘end in itself’ or for the benefits it delivers in other re-
spects. When we study the history of why people join together and often at a 
personal cost, in order to promote broad processes of democratisation, it turns 
out that few political actors give much attention to this distinction. They pur-
sue some roughly defined democratic objectives, such as dignity, equality, to-
lerance and cooperation all rolled into one, in the hope that these will both 
enhance societal cohesion and may also deliver other desired benefits, as 
suggested by democratic peace theory, democracy and development studies, 
and so on. If one variant of democracy seems a disappointment by some of 
these criteria, the response may well be to call for a further or different de-
mocratising reform rather than to relinquish the pursuit of the overall goal. 
Perhaps the essential intuition motivating such an outlook is that through ap-
propriate cooperative political action ordinary people must surely be able 
both to have their voices heard and prod their rulers into improving their 
conditions.  
The international ‘sudden stop’ to international financial flows of 2008 
clearly raises new doubts about the reliability of that intuition in a globalised 
market economy, but falls far short of dispelling it. Even if all the problems 
outlined above prove truly intractable, that will not silence demands for dem-
ocratic governance either at the national or the supra-national level –for both 
deontological and consequentialist reasons. Even if the results delivered by 
democratic politics prove a severe disappointment, it will remain possible to 
argue that more or better democracy is the remedy, and that dispensing with 
democracy would only aggravate the problem. 
 
The focus of this chapter has been on democracy as an ‘error-correction’ 
mechanism. This is only one strand among the armoury of justifications that 
can be derived from democratic theory and experience. It is, however, one 
that merits more careful examination in the context of current international 
economic realities. In principle, democracy could be either error correcting 
or error compounding or not directly relevant to how well the world financial 
system is evolving. There is a wide spread of viewpoints about which of 
these positions is more convincing. While the evidence remains provisional 
and difficult to interpret, there remains plenty of scope for the contention that 
if one particular set of democratic arrangements turns out to be error com-
pounding, then the remedy is a redesign or a renewed democratisation drive, 
rather than a loss of commitment to the broader enterprise. 
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Most Western democratic governments currently claim to be heavily fo-
cused on their ‘error-correction’ duties. They have by now nearly all settled 
on their respective narratives to explain what their predecessors did wrong, or 
failed to do, thus allowing the 2008 crisis to get out of hand. (Democratic 
governments outside the core regions of Europe and North America have 
emerged better placed, and therefore tend to highlight what they believe they 
did right.) They are mostly engaged in combining fiscal consolidation with 
monetary laxity at the democratic level, together with loose international co-
ordination at the international level. Whether this will prove error correcting 
or error compounding over the next decade remains very much an open ques-
tion at this stage. Even if this turns out to be the correct ‘technical’ response, 
and even if subsequent market ‘normalisation’ is managed smoothly, the po-
litical strains associated with this stance are likely to generate considerable 
turbulence and eventual policy instability. This would not be such a problem 
if the intellectual foundations for these corrective policies were robust and 
consensual. But, in practice, after the shocks of 2008 many economic and fi-
nancial analysts are no longer so much in agreement as before about how best 
to respond to current policy dilemmas. It is in this context of uncertainty and 
low self-confidence among the experts that democratic accountability, super-
vision and experimentation could achieve more leeway. 
 
The purpose of these concluding reflections is therefore not to generate a 
new set of prescriptions about how democratic leaders should take charge of, 
or redirect, the course of the international economy. The question of which 
prescriptions might make matters worse or better requires a different level of 
analysis. Here the objective is more modest – to separate out some crucial 
factors that help to determine how democratic responses to economic crises 
are best analysed, and where to look when assessing whether such responses 
are constructive, destructive, or simply irrelevant. The four interrelated and 
extremely complex factors selected for brief examination here are the time-
scale; the feedback; the delicate balance between political and technical con-
siderations; and the conditions under which democratic politics can remain 
independent from, or absorb the failings of, economic mismanagement.  
Timescales 
There is almost invariably a substantial mismatch between the relatively 
fixed calendar of political processes (annual budgets, periodic summits, and 
multi-year election schedules) and the decision-making rhythms required in a 
globalised economy. If all depositions in Northern Rock are not fully guaran-
teed by Monday morning the bank run will be unstoppable…. No matter 
what that signifies for national budgets over future years. At the other end of 
the scale, globalisation also sets in motion global tectonic shifts (of manufac-
turing in Asia, or of agro-industry in South America, for instance), and these 
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proceed relentlessly over decades almost regardless of intervening political 
minuets. Mismatches on this scale reveal limited scope for political direction 
over fundamental economic and financial developments. But some scope still 
remains. Democratic politicians and their expert advisers can, in principle, 
learn lessons from recent demonstrations of the severity of these mismatches. 
Left unchecked, they can be expected to further discredit the democratic pro-
cess, but once this is understood there could be scope for adjusting the timet-
able and instruments of policy management to narrow the gap between the 
requirements of political deliberation and consultation, on the one hand, and 
the logic of the markets, on the other. It should be possible to improve the 
timing of political decision-making in order to render democratic procedures 
less error compounding, even if they can never be made fully effective as er-
ror-correcting mechanisms.  
Feedback 
That connects with feedback and the role of expertise pretending to steer a li-
beralised international economy with the help of overly rigid and scholastic 
models, relying on backward-looking data with large error terms and sharp 
discontinuities, which has proved to be a poor formula indeed. Expertise is 
certainly needed to identify which defects were most damaging, and what al-
ternative forms of data collection and analysis might reduce the dangers of 
radical misdiagnosis. But this is not solely – or even mainly – a question of 
technical reform. Many democratic policymakers become too dependent on 
specialised bureaucratic procedures that promised more certainty and control 
than they could possibly be expected to deliver.  
Another crucial dimension of improved feedback is therefore the need 
for elected politicians to develop a greater sense of realism about the defi-
ciencies of the tools on which they rely. This is disquieting for busy and ha-
rassed decision-makers who need to maintain public confidence, and who 
like to shelter behind expert advice as a means of protecting their political 
reputations. Nevertheless, one clear lesson of the 2008 crisis is that politi-
cians who rely uncritically on a narrow set of orthodox indicators and advis-
ers will not escape blame when their errors are exposed.  
Some useful lessons can be extracted from this experience. Since the 
costs of misplaced over-confidence have proved so high, a more cautious ex-
perimental and incremental approach to policymaking might help minimise 
the risks of gross error; since the most prestigious sources of expertise have 
proved so fallible, a wider and more diverse pool of advice could be worth 
considering; since the most powerful economic groups in a liberalised system 
can be expected to press their interests without restraint, good democratic 
leadership requires the encouragement of countervailing pressures and ulti-
mate sources of expertise. Qualitative as well as quantitative considerations 
may merit respect, and feedback from civil society (including what ordinary 
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citizens understand and will tolerate from their leaders) could be weighed 
more carefully against the certainties of the established elites. 
The delicate balance between authority and responsiveness 
This is to turn direct attention to the delicate balance that democratic politi-
cians always need to maintain between the effective exercise of their dele-
gated political authority, on the one hand, and their responsiveness to the 
larger society and its diverse constituencies, on the other. A simple approach 
to managing the tensions between these two logics is to cater to citizen’s ex-
pectations at the moment of each election, and to govern in accordance with 
orthodox expert advice in between. Even in normal times the change of gear 
between these two periods can be very disruptive; in times of financial crisis 
and severe economic dislocation that is likely to prove short-sighted and de-
stabilising as an electoral strategy, while also enhancing the risks of error-
compounding behaviour between elections.  
A sounder democratic strategy for handling this delicate balance would 
need to include more efforts to educate the electorate about the real choices 
they confront, and not just during but also between elections. The importance 
of a two-way dialogue with the political community as a whole should also 
be conveyed to the bureaucrats, the regulators and the economic managers. A 
more ‘deliberative’ approach to policymaking may not be easy to promote, 
especially not in the fraught and polarised context of the post-2008 crises, but 
there could be a high cost for persisting with a standard electoralist approach 
arising from its error-compounding and societally de-legitimising properties. 
Democracy’s absorptive and deflective capacities 
Finally, then, the underlying question raised by these tentative conclusions is 
under what conditions the distribution stresses and policy failings generated 
by the 2008 crisis can be absorbed or deflected by democratic strategies of 
policy management. So far the evidence is mildly reassuring, but the absence 
of abrupt regime breakdowns, such as occurred in the 1930s, should not be 
over-interpreted.  
This chapter has surveyed a succession of theoretical and practical con-
cerns, and focused more on the risks of poor policymaking and of ‘low-
quality’ democratic performance than on the probability of outright regime 
rupture. Over time democracies that compound economic management errors 
and that fail to address the fundamental concerns of large sectors of the elec-
torate may become more vulnerable to downward spirals. This is all the more 
of a concern in an internationalised policy framework, where citizens fear 
that unaccountable decision-making in inter-governmental agencies is sub-
verting the sovereignty of their parliaments, parties and national political sys-
tems. But this chapter does not regard any artificial index of ‘probability of 
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breakdown’ as the crucial metric. Rather, it has been concerned to outline the 
scope for adjustments in the style and structure of democratic decision-
making so that its error-correction potentialities can be enhanced, and its 
sources of social support reinforced. The aftermath of the 2008 crisis makes 
it clear that these are urgent issues and not easy problems to tackle. But some 
scope for creative responses can still be highlighted. 
 
 
The model of liberal democracy and varieties of 
capitalism 
Ursula Hoffmann-Lange 
Introduction 
As this book considers the possible impact of the Great Recession on global 
democracy, it is necessary to understand what democracy is and how it func-
tions, what makes it desirable and preferable to other political systems, what 
its inherent strengths and weaknesses are, how it fares in various cultural 
contexts, and how it is linked to the market economy.  
This contribution starts from the assumption that the model of liberal 
democracy is universally applicable and has the ability to ensure both social 
peace and political legitimacy. The model is by no means a prescription for a 
uniform set of political and economic institutions, as it can be adjusted to fit 
the specific cultural traditions of any country, but it suffers from an inherent 
tension between its two basic principles: liberty and equality. On the one 
hand, it requires the existence of a market economy, that is, a capitalist sys-
tem, which necessarily implies inequalities of wealth. On the other hand, de-
mocracy has to ensure the equality of its citizens and this raises the question 
of whether equity should be limited only to political rights, such as equality 
of the vote etc., or whether it should also imply that democratic governments 
have a responsibility to reduce socioeconomic disparities. The topic remains 
highly controversial. Even so, the market economies of the consolidated lib-
eral democracies are characterised by a good deal of government intervention 
into the market in favour of securing a basic standard of living for their citi-
zens. Because liberal democracies are politically more flexible, ensure the ex-
istence of an open market of ideas and allow an electorate to vote inefficient 
governments out of power, they are also better equipped than authoritarian 
political systems to weather even deep economic crises without the threat of a 
decline in regime legitimacy and the consequent risk of political instability.  
Democracy is inherently a continuous rather than a dichotomous concept. 
It is an ideal type of government in the sense that it can never be fully 
achieved in reality. In practice, even consolidated liberal democracies are in 
many respects deficient. They have biased systems of interest representation 
in public policymaking, low-level corruption is endemic (cf. Transparency 
International) and political parties frequently deceive citizens in electoral 
campaigns by making promises they will not be able to fulfil after they have 
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come to power. Still, even critical observers would probably agree that such 
violations of democratic norms are much less severe in established liberal 
democracies than in authoritarian regimes.  
The initial question to ask is whether liberal democracy is indeed the best 
system for securing “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” (Jeremy 
Bentham) in the course of championing “life, liberty and the pursuit or hap-
piness” (United States Declaration of Independence). The first and most cru-
cial distinction between democratic and non-democratic polities lies in the 
method by which political leaders are selected. In a democracy this happens 
by means of regular, competitive popular elections that ensure elected leaders 
can be held accountable to the wishes of the citizens.  
While competitive elections are the central criterion for a liberal democ-
racy, many theorists have argued that such a narrow definition is insufficient 
because electoral procedures may unfairly benefit some competitors. Elector-
al rules may, for instance, prevent certain parties or candidates from running 
for electoral office because of unduly high requirements for candidate regis-
tration; constituencies may be of grossly unequal size or their boundaries 
may be unfairly drawn; high electoral thresholds may effectively bar the re-
presentation of minorities, etc. Likewise, governments can use their resources 
to prevent effective campaigning by opposition parties, opposition candidates 
may be harassed or even thrown into prison, etc. Most political scientists 
therefore agree that the existence of several parties and their representation in 
the national legislature is only a minimal requirement liberal democracies 
have to fulfil.  
Robert Dahl (1998), a well-known theorist of democracy added other cri-
teria to the list besides meaningful competitive elections, among them, fun-
damental liberty rights and the rule of law. According to another theorist, 
Guillermo O’Donnell (2004), the rule of law is an essential pillar of democ-
racy, because it is the precondition of effective political rights, civil liberties 
and mechanisms of accountability. This is why most scholars of democracy 
distinguish between merely electoral democracies in which the rule of law is 
not effectively realised, and ‘embedded democracies’ that guarantee and ef-
fectively protect the constitutional rights of citizens. 
In Central and Western Europe the development of the rule of law started 
in the Middle Ages and was already established at the beginning of the period 
of democratisation in the 19th century. It was, in fact, an important precondi-
tion for democratisation in that part of the world because it allowed citizens 
to form voluntary associations and political parties, which then became the 
driving force in mobilising the people to demand an expansion of the suffrage 
to ever larger parts of the population.  
According to a famous thesis by Samuel Huntington, there have been 
three waves of democratisation. The First Wave started in the 19th century in 
Western Europe and North America, and then lost momentum in the period 
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between the two World Wars, as illuminated in this book by Dirk Berg-
Schlosser. The Second Wave emerged in the wake of World War II and faded 
out between the 1960s and 1970s. The Third Wave was initiated in 1974 with 
the democratisation of Portugal, Spain and Greece. After the end of the Cold 
War, the Third Wave of democratisation spread to all regions of the world. 
While the First Wave was largely limited to countries that had achieved the 
rule of law before becoming democratic, the same has not been true for 
Second and Third Wave democracies. In many of those countries democracy 
was introduced without such a tradition and therefore lacked an effective and 
impartial public bureaucracy and an independent judiciary. This made the 
consolidation of democracy more difficult, because there were several chal-
lenges to be confronted at the same time. Moreover, many of the Second and 
Third Wave democracies have also been poor and lacked the financial re-
sources to establish an effective bureaucracy and an independent judiciary. 
A recent article by Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente (2010) argued 
that democratising countries that have already achieved higher levels of so-
cio-economic development are better equipped to invest in the development 
of an effective public service, while democratic leaders in poor countries do 
not only have fewer resources at their disposal, but are also exposed to much 
stronger pressures to use the spoils of office for the benefit of their followers. 
New democracies in poor countries are therefore apt to experience a pro-
longed stage of poorly functioning institutions, high levels of corruption, in-
tense social and political conflict as well as government instability. Such 
electoral democracies are frequently called defective democracies or hybrid 
regimes. According to Leonardo Morlino (2009), such hybrid regimes may 
persist for extended periods of time and can therefore not be considered as 
transitional regime types. 
(Liberal) democracy as a universal value 
Historians of non-European cultures, advocates of multiculturalism, but most 
of all autocrats of all sorts have frequently claimed that liberal democracy is a 
model of state organisation that was developed in Europe during the period of 
the Enlightenment and cannot easily be transferred to regions with different 
cultural backgrounds. They have therefore denounced attempts by democratic 
governments and NGOs (such as Freedom House or IDEA) to promote de-
mocracy in other world regions as cultural imperialism. This argument is not 
particularly compelling, however, because almost no one has ever raised sim-
ilar objections to importing technical products such as automobiles or tele-
phones, and most critics have also not criticised the adoption of modern med-
icine or new production technologies on the basis that these were not in-
vented in their own country or culture. The rejection of liberal democracy on 
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the basis that it is unsuitable for a particular country is mostly advocated by 
authoritarian political leaders intent on preserving their power, by orthodox 
religious leaders demanding a monopoly for their religious teachings, or by 
members of the well-to-do middle classes who fear that democracy will em-
power the lower classes and endanger their own privileged socio-economic 
status. Such criticism of democracy is thus primarily self-serving. 
The fact that the model of liberal democracy was developed within a 
specific cultural context does not imply that it cannot be successfully trans-
ferred to regions with a different cultural background. Human history is rep-
lete with cultural innovations that have proven their viability in other cultural 
contexts. Medieval Islamic achievements in mathematics, the natural 
sciences, medicine and the arts, for instance, have left a deep imprint on the 
rest of the world. Moreover, many democratic values such as human dignity, 
tolerance, freedom of speech, equality before the law, etc. are not only ele-
ments of Judeo-Christian cultures but also of other cultures and religions. 
The most compelling argument in favour of the universality of democrat-
ic values and principles, however, can be derived from anthropological as-
sumptions. While a similar line of reasoning can already been found in earlier 
texts, such as the Federalist Papers or the writings of Ernst Fraenkel (1991), 
David Beetham (2009) has recently rephrased it in an especially elegant way. 
Beetham starts out from two fundamental assumptions. The first is that con-
flicts of interest over scarce resources are inevitable and that only the people 
themselves have the capacity to determine what is in their own best interest. 
“There is simply no single ‘good’ which can be shown to be the supreme end 
of public policy, unless this is couched in such vague and general terms (such 
as ‘the welfare of the people’) as to be either meaningless or open to multiple 
interpretations. Political decision-making is about hard choices between 
competing goods, or values or priorities, about which there can in principle 
be no clearly right and wrong answers.” (2009: 283) Nobody can therefore 
claim to possess a priori knowledge about which course of collective action 
will be the best for achieving the public weal.  
Beetham’s second assumption relates to what he calls the “limited bene-
volence or altruism” of political leaders, implying that governments cannot 
be trusted to decide on behalf of the public interest because the pursuit of par-
ticularistic interests usually promises higher returns (2009: 286). Paternalistic 
ideologies claiming that certain philosophers, religious authorities, charismat-
ic political leaders or experts can serve as ‘guardians’ (Plato) of the public in-
terest because they are endowed with superior knowledge are therefore un-
founded.1  
                                                                          
1  Ernst Fraenkel (1991) used pretty much the same line of argument by refuting the idea that 
it is possible to identify what is the best in the public interest ‘a priori’. Instead, he argued 
that the public good can only be determined ‘a posteriori’ and can be best achieved by the 
free expression and accommodation of conflicting interests. 
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This implies that all individuals affected by collective decisions should 
also have the right to participate in them. Beetham concludes: “Now the point 
to make here … is that this argument against paternalism and in defense of 
political equality does not stop at borders, or apply only to a section of hu-
manity, but is universal in its reach. If it is valid for my country (wherever 
‘my’ is), then it must be so everywhere” (2009: 286). Even so, democracy 
presupposes the acceptance of one single albeit centrally important value, 
which is the belief in the fundamental equality of all human beings, which in 
turn requires respect for their dignity. It is obvious that ideologies or religions 
that believe in natural inequalities based on race, sex or other ascribed traits 
will not easily accept this basic tenet of democracy.  
The introduction of democratic institutions requires widespread, although 
not necessarily unanimous, elite support. Such support does not presuppose 
that all elite groups have to embrace the philosophical underpinnings of dem-
ocratic theory. Dankwart Rustow (1970) argued that democratisation may in-
stead result from the insight that it is the only viable solution for ending an 
inconclusive struggle for political dominance among competing elite fac-
tions, because it refers the decision on who should be in charge of the gov-
ernment to the citizens. This is especially likely to happen where it is difficult 
to predict which of the political camps enjoys more support among the elec-
torate and none can rule out the possibility they might end up in the opposi-
tion. Under these conditions, the major elite actors may agree to introduce 
fair electoral rules and minority rights (Przeworski 1991). Democracy may 
therefore not result from a widespread belief in its intrinsic value, but primar-
ily because it is considered as a means of conflict resolution. This latter pos-
sibility makes even more implausible the claim that it is not universally ap-
plicable. 
Determinants of liberal democracy: structure vs. culture 
In his seminal article on the social requisites of democracy, Seymour Martin 
Lipset (1959) used statistical data to determine the relationship between de-
mocracy and the socio-economic structure of societies. Lipset concluded that 
democracy flourishes primarily in economically developed societies with a 
high degree of urbanisation and a high average level of education. His claim 
has remained controversial for three reasons. First, the statistical relationship 
between socio-economic modernisation and democracy is far from perfect. It 
cannot explain why some highly developed countries such as Germany and 
Japan became democratic at a relatively late point in time compared to coun-
tries at a roughly equal or even lower level of economic development, nor 
can it tell us why some poor countries such as India have been democratic for 
a long time. Since social scientific laws are probabilistic rather than determi-
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nistic, however, such irregularities may be due to country-specific factors and 
do not invalidate Lipset’s general conclusion.  
Lipset’s assumption of a causal relationship between socio-economic 
modernisation and democracy has been subjected to extensive empirical ex-
amination, which has generally supported it, even though that relationship is 
not as linear as Lipset implied and has also varied over time. And although 
empirical evidence confirms that GDP remains the single most important 
predictor of democracy, the Human Development Index (HDI), which also 
takes into account educational level and life expectancy, has even greater ex-
planatory power. Diamond therefore recommended a modest reformulation 
of Lipset’s thesis: “The more well-to-do the people of a country, on average, 
the more likely they will favor, achieve, and maintain a democratic system 
for their country” (1992: 468).  
A more serious objection relates to the question of causality. Lipset could 
not convincingly demonstrate the direction of causality between modernisa-
tion and democracy. While it is highly plausible that socio-economic devel-
opment is a precondition of democracy, it cannot be ruled out that causality 
(also) works in the opposite direction, i.e. that democracy fosters economic 
development. Although a number of empirical studies have been published 
that have tried to determine the direction of causality, the results are not con-
clusive, because the number of cases is simply too small and the number of 
other relevant causal factors is too large. 
Finally, Lipset’s structural theory has also been criticised for neglecting 
the impact of cultural factors, international influences and, last but not least, 
the behaviour of elites. A major challenge for modernisation theory comes 
from the theory of value change. Based on the results of the World Values 
Surveys, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005) have argued that hu-
man development leads to rising support for civic liberties both among elites 
and mass publics, and that this value change has increased the pressure for in-
troducing democratic institutions in ever more countries. However, plausible 
as this may seem, human development is highly correlated with socio-
economic modernisation, which makes it impossible to statistically separate 
the effects of structural and cultural factors. 
Institutional variants of liberal democracy 
In many parts of the world the concept of liberal democracy is primarily asso-
ciated with the institutions and policies of the United States. Conversely, dissa-
tisfaction with US foreign policy, especially US interventions into the domestic 
affairs of other countries around the globe, influences the reputation of liberal 
democracy in the Third World. At the same time the knowledge about demo-
cratic values and principles among citizens in these mostly poor countries is 
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vague at best, and their authoritarian governments also try to keep it that way. 
Rather than being aware of the existing institutional variants of liberal democ-
racy, many therefore loathe democracy because they believe that the democrat-
ic world is responsible for their own miserable living conditions. 
In fact, however, aspiring democrats have an unlimited range of institu-
tional options which allow them to devise a set of constitutional rules that 
promises the closest fit with their own politico-cultural traditions. Institution-
al choices have to be made with respect to three fundamental aspects. First, 
there is the choice between a parliamentary or a presidential system of gov-
ernment. In parliamentary systems such as Great Britain, Canada or Germa-
ny, legislative elections determine who will be in charge of the executive, 
which is in turn politically accountable to the legislature and can be removed 
from power by a vote of no confidence. In presidential systems which are 
prevalent in the Americas (United States and most Latin American democra-
cies) the chief executive and the legislature are elected in separate elections 
for fixed electoral terms. 
Both systems have their merits and drawbacks. In parliamentary systems 
the executive needs the sustained support of a parliamentary majority and can 
be replaced any time, thus ensuring that the policy initiatives of the govern-
ment are usually supported by the parliamentary majority. On the other hand, 
a high degree of political fragmentation may prevent the formation of stable 
parliamentary majorities and may lead to governmental instability. Presiden-
tial systems with their fixed terms avoid this kind of instability. The separate 
elections for the chief executive and legislature, however, may produce di-
vided governments with different parties controlling the presidency and the 
legislature, and this may in turn produce a stalemate between the two 
branches of government. This implies that the stability of both systems of 
government ultimately depends on the willingness of the major political ac-
tors to engage in political compromises. Democracy thus presupposes a con-
sensus on basic rules of the game and even the best constitutional rules are 
not sufficient to ensure its viability where such a consensus is lacking. 
The second important institutional choice relates to the electoral system. 
The basic choice is between plurality/majority systems with single-member 
constituencies and proportional representation (PR). While a plurality system 
which is mainly used in Great Britain and former British colonies (USA, 
Canada, Australia) tends to foster the development of a party system with on-
ly two major parties, one of which usually gains a majority of legislative 
mandates, single-member constituency systems with majority requirement 
(e.g. France) as well as PR systems (used in most parliamentary democracies) 
will usually result in multiparty systems that require (informal or formal) 
coalitions of at least two parties for majority formation. 
A third basic decision pertains to the degree of centralisation of govern-
mental power at the national level and the degree of autonomy granted to re-
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gions. The strongest vertical separation of powers can be found in federal 
systems in which regions enjoy considerable autonomy for self-government. 
In unitary systems such as France, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, Israel 
and generally in smaller democracies, political power is instead concentrated 
in the hands of the national government. Federalism is especially suited for 
large or culturally diverse societies such as the United States, India or Cana-
da, because it allows different ethnic or religious subgroups to govern their 
internal affairs without much interference by the national government. 
It is evident that these three basic institutional choices open up a host of 
institutional options. Moreover, liberal democracies also differ a great deal 
with respect to their socio-economic structure and political culture. Cultural 
traditions may foster a preference for either a majoritarian or a consensual 
mode of decision-making (cf. Lijphart, 1999). While countries with a majori-
tarian culture such as Great Britain and the United States tend to prefer a 
strong executive based on narrow electoral majorities, those with a consen-
sual culture (primarily Switzerland and Finland) tend to accommodate minor-
ities by searching for broad-based compromises and by assigning veto power 
to independent bodies such as constitutional courts, central banks or regional 
and local governments. 
Liberal democracy and the economy 
“Democracy and market-capitalism are like two persons bound in a tempes-
tuous marriage that is driven by conflict and yet endures because neither 
partner wishes to separate from the other” (Dahl, 1998: 166). While this 
comment shows that democracy and a market economy tend to coincide, it 
fails to explicitly acknowledge that this relationship is not one of choice but 
of necessity. Liberal democracy grants individual liberty rights which also 
include economic rights. This connection between liberal democracy and a 
market economy is often not adequately acknowledged, however, especially 
since even some theorists of democracy have been known to claim that de-
mocracy does not predetermine a specific type of economic regime.2 Many 
people continue to nourish the illusion that democracy can function without 
capitalism.  
However, while both liberty and equality are fundamental principles en-
shrined in the democratic creed since the French Revolution, both are also in 
conflict with each other. The inherent tension between freedom and equality 
has been analysed by many political philosophers and political scientists. Gi-
ovanni Sartori’s treatment of this problematique is especially lucid and com-
                                                                          
2  In 1992 the Journal of Democracy devoted an issue to discussing the relationship between 
democracy and capitalism. 
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pelling (1987, Chapters 11 and 12). Sartori starts out by stating that political 
liberty is foremost defensive freedom, which implies the existence of con-
straints on the power of governments. Because it is an abstract concept and 
its benefits for the individual are not immediately tangible, its importance for 
democracy is often not properly appreciated. Most people have instead an in-
tuitive understanding of equality, which they usually associate with economic 
equality.  
Sartori goes on to emphasise that equality implies two different mean-
ings, sameness and justice, and that both are not equally compatible with li-
berty. This is only the case for equality in the sense of justice, which implies 
equality before the law, equal respect and equality of opportunities. Since in-
dividuals are different, equality in the sense of equality of conditions would 
instead require unequal treatment.  
These theoretical premises imply that democracy is incompatible with a 
command economy and that it imposes limits on the right of governments to 
encroach on the economic freedom of citizens. The upside of this connection 
between democracy and economic freedom is that democracy protects private 
property, the freedom to choose one’s occupation as well as voluntary con-
tractual relations among citizens. The downside is that free markets tend to 
produce economic disparities, which frequently violate intuitive norms of dis-
tributive justice. Moreover, they also tend to distort political equality, be-
cause economic resources can easily be converted into political resources.  
Democracy does not mean a completely unrestrained free market, how-
ever. It has been frequently – and correctly – argued that below a minimal 
level of material security, education and personal independence it is not poss-
ible for citizens to effectively exercise their democratic rights. Governments 
therefore need to become economic actors in their own right and have the re-
sponsibility to provide for public educational institutions, a public infrastruc-
ture and at least basic welfare services.  
Robert Dahl mentioned a second, even more important, reason for the 
necessity of government intervention into the market. A market economy 
without government regulation is impossible, because “the basic institutions 
of market-capitalism themselves require extensive government intervention 
and regulation. Competitive markets, ownership of economic entities, enforc-
ing contracts, preventing monopolies, protecting property rights – these and 
many other aspects of market capitalism depend wholly on laws, policies, or-
ders, and other actions carry out by governments” (Dahl 1998: 174). 
There is considerable disagreement among political theorists as well as 
political practitioners about the acceptable degree of socio-economic inequa-
lity and the degree of government intervention into the market, which is 
deemed necessary to prevent socio-economic inequalities from becoming un-
acceptably high. Since the material wellbeing of the populace is of foremost 
importance for the legitimacy of any polity, conflicts over the economic order 
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and over the appropriate economic policies to achieve the public weal are 
therefore among the most divisive in democratic polities. Democracies have 
historically developed a variety of institutional solutions to resolve such con-
flicts and they differ considerably in the ways they regulate the economy. 
These variations can be reduced to a few main models, which will be briefly 
discussed in the next section. 
An understanding of equality as procedural equality in the sense of meri-
tocratic competition and equality of opportunity implies a preference for mi-
nimal government intervention into the market. This is the conception that 
has always prevailed in the United States. It stands in stark contrast to the 
mood prevalent in many other developed democracies – and even more so in 
poor countries – where demands for redistributive egalitarianism are more in-
sistent.  
Varieties of liberal democratic capitalism 
While many critics of the market economy have insinuated that there is one 
single model of capitalism, this assumption is far removed from reality. As 
far as government regulation of the economy is concerned, the literature 
tends to treat it as a continuous variable, ranging from a liberal to a coordi-
nated market economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The logical end points of 
the continuum are a market economy without any political regulation on the 
one side and total government control of the economy on the other. A totally 
unregulated market economy is tantamount to market anarchy and implies 
that market power becomes the only criterion for determining the standard of 
living. People who have no marketable goods or services to offer will have to 
rely on their families or on the charities for their survival. On the other side 
of the continuum total government control of the economy would require the 
nationalisation of major parts of the economy, i.e. a Soviet-style command 
economy.3 It is obvious that both are incompatible with liberal democracy. 
This means that the democratic end points of the continuum lie somewhere 
in-between these extremes.  
With respect to welfare systems, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) has dis-
tinguished three basic approaches that differ considerably in their capacity for 
decommodification.4 In line with the belief that markets should be left alone 
as much as possible, the Anglo-Saxon model implies that the responsibility 
for personal welfare rests primarily with the citizens themselves and that the 
                                                                          
3  Lipset remarked that when all economic resources are under the control of the government, 
political power becomes the only source of status and wealth, which will severely curtail 
freedom and foster nepotism and corruption (1994: 3).  
4  Decommodification denotes the degree to which the dependence on market-related income 
is reduced and income is instead based on legal entitlements. 
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public welfare system would only cater to the needy. Such liberal welfare 
states therefore rely on “means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, 
or modest social insurance plans”, as well as subsidies for private health in-
surance, private retirement plans etc. 
Corporatist-subsidiary welfare states, dating back to the late 19th century 
when Bismarck first introduced social insurance systems in Germany, offer 
comprehensive coverage to shield citizens from the risks of income loss due 
to poor health, unemployment, or old age. However, while this model has a 
partly decommodifying effect, because it ensures that citizens are entitled to 
benefits that reduce their dependence on market incomes, contributions to 
and benefits from social insurance plans are primarily tied to (previous) in-
come. This type of welfare system therefore tends to reproduce existing in-
come inequalities. The social democratic model, finally, is the most decom-
modifying in that all citizens are entitled to welfare benefits regardless of 
their income on the job market.  
Among the consolidated democracies the degree of government regula-
tion of the market is relatively low in the Anglo-Saxon countries as well as in 
Japan and Switzerland. In these countries the share of the GDP spent or regu-
lated by the government is also lower than in the other established democra-
cies (see Table 1). Yet their welfare systems differ in many respects. While 
for instance, the national health service in Great Britain is paid out of taxes 
and offers health care for all citizens free of charge, the US health system is 
largely left to the private sector. Until the health care reform of 2010 a rela-
tively large percentage of the US population did not have any health insur-
ance. Only a small part of the population profits from the two public health 
care programmes, Medicaid and Medicare.5 While the 2010 health care 
reform introduced compulsory health insurance for all citizens, the majority 
of citizens below the age of 65 have to subscribe to rather expensive private 
health insurance plans.  
At the other end of the spectrum we find the Scandinavian countries and 
the Netherlands with extensive government regulation of the economy and a 
well-developed welfare state. But over the last thirty years these countries 
have experimented with rather different new models for solving the financial 
problems of their welfare states, so their economic and welfare systems also 
differ from each other. This shows once more that the model of liberal de-
mocracy offers a wide variety of political choices with respect to both politi-
cal institutions and the economic system. 
                                                                          
5  Medicaid offers needs-tested health care free of charge for the poor and Medicare is a sub-
sidised health insurance plan for the elderly. 
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Economic crises and the stability of democracy 
In his seminal textbook Political Man (1960), Seymour Martin Lipset em-
phasised the importance of government effectiveness for the legitimacy of 
political systems. He defined effectiveness as the ability of the political sys-
tem to “satisfy the basic functions of government as most of the population 
and such powerful groups within it as big business or the armed forces see 
them” (1960: 77). Later in the book, however, Lipset used a much narrower 
concept of effectiveness, as the following quote shows: “In the modern 
world, such effectiveness means primarily constant economic development. 
Those nations which have adapted most successfully to the requirements of 
an industrial system have the fewest internal political strains, and have either 
preserved their traditional legitimacy or developed strong new symbols” 
(1960: 82). He thus redefined effectiveness as primarily involving successful 
economic policy, and this is also how the concept of effectiveness has been 
understood ever since.6 
Lipset’s analysis of the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy 
has become conventional wisdom in the social sciences. His famous fourfold 
table identifies four different types of polities (1960: 81): 
 
 Effectiveness 
Legitimacy + - 
+ A B 
- C D 
 
Consolidated democracies (A) (examples: United States, Sweden, Britain) are 
high on both effectiveness and legitimacy. Polities lacking in both (D) are in-
herently unstable and prone to breaking down, unless upheld by force (exam-
ples: Communist Hungary, the German Democratic Republic). Austria and 
Germany during the 1920s are mentioned as examples of relatively effective 
democracies which lacked legitimacy (C), because their systems of govern-
ment were not held to be “legitimate by large and powerful segments of its 
population” (1960: 81). Societies of type C, however, may eventually devel-
op into consolidated democracies, since “prolonged effectiveness over a 
number of generations may give legitimacy to a political system” (1960: 82). 
Lipset thus assumed that in the long run effectiveness may engender legiti-
macy.  
Type B is particularly interesting, because Lipset assumed that high legi-
timacy would function as a safety valve, stabilising consolidated democracies 
even in times of poor economic performance. Lipset’s assumption has been 
                                                                          
6  However, Lipset’s original concept of government effectiveness also included a well-func-
tioning public administration. 
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corroborated by historical evidence. Although the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France and a number of smaller European democracies, primarily 
the Benelux countries, the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, were no 
less severely affected by the Great Depression of the early 1930s than Ger-
many and Austria, democracy survived in these countries because their dem-
ocratic institutions enjoyed widespread legitimacy (see also Dirk Berg-
Schlosser’s chapter in this volume). 
A more recent study by Przeworski et al. (1996) disputed Lipset’s con-
clusions regarding the beneficial effects of democratic consolidation. Based 
on data for the period between 1950 and 1990, the authors concluded that the 
stability of democracy is primarily a function of socio-economic develop-
ment. During that period no democracy in a country with a per capita income 
of more than $6,000 broke down. Poorer countries were instead more likely 
to experience a breakdown of democracy, regardless of the length of time the 
country had been democratic. Since this latter study is more comprehensive 
and based on more systematic evidence than Lipset’s, it shows convincingly 
that political legitimacy is not a sufficient safety valve against democratic 
breakdown in poorer countries in the instance of a prolonged economic crisis.  
Since democracy and the market economy are closely related, and be-
cause democracies are more frequently found in socio-economically devel-
oped countries, the question arises whether it is democracy or rather the mar-
ket economy that is conducive to economic growth. It is obvious that democ-
racy will not automatically lead to economic success. There are several rea-
sons why this might not be the case. The first and most important reason is 
that authoritarian countries are frequently characterised by collusion between 
political leaders and large private enterprises, whereby high profits accrue to 
both sides. The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in early 2011 made it 
once more abundantly clear that authoritarian leaders tend to exploit their po-
litical power to amass private fortunes. Neither side is therefore interested in 
ending their mutually profitable relationship after democratisation. Unless the 
old leadership is ousted and a completely new leadership takes over, the old 
networks tend to persist, which in turn undermines the development of a 
competitive and successful market economy. 
In addition, most new democracies do not have a legal framework of mar-
ket regulation nor a rule of law tradition, both of which are required for a prop-
erly functioning market economy. These drawbacks result in an extended pe-
riod of institutional engineering and they require scarce resources, which are at 
the same time needed for alleviating poverty and stimulating economic growth. 
Many poor democracies therefore suffer from corruption, which is not only bad 
for the functioning of democracy, but also impairs the economic performance 
of a country. Corruption fosters the inefficient allocation of resources, impairs 
productivity and makes a country less attractive for foreign investors. It also 
contributes to inflating public budgets, because investments in large infrastruc-
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tural projects promise personal profits for corrupt bureaucrats and politicians, 
while at the same time reducing the allocation of resources for the maintenance 
of the existing infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi, 2001).7 
Authoritarian governments, in contrast, may promote the liberalisation of 
their national markets and stimulate economic success without at the same 
time liberalising, let alone democratising, their political system. Examples are 
the German Empire after 1871, Pinochet’s Chile after the 1973 coup, or Chi-
na over the last decades. While democrats of course hope that market libera-
lisation and the improvement of living conditions will eventually lead to in-
creasing demands for democracy, economic success may also contribute to 
stabilising authoritarian political systems at least in the short run.  
The impact of the Great Recession on the prospects for 
democracy 
It is obvious that the politically problematic side-effects of the close associa-
tion of democracy and a market economy can severely compromise support 
for democracy in a deep and prolonged economic crisis. The fundamental 
flaws of a market economy become more obvious in economically hard 
times. Disparities in income increase, bargaining conflicts over income levels 
and the distribution of wealth intensify. At the same time tax revenue de-
creases and in turn limits the ability of politicians to compensate for income 
losses by initiating new programmes to increase the demand for labour. Un-
der such adverse conditions the disproportionate political influence of the 
business sector comes under increasing public scrutiny and the hardships in-
curred by members of the lower classes nourish feelings of frustration as well 
as doubts regarding the social balance of democratic politics.  
Globalisation is also a factor. It props up the disproportionate political 
clout of private business, because the “increasingly unrestrained movement of 
capital between nations has the potential to reduce the policy autonomy of gov-
ernments while strengthening the political bargaining power of capitalists” 
(Bernhagen, 2009: 116). It is therefore not surprising that both globalisation, 
and even more so the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, triggered widespread 
criticism of capitalism. Public opinion surveys show a decline in the belief that 
a market economy is the best system for achieving fair allocation of economic 
resources (e.g. Globescan, 2011). Many people believe that the greed and irres-
ponsible behaviour of a small group of managers in global finance were mainly 
responsibility for the crisis. There is also a widespread perception that this 
small group has profited disproportionately from the deregulation of the mar-
                                                                          
7  Tanzi/Davoodi (2001) also mention that corruption primarily hurts small and medium-sized 
enterprises that do not have the means to pay high bribes multinational corporations have. 
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kets, which allowed them to invent complex and seemingly safe financial prod-
ucts and so lure unsuspecting small investors (including local governments) in-
to buying those toxic products. Governments had to intervene with loans to the 
order of billions of US dollars to save financial institutions that would other-
wise have collapsed. Many observers expect that the less well-to-do will have 
to pay the bill for these excesses, because the public debts incurred to fight the 
crisis will eventually lead to tax hikes and inflation. The ensuing dissatisfaction 
is not only directed against financial institutions, but also against the govern-
ments of the rich democracies because of their failure to regulate the financial 
markets, which could have avoided a crisis of this magnitude.  
Interestingly enough, and contrary to expectations, this drop in support 
for free markets has been most pronounced in countries in which support was 
already very low before the onset of the crisis. The sharpest drop in support 
in six of the world’s leading economies was noted in the US and Britain.8 
While primarily dealing with the effects of globalisation on advanced liberal 
democracies and not directly with the current crisis, Jude Hays’s (2009) anal-
ysis provides a plausible explanation for the sharp drop in US and British le-
vels of belief in the beneficial effects of the market economy. The author 
claims that for a long time democratic governments have quelled public criti-
cism of globalisation by a policy strategy, which he calls ‘embedded liberal-
ism’. People working in globally non-competitive business sectors have been 
shielded from the adverse effects of increasing global competition by a mix-
ture of unemployment benefits and active labour market policies.  
However, the policy of embedded liberalism depends primarily on suffi-
cient tax revenue for financing such expensive public programmes. Hays ar-
gued that globalisation will affect more deeply majoritarian democracies such 
as, for example Great Britain or the United States, which have the most open 
market economies, than democracies such as the Scandinavian countries or 
Austria, which have corporatist economies. Majoritarian democracies are 
more likely to suffer from rising levels of unemployment, because their open-
market policies make it easier for businesses to move their capital to wherev-
er they expect to realise higher returns; and they also have more lenient regu-
lations for dismissals of redundant work force. At the same time they rely 
primarily on capital taxes (rather than on income taxes) and cannot increase 
revenue accordingly, because raising these taxes would drive capital out of 
the country. In order to balance their budgets, governments of these demo-
cracies will therefore have to cut public welfare programmes, which will in 
                                                                          
8  At the same time, confidence in the market rose in Germany and China. France and Turkey 
are especially interesting cases because they are ‘anti-capitalist outliers’ with an exception-
ally high level of scepticism about the benefits of a free market economy (Economist, 07 
April 2011). Despite the relatively low number of respondents included in that poll and the 
lack of corroborating evidence, the results are sufficiently robust to prove that the economic 
recession following the financial crisis has indeed affected support for the model of market 
economy. 
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turn result in declining support for their open market policies. This vicious 
circle is likely to become even more pronounced during recessions.  
Corporatist countries with more restrictive regulations for protecting em-
ployment and more balanced tax systems based on both income and capital 
taxes have been less affected by globalisation and therefore are also less vul-
nerable during a recession.  
In a recent analysis of the impact of the global economic crisis, Larry Di-
amond (2011) found that the crisis has not led to many breakdowns of new de-
mocracies. His analysis shows that the reversals back to authoritarian patterns 
of the last decade mostly happened when these countries were doing economi-
cally rather well, citing in particular the oil-rich countries Nigeria, Russia and 
Venezuela. Conversely, those Third Wave democracies that have been hardest 
hit by the Great Recession have shown a remarkable resilience. Rather than 
turning against democracy, voters in these countries have instead tended to pu-
nish incumbent governments and to vote new – and frequently even rightist ra-
ther than leftist – governments into power. However, Diamond also notes that 
the danger is far from over and that a prolonged global recession might damage 
the prospects of democracy in the poor Third Wave democracies.  
In a similar vein Marc Plattner argued that the global economic crisis 
“has posed some difficult challenges for defenders of democracy and of free 
markets”, but that its consequences have been limited so far (2011: 31). The 
author concedes that the responsibility of the advanced democracies – and 
especially of the United States – for precipitating the crisis has the potential 
“to discredit not only capitalism but the democratic political framework with 
which it is associated”. At the same time he concludes that the crisis has been 
even more devastating for authoritarian systems – with the exception of Chi-
na – whose poor economic performance has undermined their weak legitima-
cy even further. The uprisings that have taken place in the Arab world since 
the publication of Plattner’s article confirm the accuracy of his observation.9 
While it is still too early to draw firm conclusions about the long-term 
impacts of the Great Recession on economic development and on support for 
democracy and the market economy around the globe, the key economic in-
dicators for the fourteen consolidated democracies included in the following 
Table 1 provide some preliminary insights. They confirm that all of these 
countries suffered a considerable decline in GDP growth in 2009. With the 
exception of Australia and Poland,10 all of them had negative growth rates in 
2009.  
                                                                          
9  Plattner critically observes, however, that the emerging market democracies, in particular Bra-
zil, India, Indonesia and South Africa, are primarily intent on boosting their economies by cul-
tivating trade relations with authoritarian systems such as Iran, Russia, China or Venezuela 
and show little solidarity with democratic nations when it comes to voting in favor of human 
rights or against abuses of power by authoritarian governments at UN meetings (2011: 26-38). 
10  For reasons of this exception see chapter by P. Mohr, pp. 63-64. 
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Thanks to the swift implementation of major government programmes to 
save failing financial institutions and to stimulate economic growth, growth 
rates were back in the positive range in 2010. This can be seen in the second 
and third sections of the Table. The figures confirm that total government ex-
penditure as a percentage of GDP rose sharply in 2009 and that the public 
budgets were strongly affected by either declining surplus or increasing defi-
cit rates. The last section of the Table shows the total government debt, rang-
ing from 23.6% in Australia to nearly 200% in Japan. 
Overall the Table indicates the existence of considerable differences in 
the economic policies of consolidated democracies. In order to assess the full 
impact of the crisis and the effects of different economic policies to cope 
with it, more detailed empirical studies will be needed. In any case, it has to 
be assumed that despite the global economic rebound in 2010, the current cri-
sis is far from over, because the bill for increased government spending will 
only have to be paid in the years to come. 
Conclusions 
As the above discussion shows, while the model of liberal democracy is 
based on a number of common premises, it also allows for a broad range of 
institutional patterns to organise a democratic polity. This means the model 
can be adopted by countries with different cultural traditions and historical 
experiences. The model is based on universal principles and values.  
It should have become equally obvious that liberal democracy requires 
some form of market economy, because political liberties also include eco-
nomic liberties. However, the existing liberal democracies are not the puppets 
of a bunch of capitalists, as critics have frequently claimed. Table 1 shows 
that the governments of advanced liberal democracies control between one 
third and one half of the overall national income. Democratic governments 
therefore have sufficient clout to reduce the most flagrant disparities pro-
duced by free markets, to actively promote economic development, to invest 
in a functioning public infrastructure and to introduce protective measures for 
the economically less advantaged. However, the increased mobility of private 
capital has also made it more independent from decisions of national gov-
ernments and thereby increased its political influence even further. 
While the wealthy consolidated democracies can be considered strong 
enough to cope even with major political and economic challenges, the poor 
Third Wave democracies are much more vulnerable because their political in-
stitutions and party systems are not as well established, democratic value orien-
tations are not as deeply rooted in their political culture and they have fewer 
economic resources to cope with income losses in a recession. But the most 
vulnerable are authoritarian systems. Their political legitimacy is based exclu-
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sively on their ability to secure acceptable economic outputs and therefore poor 
economic performance has a much more adverse effect on their legitimacy. 
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PART III 
An authoritarian response 
Some authoritarian capitalisms have recently lost stability, at least partly, as a 
consequence of the Great Recession; the Arab Spring is often quoted as an 
example in this context. There is, however, an important exception to this 
general rule that calls for closer inspection. This exception is China. China 
not only weathered the crisis amazingly well, but in one respect appeared to 
have benefited from it. It seems that the crisis helped this economic giant to 
initiate the badly needed reorientation of the economy towards the huge do-
mestic market so as to reduce tensions produced by an over-heated economy. 
China is a world-leading authoritarian capitalist country that lifted hun-
dreds of millions of people out of poverty in a relatively short period. The 
breath-taking speed of development and the country’s relatively solid im-
munity to the Great Recession call for reflection. It is not difficult to imagine 
that, barring a political breakthrough, the coming decade or two may see 
China catching up with the most advanced world economies while still re-
maining an authoritarian state. This assumption is strengthened by the fact 
that China is already reaching a world-leading position in a number of eco-
nomic, technological and military fields.  
Should the current rate of the Chinese development be further main-
tained, one could expect that China might serve as a trend-setter for both poor 
authoritarian capitalisms and malfunctioning democratic capitalisms. But for 
the time being China is a trend-setter without followers. It will be of crucial 
importance for world order whether China will in the not too distant future 
enter a transition to democracy and join the democratic family, or continue its 
‘authoritarian economic miracle’, prompting others in many different corners 
of the world to follow suit. Should the latter scenario develop, we may wit-
ness another type of global rivalry: not in the military field but rather in eco-
nomic and technological areas, and not between communist command econ-
omies and capitalist democracies but between democratic and authoritarian 
capitalisms. 

China and the crisis in historical perspective  
Ursula J. van Beek 
Introduction 
China is the only ancient empire that survived into the 20th century. For a 
Westerner to fully appreciate the longevity and richness of Chinese civilisa-
tion, it is useful to place it on a comparative timeline. The temporal compari-
son shows that during the rule of the Shang Dynasty (1600-1100 BCE), a pe-
riod during which Moses led the exodus from Egypt and the Trojan wars 
were fought, the Chinese were already engraving symbols and pictures onto 
shells of turtles and bamboo sticks as a means of expression. As these pic-
torial characters developed during the Han Dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE) into 
the unique language system that to this day fosters and preserves the distinc-
tive identity of Chinese civilisation, the Romans invaded Britain. During the 
same period the Confucian philosophical system was adopted in China. All 
this took place some centuries before the final collapse of Rome in 476 CE. 
For much of its recorded history China was a dynastic empire which to-
wered over the rest of Asia under rulers whose sovereignty was said to have 
been bestowed upon them by the Mandate of Heaven and whose autocratic 
rule over the populace was akin to the paternal function of a strict father in 
charge of a household. China, or the Middle Kingdom, was thought to have 
been situated in the centre of the world and possessed of a civilisation supe-
rior to that of the entire ‘barbarian’ universe both across the seas and outside 
its far-flung and ever-changing land boundaries, which were deliberately kept 
ill-defined. Convinced of its cultural greatness, the imperial Chinese state as-
signed itself the mission to ‘civilise’ neighbouring peoples but had little in-
terest in the rest of the world, although in the early Ming dynasty (1368-
1644) a large navy was built and sailed the China seas and the Indian Ocean, 
reaching the east coast of Africa. These voyages merely confirmed to the 
Chinese that they did not have much to learn from the outside world.  
From antiquity the Chinese made significant advances in science and inno-
vation including, among other things, the first recorded observations of comets, 
solar eclipses and supernovae, the invention of the abacus, the compass, gun-
powder, the wheelbarrow, papermaking techniques and printing. Mediaeval 
Europe borrowed extensively from Chinese science and technology until Eu-
rope’s own scientific revolutions in the 16th and 17th centuries propelled it to a 
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position from which it gradually outstripped Chinese technological advances. 
Unconcerned by this shifting balance, up until the early 19th century the Chi-
nese emperors treated with disdain the small and squabbling European states, 
even when the latter were busy building their commercial empires in Asia. 
China’s rulers refused to deal with European governments on equal terms and 
conceded at most limited trading privileges at the coast or at the border through 
which trade was conducted to meet Europe’s high demand for Chinese tea, 
porcelain and silk. Repeated British representations made at the turn of the 18th 
and 19th centuries to improve the severely restricted trading conditions fell on 
deaf ears as the emperor who saw little point in making concessions to a state 
he believed had nothing to offer China in return.  
This situation changed drastically once foreign traders discovered Chi-
na’s virtually limitless demand for opium. By the1830s opium represented 
nearly half of all British exports to China and, when importation was banned 
in Canton, smuggling began. To put an end to the opium trade and its disastr-
ous health consequences for the Chinese population, the emperor in 1839 or-
dered all opium in the possession of British merchants to be seized and de-
stroyed. The British response to this action was war. What has since become 
known as the Opium Wars (1840-1842) ended in the Treaty of Nanking, 
which included the first of the ‘unequal treaties’ between China and the 
West. These treaties, which forced the Chinese to grant equal trading rights 
first to the British and later to the Americans and the French, ended what the 
West perceived to be a humiliating assumption of Chinese superiority; the 
Chinese regarded them as an encroachment on their sovereignty.  
The Opium Wars marked a crucial turning point in China’s long history. 
The conflict, which was less about opium than about grabbing the last prize 
in the Far East, forcibly prised open the Chinese empire to the world as it ex-
posed China’s markets and resources to subsequent colonial exploitation. The 
wars also helped to eventually oust the weak and unpopular last Chinese dy-
nasty (Manchu Qing, 1644-1911) from power. The revolution of 1911, which 
toppled the imperial regime, opened the door to a failed attempt at republi-
canism, instability, corruption, rule by warlords and opportunistic Japanese 
exploits aimed to establish political and economic domination over China. In 
1915, taking advantage of the internal turmoil and the Western powers’ en-
gagement in World War I, Japan presented China with the infamous Twenty-
One Demands, which would have turned the country into a virtual Japanese 
protectorate had the surreptitious terms not been made public and had the 
subsequent pressure of world opinion not forced Japan to modify some of the 
more extreme demands. But the national sovereignty of China was further 
compromised and the day of the acceptance of the Japanese demands became 
known as National Humiliation Day. 
It has been said that whereas the word freedom offers the means to un-
derstand core American values and the term rule of law is the key to unlock 
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the spirit of England, the essence of Chinese values can be found in the word 
history. Both Chinese national identity and the legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) are outgrowths of the past (Callahan, 2004). The 
Communist Party elite were the product of an extensive but failed search by 
traditional Chinese elites to save the post-dynastic country from crippling do-
mestic chaos and foreign imperialist encroachment. The successful commun-
ist revolution of 1949 delivered on both counts. And since then Chinese lead-
ers have claimed legitimacy not on the basis of democratic electoral victory, 
but on the grounds of the historical record of having ended China’s century 
of national humiliation and of having returned the country to a place of glob-
al prominence. Behind modern China's remarkable development is a regime 
carefully cultivating the inherent patriotism and pride of the Chinese people 
as a means to bolster its legitimacy, which is further defined by substance, 
that it to say, by testing good governance in terms of how it delivers. China’s 
successful weathering of the recent world-wide economic and financial storm 
could not but highlight this even further, and not only in China itself but well 
beyond her national boundaries.  
The aim of this chapter is to look through the lens of time to try unveil 
some of the mystery of why China has become so successful economically 
and to consider the implications of this success for the post-crisis world and 
for democracy in particular.  
Change and tradition  
Even prior to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis China had come to be 
viewed as a major force in the world’s economic and security systems. In the 
wake of the crisis the country’s stature increased further to a position from 
which to effectively challenge the dominance of the United States in global af-
fairs. The stunning rise of authoritarian China as an economic power and Chi-
na’s continued high rate of growth, at a time when the developed world was 
overtaken by the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression, con-
founds Western economists. The conditions China lacks and that they consider 
necessary for successful economic development include the limited role of the 
state; a democratic dispensation as the political mechanism that ensures the 
balance between state power and decentralised co-operation; and democratical-
ly empowered citizens who prevent the state overreaching itself. And so they 
ask why is it that in the absence of these conditions the Chinese state seems 
able to arrange productive co-operation on an unprecedented scale without run-
ning into the seemingly insurmountable knowledge, incentive and administra-
tive problems that economists expect in such circumstances. Part of the answer 
can be found in the deep history of China and in the way modern China tra-
velled from the semi-periphery to the centre of global affairs.  
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The enforced interaction with the outside world, which shattered the tra-
ditional Chinese worldview of the centrality of the Middle Kingdom in the 
world order, brought home two basic truths. The first was that China was but 
one state among many, and a weak one at that; and the second was that a 
feeble central power was responsible for the century of humiliation that had 
transformed the empire into a semi-colony. This in turn led to the conviction 
that the only way to achieve national survival was to build a powerful mod-
ern state with a strong central government. State-building thus became close-
ly associated with the concept of national unity and nationalism. Sun-Yat-
sen, the founder of the Republic and co-founder of the Chinese Nationalist 
Party, Kuomintang (KTM), considered nationalism not only the key to sur-
vival of the Chinese nation, but also as a fit state doctrine and the means to 
ensure the equality and freedom of all races in China (Chou Yu-sun, 1996).  
Hidden in the shadow of Mao’s revolutionary internationalism, the theme 
of national unity resurfaced under Deng Xiaoping, who took over as China’s 
de facto paramount leader in the late 1970s, and who replaced Mao’s ideo-
logical philosophy of ‘politics in command’ by the philosophy of ‘economics 
in command’. For Deng the entire project of mapping out a brand new road 
forward for China’s development rested on the fundamental assumption that 
national unity was not the source of China’s power, as was believed earlier, 
but that this power depended on whether or not China could catch up with 
developed countries (Zheng, 1999). In Deng’s vision economic wealth was to 
be the foundation of Chinese power and economic development was the way 
that would lead to China assuming her rightful place in the world of nations. 
At the same time, national, or even nationalistic, pride and economic success 
could became mutually reinforcing, thus providing the Communist Party with 
a form of substitute legitimacy 
Given Mao’s near godlike status in China, Deng took a considerable po-
litical risk by promoting this momentous change. One of the ideas thought to 
have inspired him was the Yan Fu argument, a line of reflection pursued at 
the turn of the 20th century by the famed Chinese scholar and translator, who 
argued that only by freeing the spirit of initiative in every single Chinese citi-
zen could their total energies be amplified to ensure the survival of the state 
and to maximise the capacity of the nation as a whole (Schram,1984). This 
spirit of initiative was badly depleted by Mao’s policies of the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, which left the people physically de-
prived, psychologically scarred and, not unlike the Germans after World War 
II, totally uninterested in politics. Their overriding concern was how to sur-
vive and Deng’s economic reforms offered some hope, thus creating a plat-
form on which to build consensus between reformist leaders and society. And 
while the leaders recognised the need to depoliticise peoples’ daily lives, they 
also identified decentralisation of economic decision-making as a major 
strategy for reforming the economic system. In this way they created an insti-
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tutional setting in China for what came to be known as development-oriented 
local government (White, 1984).  
As the ‘reform and opening’ strategy initiated by Deng in 1978 devalued 
Mao’s class struggle rhetoric as a device legitimising the party’s continued 
rule, nationalism was revived. The notion of the century of humiliation came 
into play once more, as did the party’s historically based credentials. But 
there are inherent dangers, both internal and external, in using nationalism as 
a legitimising strategy. By its very nature nationalism is ethnocentric and thus 
exclusive. In a multi-ethnic country such as China it could – and frequently 
has – come across more as the nationalism of the Han majority than of the 
Chinese people as a whole, increasing the threat of ethnic tensions and inter-
nal alienation. Externally, it conjured unhelpful images of a China that should 
be feared rather than encouraged to integrate into the world’s structures. Re-
cognising this downside, the CCP moved from the theme of injured victim-
hood epitomised by the century of humiliation to the safer ground of China’s 
proud past and the party’s leading role in returning the country to its former 
global greatness. From the theme of modernisation and rejuvenation of China 
in the Deng Xiaoping era, the Chinese party chiefs from Jiang Zemin to Hu 
Jintao started to talk about the Great Renaissance of the Chinese nation, indi-
cating a radical turnabout from the earlier disdain for, to the re-embracing of, 
elements of traditional Chinese culture (Kang, 2006).  
The turning point was the 1989 tragedy of Tiananmen Square. Although 
Chinese intellectuals were unhappy with the vicious way their government 
had dealt with the protests, they also objected to the harsh criticism of their 
country by Western governments. A surge of nationalist sentiment followed 
that, among other things, produced a number of bestselling books calling for 
resistance to the West’s ‘interference’ in Chinese society and urging the gov-
ernment to adopt a strong stance in foreign policy (Trailokya, 2010). While 
initially pleased with this reaction and encouraging it, the Chinese leadership 
came to realise the possible adverse effects the anti-foreign nationalist out-
burst could have on China’s prospects for further progress and they put an 
end to it by dusting off the moral teachings of the old sage Confucius. This 
approach both satisfied the intellectuals who were pleased to see China did 
not concede to the West, and resonated with the common people for whom 
traditional values matter.  
But opinion is divided among China analysts both inside and outside the 
country as to how seriously the Communist Party takes Confucianism. Views 
range from those who claim Confucianism is of marginal and purely utilita-
rian interest to the party, to those who forecast the CCP’s imminent transfor-
mation from Chinese Communist Party to Chinese Confucian Party (Bell, 
2010). On the basis of the historical record of the CCP it seems fairly safe to 
say that Confucianism is merely another ingredient added to socialism as a 
device to legitimise the party’s continued rule. The Chinese leaders are above 
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all pragmatic and adapt well to constantly changing circumstances. This 
pragmatic mentality can be traced back to Deng Xiaoping, whose most fam-
ous political adage held that it was immaterial whether a cat was black or 
white as long as it caught mice. At the same time Deng Xiaoping also made it 
clear that while economic construction and development moved to the centre 
stage, the party would never abandon the Four Cardinal Principles: socialist 
road, dictatorship of the proletariat, leadership of the Communist Party and 
Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought. In all probability the Four Cardinal 
Principles were less ideological than they were functional. Their aim was to 
send a message to the Chinese people, and to the intellectual elites in par-
ticular, that they were free to improve their material living conditions but 
should keep out of politics and human rights issues, and that they should for-
get Tiananmen. Pragmatism of this kind has made it possible for the Chinese 
leadership not only to shift to a fundamentally different policy in response to 
a changing political environment, but also to respond swiftly to single events, 
especially if these involve populist or nationalist pressures. The sudden shift 
in labour policy from suppressing wages to actively boosting wages is just 
one recent example of the pragmatic mentality among Chinese policyma-
kers.1 
Ideology has been and continues to be used instrumentally. Sometimes it 
is used as a guide for action, but mostly it is a means to make moral claims 
associated with leadership and to forestall the possibility of open talk about 
politics that could lead to chaos, the most nightmarish of prospects for Chi-
nese leaders from time immemorial. The seeming absence of any tension be-
tween ideology and pragmatism is, according to Lucian Pye (1985), a pecu-
liarly Chinese phenomenon and can account for the divergence between doc-
trinal theories and practice. Whereas in Western culture correctness about 
doctrinal questions is a value in itself, the Chinese are much more relaxed 
about matters of belief; one can sense the great difference between Western 
and Chinese attitudes towards ideology by reflecting on the stark contrast be-
tween Western and Chinese approaches to religion. The provenance of the 
prevailing socialist ideology itself is instructive in this context. Chinese his-
torical consciousness was sustained for centuries by the conviction that China 
was unique and culturally superior to the West. And yet, ironically, the ‘for-
eign’ ideology of Marxism-Leninism was adopted and, astonishingly, with 
the addition of Maoism was transformed into something believed to be essen-
tially Chinese. At the same time traditional Confucianism was rejected and 
attacked as a vestige of oppressive feudalism.  
At present Confucianism is officially in vogue again. It is used to gain 
soft power through the establishment of worldwide Confucius centres,2 which 
                                                                          
1  For details on this policy see chapter by Han and Lu in this volume. 
2  In July 2010 there were 316 Confucius Institutes and 337 Confucius Classrooms in 94 coun-
tries and regions http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confucius_Institute#cite_note-2#cite_note-2. 
China and the crisis in historical perspective 125 
promote Chinese language and culture. At the same time the Confucian-
derived notion of a Harmonious Socialist Society has come to occupy a 
prominent place in the politico-speak of the leaders. The concept was first 
mooted at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002 and was later defined more 
clearly as a term that describes a society in which order and stability prevail, 
and in which each individual does his or her best and has a proper place. In 
2005 Hu Jintao declared the creation of a Harmonious Socialist Society to be 
“essential for consolidating the party’s social foundation and achieving the 
party’s historical governing mission” (Holbig, 2009). On the one hand, har-
monious social governance is meant to enrich and re-actualise Marxism; on 
the other, it aims to revitalise Confucian norms and responsibilities in socie-
ty. But in keeping with the ambiguous nature of the policies of the Chinese 
leaders, their drawing on elements of traditional Confucianism once again 
does not translate into embracing traditional values as a whole. The effort, ra-
ther, is to weave the threads of Confucian tradition into the fabric of Marxism 
by emphasising elements the two are said to have in common, such as strong 
leadership, social justice and harmony.  
Yet Confucianism in China is a lasting force that deserves careful atten-
tion, because it offers a key to understanding both the values and the norms 
that shape social relations among the Chinese people and their attitudes to-
wards their rulers. Traditional Chinese culture places the relationship of an 
individual to others in the context of a society of which each member has a 
responsibility to improve. The core values of thrift, diligence and an ethic of 
hard work encourage dedication and commitment as a way for the individual 
to contribute to the development of a harmonious society. Governance based 
on the concept of a Harmonious Socialist Society taps into these very values. 
It was devised as a strategic move to respond to the serious social contradic-
tions that emerged in the wake of the increasingly diverse material and cul-
tural needs of the Chinese people and could work to threaten social stability. 
The aim of the policy is to promote a more ‘liberal’ governance style, which 
purports to offer more space for individual self-realisation and self-respon-
sibility.  
Traditionally, the justification for the political legitimacy of the rulers 
flowed from four basic concepts: the Mandate of Heaven, rule by virtue, 
popular consent and legality. The Mandate of Heaven gave the ruler a divine 
right to rule, but the rule, according to the moral teachings of Confucius, was 
circumscribed in that the ruler had to be virtuous and the people had to be 
content. In this relationship, which was to ensure harmony and social order, 
the rulers demanded submission of the people to their authority. In return 
they were obliged to constantly seek popular approval through winning the 
hearts and minds of the people by looking after their wellbeing. In this con-
cept the true test of the will of Heaven was the acceptance of a ruler by the 
people. This moral contract constituted the foundation of the imperial politi-
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cal system; the accompanying laws and regulations were based mainly on 
family rules, norms, customs and social traditions, and although during the 
Qing Dynasty more emphasis was put on rule by law, the use of law was 
primarily a means by which to strengthen, rather than restrict, the power of 
the ruler.  
It is not too difficult to find parallels in the relationship between the Chi-
nese people and their rulers then and now: power continues to emanate from 
the top and the rulers, though their virtue might be questioned (as it often had 
been in the imperial era), continue to seek popular consent, nowadays by 
readjusting their claim to legitimacy in step with changing circumstances. 
And as unlikely as this might seem, continuity did not reassert itself with the 
more recent official return to the essence of Chinese culture and tradition, but 
was preserved in the wake of the success of Mao’s communist revolution in 
1949, when the victorious CCP carefully replaced the traditional Confucian 
Mandate of Heaven with an ideology that seemingly resembled the yearned-
for ideal society of harmony and social justice, and thus found an easy reson-
ance with the people. At the same time full use was made of history or, more 
precisely, of the historic mission the party fulfilled when it restored the terri-
torial map of China to correspond roughly with that of the pre-1919 Qing era. 
This pride-reaffirming feat that no other Chinese force was able to claim 
since China’s humiliating defeat in the Opium Wars, gained the CCP a popu-
lar mandate to rule through the legitimising support of the people.  
On these foundations grew the paradox of modern China, a country at 
once far removed from its imperial past and yet firmly rooted in that past. 
The most significant expression of that paradox is the curious mix of Confu-
cianism and Marxism. The two ideologies share an emphasis on humane 
government and the centrality and self-cultivation of the human being. But in 
socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Marxist notion of class struggle 
has been replaced by the notion of social harmony, combined with scientific 
development. At the same time hierarchy and the supremacy of the collectivi-
ty over the individual as a means of societal organisation have been retained, 
placing a powerful instrument of power in the hands of the Communist Party.  
The linking ideological theme is the continuing belief that each individu-
al is a part of a whole and that harmonious relations with others are the key to 
the wellbeing of the whole. In a concept of society construed in this way the 
rulers frame the broad goals for the society by taking cognisance of bottom-
up ideas, demands and reactions. In contrast to a democratic society, which is 
thought of as a horizontal structure, a top-down and bottom-up dynamic is 
thus established and is adjusted as conditions change, though the ultimate aim 
remains reaching goals set by the leadership. Under Deng Xiaoping this sys-
tem took on the appearance of democratic centralism, whereby policies origi-
nating at the centre were tested and evaluated on the ground and then reports 
on results and on problems encountered were channelled back to the system’s 
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centre for debate. According to Naisbit (2010), this vertical structure encom-
passes a democratic model that fits Chinese history and thinking, and allows 
a steady flow of ideas up and down the hierarchy. 
Implications 
This is in theory. In practice the flow has been interrupted by political patro-
nage and ineffective monitoring of agents of the state, which results in en-
demic cadre corruption. This problem, like much else in China, is not new. It 
can be traced back to the middle of the 14th century when the founder of the 
Ming dynasty, Hung Wu, issued an official imperial edict in which he be-
moaned the great misfortune befalling China in the form of the ‘idle riffraff’ 
concerned only with establishing connections with local officials who, utilis-
ing the prestige of the government, help them oppress the masses below. 
Hung Wu, who came from a humble background himself, was familiar with 
the suffering of the poor under the combined oppression of the scholar-
bureaucrats and the wealthy. He lamented that if he were to punish them, he 
would be considered a tyrant; and if he were lenient, the law would become 
ineffective, order would deteriorate and the people would deem him an in-
capable ruler. The emperor reached the conclusion that “To be a ruler is in-
deed difficult” (Pye, 1985).  
Today, as then, the culture of bribery and corruption is both rife and well 
recognised by Chinese leaders, who consider venal local officials a grave 
problem not only because they damage the credibility of the CCP at the local 
level, but also because they tarnish the party’s image as a whole; government 
corruption was one of the major issues behind the Tiananmen demonstrations 
of 1989. According to the former Prime Minister, Li Peng, who tried to de-
centralise and downsize the Chinese bureaucracy, with varying degrees of 
success, “The fight against corruption is a matter of life and death” (Tuck, 
1995). But like the Hung Wu emperor of old, the Chinese leaders of today are 
damned if they tackle the problem head-on and they are damned if they do 
not. Hence efforts to eradicate corruption are nothing more than isolated in-
stances that hardly touch the surface of the inherent patron-client relation-
ships between state officials and business elites. A real effort would require a 
fundamental institutional overhaul, which the party-state with its fear of the 
chaos that this would be likely to produce, has yet to initiate (Pei, 2006). In 
the absence of such a consolidated effort, the national leaders aim to diffuse 
pent-up resentments by trying out semi-democratic substitutes for elections in 
the form of public hearings and releases of information through the media. 
Several authors (e.g. Lu, 2000; Pei, 2006; Ngo, 2008) point to the existence 
of many other problems plaguing China. Along with weak accountability, 
seen as the main reason for corruption, there is also the glaring absence of the 
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rule of law, of political opposition and of civil liberties. These factors are not 
likely to create the developmental state to which China professes to aspire, 
but a predatory one.  
Is China such a state? It is in the nature of a predatory state apparatus for 
the rulers to plunder state coffers without regard for the welfare of the 
people; available surpluses are used for self-enrichment rather than for rein-
vestment in the economy to maintain its growth and, in the process, provide 
collective goods to the populace. China’s continued economic success alone 
suggests that the Chinese rulers are unlikely to be primarily driven by preda-
tory instincts, but that concerns about the livelihood of the people also come 
into play. One example is that the government identified poverty eradication 
as the most fundamental human right (Zhan and Su, 2009), achieving re-
markable results.3 The handling by the government of the economic crisis in 
general, and in the rural areas in particular, also made this clear. According to 
reports, some 20 million rural migrant workers were laid off in coastal towns 
towards the end of 2008 as the world’s economy slowed down, which led to a 
sharp reduction in demand for Chinese exports (Hsu et al., 2010). As the laid-
off workers began to return to their inland home provinces, social instability 
grew in step with mounting economic hardships and anxieties about the fu-
ture. But by mid-2009 the government’s swift proactive economic package 
policy response halted and even reversed this trend, thus calming much of the 
economic uncertainty. Significantly, experiences on the ground alerted the 
Chinese leaders to the need for a more balanced relationship between nation-
ally and internationally driven economic interests. Hsu et al. (2010) suggest 
this is likely to lead to a policy shift away from an export-led model of de-
velopment located primarily in the coastal regions to a more inward-oriented 
model of development. Such a shift would have a positive impact on the tens 
of millions of Chinese who, even though they have been involved in the most 
dramatic economic transformation in recent history, have been also partly ex-
cluded from it. The crisis, in short, has been used as an opportunity to assume 
a more equitable approach to the professed project to build a Harmonious So-
cialist Society.  
The intriguing question is: why should the Chinese rulers care about the 
people in the absence of any institutional mechanisms to check their power? 
And here again one might usefully turn for guidance to history, and more 
specifically to the Mandate of Heaven that bestowed the right to govern on 
the ruler, but only if he ruled well and justly, made the people happy and led 
through moral example not by force. Of course, it would be ludicrous to sug-
gest that the divinely inspired Mandate of Heaven has any significance to the 
                                                                          
3  Between 1981 and 2004 the fraction of the population consuming less than a US dollar a 
day fell from 65% to 10%, and more than half a billion people were lifted out of poverty. 
Facts about poverty in China challenge conventional wisdom. The Wall Street Journal, 13 
April 2009. 
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Chinese Communist Party. At play rather is that part of the qualifying provi-
sion of the Mandate that allows for incompetent or despotic rulers to be re-
moved by force in a rebellion, which in terms of Confucian philosophy bes-
tows instant legitimacy on the successful rebel leaders. China’s history is rep-
lete with examples of popular revolts and upheavals that frequently fractured 
the continuity of dynastic rule from the third century BCE onwards (Perry, 
2001). The most recent victory was that of the communists themselves who, 
under Mao Zedong, claimed power along with legitimacy. With well over a 
billion potential rebels, the CCP, like every emperor before it, has little 
choice but try to keep the people happy, albeit strictly under the party’s con-
trol. Viewed with a more jaundiced eye, the communist regime’s efforts are 
not so much driven by the needs of the people as by the need to stimulate 
economic growth to ensure the regime’s legitimacy. And, as noted by Philip 
Mohr elsewhere in this volume, the pursuit of economic growth is not only 
the goal of the central government but also of the local ruling structures, who 
act as if they were private corporations instead of involving themselves in the 
task of redistribution and social development.  
China’s growth-oriented development path seems more in tune with the 
traditional Chinese power structure than with the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution, when arbitrary top-down autocracy ruled supreme and 
people’s needs were disregarded. The present one-party leadership with 
strong bottom-up participation aims to be more inclusive and more transpa-
rent for, as President Hu noted, “Power must be exercised in the sunshine to 
ensure that it is exercised correctly” (Naisbit, 2010: 42). No one can tell with 
any degree of certainty where this development path might lead, but it seems 
increasingly unlikely that it will lead to a political system that is recognisably 
democratic in the Western sense, as many commentators predict. What might 
emerge instead is a more internationally legitimate and internally less repres-
sive China.  
Internationally there is already certain currency attached to the term Bei-
jing Consensus, which implies an alternative economic development model 
to the increasingly more controversial, if not discredited, Washington Con-
sensus model.4 According to Joshua Ramo, who coined the term, the Beijing 
Consensus is guided by three main characteristics, all of which set it apart 
from the Washington Consensus. First, there is commitment to innovation 
and experimentation on an ongoing basis, and a dynamic developmental path 
that gets adjusted when circumstances change, because of the belief that no 
single plan can work in every situation. Secondly, GDP is not the only meas-
ure of progress; the other two important indicators are the sustainability of 
the economic system and an even distribution of wealth. The third guideline 
refers to a policy of self-determination to allow less-developed nations use 
                                                                          
4  For a more thorough comparative discussion on the Beijing Consensus and Washington 
Consensus models see the chapter by Philip Mohr in this volume. 
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leverage to keep the superpowers in check and assure their own financial so-
vereignty. In contrast to the Washington Consensus, which largely ignores 
questions of geopolitics, in the Chinese context geopolitics and geo-
economics are fundamentally linked. What has linked the two since the Six-
teenth Party Congress in 2002 is the rhetoric of harmony, which is supposed 
to underpin both China’s internal socio-political structure and her foreign re-
lations. The idea of a harmonious and peaceful world is seen as the key 
enabling mutual development. The concept of harmony is also meant to indi-
cate that China’s rise to a global power is peaceful and non-militaristic.  
The notion of a harmonious world also has an ancient origin and was 
rooted in the concept of All under Heaven, which placed China in the cultural 
and political global centre as the Middle Kingdom. Foreign relations with pe-
ripheral states were conducted through what was known as the tribute system, 
which was based on symbolic obedience to the authority of the Chinese em-
peror, or the Son of Heaven, but was mutually beneficial. Rule under the All 
under Heaven principle was open to any qualified candidate who best knew 
the Way (Tao) to improve the happiness of all peoples universally. Around 
500 BCE the founder of Taoism, Laozi, wrote: “A king could rule a state by 
his orders, win a war by strategies, but enjoy All-under-Heaven only by 
doing nothing to decrease the freedom and to deny the interests of people” 
(Tingyang, 2006). If the prescription of the heavenly mandate was followed 
correctly, a harmonious society and a harmonious world would emerge; if it 
was violated disharmony would ensue.  
The Chinese emperor’s self-assigned identity as the Son of Heaven was 
motivated by the need for legitimacy and security. These two requirements 
remain as important for Chinese leaders today as they were during the dynas-
tic period, if not more so, given the pressing need for China’s development-
oriented modernisation strategy within far more complex internal and exter-
nal social and political environments. The rhetoric of a harmonious world to-
day calls for multilateral structures as mainstays of security interests and 
peace; an international trade system characterised by fairness, equality and 
absence of discrimination; and the rejection of Huntington’s clash of civilisa-
tions thesis in favour of inter-cultural dialogue and exchange in which com-
petitors look for common ground but preserve their cultural differences.  
A concept of a harmonious world construed in this way was presented by 
President Hu Jintao in his 2009 foreign policy programme, which took into 
account “the profound changes” in the world situation and went on to pro-
pose constructing a “harmonious world” by means of “joint development, 
shared responsibilities and enthusiastic participation” in global affairs. Ac-
cording to Zhang Xiaotong, one of the Party’s leading ideologues, the Presi-
dent’s programme amounted to a “major theoretical innovation” based on the 
“scientific judgment of the development and changes of the times” (Lam, 
2009). It also represented a fundamental departure from Deng Xiaoping’s 
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famous diplomatic credo of “adopting a low profile and never taking the 
lead” in international affairs (Xinhua News Agency, 2009). Of all the com-
ponents of the Hu leadership’s foreign policy outlook, “shared responsibility 
and enthusiastic participation” were the two most novel and significant, as 
they indicated for the first time that Beijing was willing to co-jointly shoulder 
responsibilities for global obligations.  
Conclusions 
This chapter aimed to address two questions: What makes authoritarian Chi-
na such an economic success story in the absence of democratic conditions 
that are typically associated with thriving economic development? And, 
second, does China’s success translate into post-crisis global reconfiguration, 
and if so, with what possible implications for democracy?  
The simplest answer to the first question would be to say that authorita-
rian regimes have been known to be economically successful because capital-
ism does not necessarily need democracy to prosper, and there are many ex-
amples – besides China – to prove this. But such an answer would fail to reg-
ister the relevant aspects of traditional Chinese philosophy and the historical 
path communist China took to get where it is today. Therefore the more use-
ful question is to ask why communist China succeeded where other commun-
ist countries failed so dismally. The fundamental difference is in the method. 
For Lenin and Stalin and their successors both in the Soviet Union and across 
the Soviet bloc the revolution meant putting immovable laws of history into 
practice. This teleological approach allowed the vanguard parties in the re-
spective countries of the bloc to assert they were in possession of the ultimate 
‘truth’ and to claim that they alone knew what was best for the people and 
could therefore decide which policies should be implemented. All grassroots 
initiatives and experimentation were frowned upon and quashed. 
The method of leadership in China, on the other hand, followed practice-
based epistemology. And interestingly it was not Deng Xiaoping but Mao 
Zedong who first understood that learning from experimentation was crucial 
to innovation and that therefore policy implementation, not policy debate, 
was the key. Many academics believe that Mao, along with a whole genera-
tion of political thinkers and party activists, was strongly influenced by John 
Dewey.5 In a series of lectures at Chinese universities during 1919 and 1920 
the American scholar presented the experimental method as the core feature 
of modern science and the most important tool for obtaining scientific know-
                                                                          
5  Mao is said to have attended one of Dewey’s lectures in the spring of 1920 and to have read 
and recommended the Chinese edition of Dewey’s Five Major Lectures. He stocked this 
book in the bookstore he opened that year (Di, 1992). 
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ledge. Dewey’s modern approach stressed that theory should be tested 
through practical application as this was the only way in which to revise 
one’s outlook, assess methodically all learnt facts and discover new facts. 
Subsequently Dewey’s Chinese students placed experimentation at the centre 
of social reform initiatives. In practice this translated into the so-called 
‘point-to-surface’ controlled experimentation whereby model villages were 
established and expanded between the 1930s and mid-1950s6 for the purpose 
of conducting experiments, the results of which were then disseminated to the 
centre with a view to progressively refining policies (Heilmann, 2008).  
Deng Xiaoping and his group were disciples of Mao and therefore his le-
gitimate heirs, but they still needed a justification for shifting China’s devel-
opment away from Mao’s subsequent hugely devastating revolutionary path. 
Deng found it in Mao’s early conviction of making practice the sole criterion 
for testing truth. Ironically, as Elizabeth Perry put it, in this way “elements of 
China’s revolutionary inheritance have actually furthered the stunningly suc-
cessful implementation of market reforms” (2007). The link between central 
policymakers and local enterprise re-established under Deng proved essential 
both as a mechanism for mediating conflicts over strategy and as an outlet for 
freeing the individual spirit of initiative propagated by Yan Fu.  
China’s economic success, strongly underscored by the recent crisis, 
begs the question not so much of whether the country will become a leading 
global player, but what kind of a player it will be. The official rhetoric of a 
harmonious world coupled with membership in the World Trade Organisa-
tion and a greater involvement in world issues as well as in UN peacekeeping 
activities might suggest that, contrary to a long-established historical tenden-
cy, China has developed a more universal vision of the international commu-
nity into which it is becoming integrated and in which it wants to play an ac-
tive role. But such perceptions are soon belied by China’s standing commit-
ment to the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention, and by 
the frequent cultural references to ‘Chinese characteristics’ indicating a con-
tinuation of a traditional inward-oriented cultural exceptionalism. As reported 
by Lam (2009), the Chinese leader, Hu Jintao, has been urging party and 
government officials to make a contribution towards “fostering humankind’s 
peace and development” by synthesizing “independence and sovereignty” 
with globalisation. The Chinese leader has also made it repeatedly clear that 
China’s more active participation in global affairs would not affect its unique 
model of development, and that countries should respect and learn from each 
other so as to “safeguard the world’s pluralism and the multiplicity of devel-
opment models”.  
These utterances point towards a Chinese vision of a regional, rather than 
global, order within which international societies sharing region-specific val-
                                                                          
6  The practice was abandoned during the frenetic activities of the Great Leap Forward and 
the Cultural Revolution, when Soviet-style top-down policy implementation was instituted. 
China and the crisis in historical perspective 133 
ues operate under the pluralist management. East Asian countries, for exam-
ple, already form the nucleus of an emerging market group bound by com-
mon values. In January 2010 China signed a free-trade agreement linking it 
to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and in March the 
ASEAN countries (China, Japan and South Korea) set up a pool of foreign 
exchange reserves to give them some element of monetary policy coordina-
tion (The Economist, 2010). According to one commentator, the economic 
crisis provided a considerable opportunity to move in the direction of regio-
nally focused global solutions, because the undoing of the Washington Con-
sensus provides “more room, and more need, for experiments in alternative 
modes of international political economy.” Going that route will let China re-
tain the combination of nationalist politics and liberal economics and will al-
low it to rise on the back of the global market while remaining non-demo-
cratic (Buzan, 2010).  
For many countries not satisfied with Western liberal economic and po-
litical systems China symbolises a new and tempting alternative to democra-
cy and the perception has grown in the post-crisis period. The Chinese ‘mod-
el’ has no internationally infectious doctrine to offer. It attracts because the 
unrestricted use of power makes for more efficient decision-making, as Chi-
na’s crisis management has demonstrated; because it shows faster economic 
growth than that noted in market-led democracies; and because it seems to 
hold the potential for greater regime longevity, something of much interest to 
autocrats and would-be autocrats the world over. What is forgotten, though, 
is that in contrast to the tried and well-tested democratic mechanisms that dif-
fuse tensions, the Chinese authoritarian system has no such built-in safety 
valves, which makes China susceptible to implosion in response to any num-
ber of issues related to social and/or nationalist demands. Any country wish-
ing to emulate China, but coming from a different development path, would 
be even more vulnerable in this respect.  
There are some aspects of the Chinese experience from which countries 
could learn. South Africa, for example, might do well to note that innovative 
policy implementation, not endless policy debates, is the secret to successful 
service delivery. But the benefits of learning selectively from China should 
be clearly distinguished from the folly of trying a wholesale imitation of a 
culturally distinctive form of authoritarian governance. The countries with 
the most to lose, but among the ones most likely to try it, would be imperfect 
democracies that show poor economic performance.7 At present they are ob-
liged to at least uphold the pretence of a democratic rule in order to access 
global markets and money; under China’s patronage things would be differ-
ent since the Chinese principle of non-interference attaches no conditions for 
governments to reform, be transparent or respect human rights. Given the cul-
                                                                          
7  For the most likely candidates see E. Wnuk-Lipinski in this volume 
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turally idiosyncratic type of autocratic rule in China, trying it outside the 
Chinese context would be most unlikely to produce the desired economic 
outcomes, but would be sure to eradicate the meagre vestiges of democracy 
that the citizens of these countries still have as their last means to keep some 
degree of check on their governments. 
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A new bi-polarisation? 
Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski 
Introduction 
Reading the global press or surfing the net one gets the distinct impression that 
the 21st century belongs inevitably to China. China is currently second (after 
Germany) in investment into renewable energy and, according to estimates, 
may soon be a global leader in the production and supply of this kind of ener-
gy. Its continued high economic growth rate is an extraordinary achievement, 
considering that other major economies struggle with the consequences of the 
global financial crisis and at the time of writing have merely succeeded in re-
turning to the path of earlier growth after a significant drop in their GDPs. Over 
the last decade China has become a giant in global exports and it will probably 
soon be No. 1 in the global economy. John Toon from Georgia Institute of 
Technology wrote in 2008: “A new study of worldwide technological competi-
tiveness suggests China may soon rival the United States as the principal driver 
of the world's economy – a position the U.S. has held since the end of World 
War II. If that happens, it will mark the first time in nearly a century that two 
nations have competed for leadership as equals. The study's indicators predict 
that China will soon surpass the United States in the critical ability to develop 
basic science and technology, turn those developments into products and ser-
vices – and then market them to the world. Though China is often seen as just a 
low-cost producer of manufactured goods, the new “High Tech Indicators 
study done by researchers at the Georgia Institute of Technology clearly shows 
that the Asian powerhouse has much bigger aspirations.”  
At the same time China’s military power is not only growing, but is also 
being fundamentally modernised. The fire power of the Chinese army recently 
surpassed the similar strength of the Russian army and, according to Global 
FirePower, may be positioned in the second place, just after the US Army fire 
strength. The already accomplished programmes to modernise the army are 
impressive and further modernisation to be implemented in the coming decade 
will fundamentally change Chinese military capabilities. First of all, China will 
move from the position of a regional military power to the status of a global 
player. Secondly, in the area of cyber attacks and cyber warfare technology it 
will probably be the best developed nation-state in the world. Such conclusions 
at least can be drawn from the Annual Report to the US Congress prepared by 
138 Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski 
the Office of the Secretary of Defence in 2007. In the same year the Christian 
Science Monitor (September 14) published a more open assessment by James 
Mulvenon, expert on China's military and director of the Center for Intelligence 
and Research in Washington. Mulvenon said the Chinese “are the first to use 
cyber attacks for political and military goals. Whether it is battlefield prepara-
tion or hacking networks connected to the German chancellor, they are the first 
state actor to jump feet first into 21st-century cyber warfare technology. This is 
clearly becoming a more serious and open problem.” 
Even if the above assessments are somewhat cursory, it is still fair to say 
that the Chinese giant is waking up. The wounds of the Cultural Revolution 
have been healed, the memory of the Tiananmen massacre is receding and the 
ideological fervour of the earlier decades of communist China has been re-
placed by a pragmatic task-oriented attitude among both the elites and the 
masses. Paradoxically, the global financial crisis reinforced the already strong 
position of the Chinese economy on the global market. For this economy 
proved to be relatively resistant to the financial turbulence; the huge Western 
currency reserves discouraged attacks by global ‘casino-capitalism’ investors in 
local Chinese currency, and exports surplus as well as steady demand on the 
domestic market kept the economy on a path of growth. ‘State-led capitalism’, 
to use David Lane’s (2010) phrase, combined with the huge size of the country 
produced an outcome that can be summarised in a simple statement: China’s is 
the fastest growing emerging market in the world. And yes, China is an eco-
nomic success story that cannot be without consequences on a global scale.  
China is being watched with increasing concern by the core countries of 
globalisation and particularly by the US. This is not surprising, given some 
convincing predictions that China will soon become a new and probably de-
manding partner in the current club of global players. But one can assume that 
China is also being watched, and possibly with growing hope, by a number of 
either formally democratic or authoritarian peripheral countries who cannot 
claim their development to have been a success story either in economic or in 
political terms. For the periphery the Chinese example may be a more and more 
attractive alternative to the patterns offered by democratic countries, still afflu-
ent but evidently more vulnerable to the global financial crisis. This, of course, 
would be a fundamental shift from the previous ‘no-other-alternative’ route – a 
route that became quite popular in the wake of the somewhat premature belief 
in the final victory of liberal democracy and free market economy proclaimed 
by Francis Fukuyama after the collapse of the world communist system. The 
recent financial crisis has shaken the global market and revealed the vulnerabil-
ity of the global economy to regional turbulence. It also undermined a belief in 
the stability of market rules, and in the capitalist economy itself.  
The general question pondered in this chapter is: If peripheral democra-
cies suffer as a result of the global financial crisis while authoritarian China 
manages to reinforce its global economic standing despite the trying circums-
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tances, can we expect a gradual shift from the current pattern of development 
that combines liberal democracy with a free market economy to a pattern in 
which authoritarian rule is combined with a free market as a shortcut to a 
more secure and in consequence better position on the global market?  
Democratic and authoritarian capitalisms 
The collapse of the Communist bloc in 1989 gave a new impetus to Hunting-
ton’s Third Wave of democratisation thesis. The impetus was so powerful 
that it prompted some students of democracy to announce triumphantly that it 
was only a matter of time before liberal democracy would prevail all over the 
world. Soon afterwards, though, it became clear that this kind of optimism 
was groundless. According Freedom House estimates, around the year 2000 
the number of electoral democracies stood at 120 or 63 percent of all inde-
pendent nation-states. According to the same source, more recently there has 
been not only stagnation but even a decline in the number of electoral demo-
cracies from 124 in 2005 to 116 in 2009. It is too early to conclude that the 
Third Wave of democratisation is over, but there is little doubt that it has lost 
momentum. A decline is also evident in the area of civil liberties; Freedom 
House estimates that in 2009 alone a decline occurred in 14 countries and on-
ly in four did the civil liberties index rise. In short, the global wave of demo-
cratisation, so vigorous in the last decade of 20th century, seems to have come 
to a turning, which is either just a temporary slowdown or, what seems to be 
more likely, the beginning of the reverse wave.  
The one truly global consequence of the collapse of the communist system 
was that it put an end to the dismal failure of the experimentation with a com-
mand economy of the Soviet type and that since then countries in transition 
have been encouraged to adopt some kind of market economy. Only North Ko-
rea and Cuba deviate from this general pattern. As a result the really global 
market economy is capitalist and consists of a whole range of solutions to the 
problems of various local economies, from liberal in the US through to welfare 
state capitalism in the EU to a mixture of state and private capitalism in China. 
Thus, what had in fact been victorious globally as an outcome of the moment-
ous year 1989 was not so much liberal democracy as capitalism.  
It goes without saying that democracy, and especially citizenship, can 
hardly be functional without a market economy and private property rights. The 
opposite, though, is not true: the market economy, or more broadly capitalism, 
may well function both under a democratic or a non-democratic regime. What 
is needed for capitalism to work are predictable rules of the game, an army of 
consumers and a non-rebellious society willing to trade human rights for eco-
nomic wellbeing and social peace. Krzysztof Gawlikowski, a Polish sinologist, 
commenting on the specificity of the ‘Asian value systems’ claims that the 
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Asian cultural context, and notably Confucian values, that shape the worldview 
of the Chinese people are substantially different from – and incompatible with 
– Western values. Gawlikowski (2005) refers to empirical studies conducted by 
David I. Hitchcock (1994) on East and Southeast Asian elites that show striking 
differences when compared with American elites. For example, the elites of 
East and Southeast Asia value much less than the Americans do personal free-
dom (32 and 82% respectively), individual rights (29 and 78%), free expression 
(47 and 85%) and open debates on the solution of social problems (29 and 
74%). Asians, on the other hand, appreciate much more an orderly society (71 
and 11%), harmony (58 and 7%), consensus (39 and 4%), respect for authority 
(42 and 11%) and the rights of society (27 and 7%). Hitchcock adds that a sig-
nificant number of Asians considered decisions taken behind closed doors as 
the proper way of solving social and political problems (29% compared to 0% 
of Americans). As far as respect for learning was concerned, the figures were 
69% for Asians and merely 15% for Americans. Asians also valued self-
discipline more highly than Americans did (48 and 22%). These findings ex-
plain why civic and political rights that are taken for granted in Western liberal 
democracies could be perceived in the Asian, and especially in the Chinese cul-
tural context, as an imposition of norms from an alien culture and as such pro-
duce cultural resistance understood by local populations as a defence of their 
traditional identity.  
Citizens with civic and political rights are not a necessary condition for 
the wellbeing of capitalism. Moreover, too many social rights for the citize-
nry may slow down capitalist effectiveness and increase the cost of the vari-
ous elements of production as well as making the economic system more 
vulnerable to global crises. The global division that seems to have emerged 
currently is one between democratic and authoritarian capitalisms. According 
to Freedom House, of the 192 independent nation states only 113 (58,8 %) 
enjoy the status of electoral democracies. And the category ‘electoral demo-
cracies’ covers all nation-states that practise minimal procedural democracy, 
i.e. they hold competitive elections in a multiparty system. Liberal values that 
are attached to a democratic regime and are taken for granted in the Western 
world are not necessarily perceived as an integral part of democracy in other 
world regions and civilizations. And China’s economic achievements could 
undermine the near-axiomatic conviction in political science that democracy 
goes hand in hand with economic success, while an autocratic regime is like-
ly to be associated with poor economic performance. More on this later. For 
now it will suffice to say that it is increasingly less clear whether democracy 
increases the probability of economic success or rather – and this is more 
likely – whether it produces improvements in the living standards of wide 
segments of a society but only when good economic performance is already 
in place The legitimate question to raise in this context is whether the Chi-
nese model of authoritarian capitalism might become an attractive alternative 
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to liberal democracy of the Western type, which is combined not only with a 
market economy but also with the whole package of civic values such as hu-
man rights, the role of the individual in society etc. And, if so, to whom 
might the Chinese model appeal most? Before offering tentative answers to 
these questions, it will be useful to briefly survey the volatile world order that 
emerged after the collapse of the communist system. 
Two world divisions: poverty and democracy 
The self-liberation of Central and East European countries from communist 
rule and especially the end of the Soviet Union led to a rearrangement of the 
global chessboard; the bipolar division of the world came to an end and all of 
a sudden most of the global strategies (political and military) based on the 
premise accepted for decades that this bipolar construction of the world order 
was solid and stable was proved to be without foundation. There was no Cold 
War any longer and the threat of a global military conflict disappeared, along 
with that of an expanding communist sphere. The so-called ‘free world’ lost a 
basic point of reference. To put it differently, the communist threat that sus-
tained the unity of liberal democracies and forced them into economic, tech-
nological and, above all, military alliances so as not to be outdone by the So-
viet bloc was no more. NATO underwent an identity crisis and the question 
of a new world order jumped to the top of the agenda. Indeed, the last decade 
of the 20th century saw a fundamental reshuffling of the global scene.  
The question is which factors of the former world order remained impor-
tant when the bipolar division of the Cold war era passed into history? There 
were at least two. One was the level of economic development and the other 
was the level of freedom offered by the various political systems around the 
world. These two dimensions partly overlap (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: World according to wealth and democracy (2009) 
Nation states Total Affluent Neither affluent, 
nor poor 
Poor 
Total  192 (100,0) 51 (100,0) 94 (100,0) 47 (100,0) 
Electoral democracies 113   (58,8) 42   (82,4) 54   (57,4) 17   (36,2) 
Others 79   (41,2) 9   (17,6) 40   (42,6) 30   (63,8) 
Source: own calculations on the basis of Freedom House (2010). Freedom in the world 2010: 
erosion of freedom intensifies (http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FIW_2010_Tables_ 
and_Graphs.pdf (without Tuvalu and Nauru) and data from: World Development Report 2010, 
The World Bank, Washington D.C. p. 377 (“Affluent” – annual income per capita for 2008 equal 
to 11,906 US $ or more; “neither affluent, nor poor” – income per capita for 2008 between 978 
US $ and 11,905 US $; “poor” – income per capita for 2008 equal to 975 US$ or less). 
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In statistical terms there is a clear correlation between the democratic order 
and the wealth of nations measured by per capita income. This is nothing new 
as a number of empirical studies confirm this association. Most of the afflu-
ent societies are electoral democracies, and most of the poor countries are not 
democratic; they do not even fit the minimal procedural criterion of democ-
racy that is applied here. But the problem lies in the question of whether a 
given society is affluent because it is democratic, or whether it is democratic 
because it is affluent. Empirical findings are not clear; in the literature one 
finds some arguments supporting both of the opposite theses, but because 
they are expressed in causal terms they cannot both be true. This theoretical 
controversy deserves an in-depth analysis that would, however, go beyond 
the scope of this chapter. For the sake of further reflection it will be enough 
to say that so far electoral democracies have been positively associated with 
good economic performance, creating the widely shared conviction that a 
democratic system offers the best entry ticket to the club of economically 
successful nation-states. This conviction was strengthened by the fact that the 
club consisted exclusively of liberal democracies. However, the global finan-
cial crisis and the following deep recession hit leading democratic capitalisms 
the hardest exposing the fragility of economic growth and the vulnerability of 
democratic capitalisms to financial mismanagement. This in turn undermined 
the widely shared belief that the best recipe for a prosperous future is elector-
al democracy combined with a free market economy. This was especially 
evident in the fact that an economic giant such as China didn’t suffer much 
from the crisis and even used it to show off its striking competitive edge on 
the global market.  
As Table 1 illustrates, there are also electoral democracies among the 
poor nation-states. In fact over one third of poor countries are formally elec-
toral democracies. Looking at the same issue from a different perspective one 
can see that of all electoral democracies only 37,2% belong to the club of af-
fluent nations-states; nearly half are neither affluent nor poor (47,8%), and 
15% of electoral democracies fall into the category of poor nations. Among 
all non-democratic nation-states 11,4% belong to the category of affluent so-
cieties; half of the non-democratic countries (50,6 %) are neither poor nor 
rich, and 38,0% fall into the category of poor nation states.  
As already mentioned, the criterion applied by Freedom House to form 
the category of electoral democracies is a purely procedural element. It in-
cludes all nation-states that organise competitive elections at regular inter-
vals, but it ignores a set of values (a package of civil and political rights of an 
individual) which in the Western hemisphere is attached to democratic pro-
cedures as an integral part of democracy. As already said, what is generally 
taken for granted in the Western cultural zone can be (and indeed is) ques-
tioned elsewhere, and particularly in China. Table 2 provides data on the as-
sociation of wealth and freedom in the set of independent nation-states. 
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Table 2: Freedom and wealth among the nation-states (2009) 
Nation-states World total Affluent Neither affluent, 
nor poor 
Poor 
World total 192 (100,0) 51 (100,0) 94 (100,0) 47 (100,0) 
Free 87   (45,3) 42   (82,4) 38   (40,4) 7   (14,9) 
Partly free 58   (30,2) 2     (3,9) 33   (35,1) 23   (48,9) 
Not free 47   (24,5) 7     (13,7) 23   (24,5) 17   (36,2) 
Source: own calculations on the basis of Freedom House (2010). Freedom in the world 2010: 
erosion of freedom intensifies (http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FIW_2010_Tables_ 
and_Graphs.pdf (without Tuvalu and Nauru) and data from: World Development Report 2010, 
The World Bank, Washington D.C. p. 377 (“Affluent” –annual income per capita for 2008 equal 
to 11,906 US $ or more; “neither affluent, nor poor” – income per capita for 2008 between 978 
US $ and 11,905 US $; “poor” – income per capita for 2008 equal to 975 US$ or less). 
 
Today fewer than half of the independent nation-states fully observe civil and 
political rights. But most affluent societies (82,4 %) protect the civil and po-
litical rights of citizens, whereas poor countries show the opposite trend: they 
are – in the vast majority of cases – either “partly free” or not free at all. So 
the panoramic view of today’s world reveals a picture where wealth and free-
dom are concentrated at one end of the pole, and poverty and neo-
enslavement at the other. As a result of the global circulation of information, 
both ordinary people and political elites in poor countries are well aware of 
their position and know that the distance to the other pole is not getting short-
er; but may indeed be getting longer. In the period between the collapse of 
the world communist system and the onset of the 2008-2009 global crisis the 
remedy to help those countries escape from the poverty zone seemed clear. 
International institutions, such as the IMF or the World Bank, and some 
democratic nation-states led by the US were willing to provide aid under the 
condition of thorough local reforms that would restructure the economic and 
political system of a given country along the lines of Western liberal demo-
cratic capitalism. This was the model before the onset of the global financial 
crisis that highlighted China’s good economic performance despite the unfa-
vourable global economic climate. China’s economic success and its crisis-
proof growth not only reinforced authoritarian rule in China itself by proving 
that its policy works, but it also shifted China from the status of a poor and 
backward country to the position of a global player, at least on the world 
market. The communist ideology that plays its ritualised role to legitimise an 
authoritarian hold of power is undergoing modifications, as discussed by Ur-
sula van Beek in this volume. But generally ideology no longer moves the 
Chinese people. They are rather mobilised on a massive scale by the high 
consumption standards to which they aspire. One need not be a dedicated 
communist any longer to participate in the success of the Chinese system; it 
is enough to be pragmatic in the market and at the same time avoid suspicion 
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that one has political aspirations that might challenge the ritualised commun-
ist power structures.  
John and Doris Naisbitt (2010) argue that the Chinese ‘economic mi-
racle’ rests on a specifically Chinese model of social relations that has rough-
ly the following attributes:  
1. Top-down strategic decisions supported by bottom-up participation;  
2. Ideological indoctrination replaced by encouragement for innovative 
thinking in business;  
3. Political legitimacy of power provided by economic performance and not 
by democratic procedure;  
4. Top-down and bottom-up forces in a delicate balance that forms a new 
model of power relations called by the Naisbitts “vertical democracy”, 
however strange this might sound to Western ears;  
5. Placing social order and harmony, fundamental to the teaching of Confu-
cius, at the top of the Chinese value system;  
6. Central power defines border conditions that cannot be trespassed by in-
dividuals or groups, but within a framework of conditions that allow rela-
tive economic freedom, expressed in a poetic Chinese way as ‘Framing 
the forest and letting the trees grow’;  
7. Rigid directives from the centre replaced by a trial-and-error strategy, 
elimination of fear of risk, and encouragement of experimenting in the 
economy and in intellectual life; and finally,  
8. Opening to the world, and above all to the world market, combined with 
the evolution from imitation to innovation, that is “from manufacturing 
brands to creating brands”. 
Such a model of pragmatic market communism, no matter how odd it might 
sound, seems to have worked well during the global financial crisis and is un-
likely to be overlooked by the world, and especially by poor countries that 
show perennially poor economic performance.  
These countries are located on the peripheries of the global network of 
political and economic relations and are either authoritarian or electoral de-
mocracies. The peripheral electoral democracies are sometimes called ‘defec-
tive democracies’, because of their many institutional malfunctions and subs-
tandard adherence to the rights of citizens. In fact, nearly one quarter (24,8%) 
of electoral democracies are evaluated by Freedom House as “partly free”. In 
other words, a substantial number of procedural democracies show some 
shortcomings, predominantly in the area of civil and political rights of indi-
viduals. This is even stronger in the category of poor countries, where of the 
17 electoral democracies that fall into that category only 4 are estimated by 
Freedom House as “free” (Benin, Ghana, Serbia and Ukraine), and 13 as 
“partly free” (Bangladesh, Burundi, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Vanuatu and Zambia). ‘De-
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fective democracies’ are the weakest element of the Third Wave of democra-
tisation.  
The question of world leadership – politics and economy 
Not many people today would doubt US world leadership in technology, the 
economy and military affairs. However, the world order is shaped by dynam-
ic economic, technological and political forces, which may in the relatively 
short time of a decade or two change the established situation.  
When we speak about leadership we may think about one of its two di-
mensions. First, leadership means that some nation-state achieves the best 
score in a given area. And this kind of leadership can be easily verified by 
empirical proof (statistics, observable performance etc.). Secondly, leadership 
may mean that a given-nation state is simply followed by other nation-states 
either in policies implemented or paths of development (leadership in a 
stronger sense); or the position of this nation-state is so powerful in a given 
area that other nation- states will be discouraged from doing anything expli-
citly against the will of this privileged nation-state.  
If leadership is understood as achieving the highest score in a specific 
area, then one can say the US is the world leader in military strength and in 
technological progress. In this leadership position the state of the American 
economy shapes many economies around the world. The 2008-2009 global 
financial crisis was born in the US and produced recession not only in that 
country but also in many different regions of the world, including Europe. As 
long as the American economy is in a good shape the world economic order 
is more or less stable, but if the American financial system or the economy 
catches a cold, the world economic order may well fear that it will be getting 
the flu. This correlation, which the last crisis so brutally revealed, might be 
too close for comfort to some and might in consequence be redefined as a 
constant threat by an increasing number of national economies – a threat that 
is beyond their political control structures. One of the outcomes of the crisis 
has been an urgent search for an answer to the question “How can we make 
the global economic order more immune to financial turmoil or even to fi-
nancial fraud, which can always occur in one of the global economic players, 
but especially in the US?”  
American leadership in the second sense is less obvious. First of all, the 
leadership is challenged by various authoritarian nation-states, and especially 
by the countries of militant Islam. It is also increasingly being challenged by 
China. In a sense, the relation of China to the US serves as a factor that is 
used for the formation of a new and more nationalistic identity of China after 
the collapse of the Maoist totalitarian ideology. But even among American 
allies there are clear signs of ambivalent attitudes towards US political and 
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military leadership. A good indication of this phenomenon is the winding 
road of transatlantic US relations with the EU, where friendship is mixed 
with competition. In these relations US leadership is accepted as long as it 
does not become too powerful.  
The end of the Cold War redefined the criteria that determine the posi-
tion of a global leader. Military strength, though still important, is gradually 
losing its formerly overriding power as the threat of a global military conflict 
recedes. What matters more now is economic expansion and technological 
progress as well as economic cooperation within structures that transcend the 
borders even of giant nation-states with huge domestic markets.  
There is an additional trend that may soon change the global balance of 
power and put the question of leadership into a new context. Bilateral rela-
tions are gradually being replaced by multilateral cooperation, while the tra-
ditional direct power relation on the global scene of hegemony vs. submis-
siveness gives way to the ‘soft power’ of norms and regulations. In this con-
text the question of leadership moves from the issue of who matters most in a 
cluster of bilateral relations to the issue of who is powerful enough to impose 
norms and regulations that shape multilateral cooperation above the nation-
state level. The Chinese strategy of world expansion seems to take this evolu-
tion in the nature of international relations into account seriously. South-
eastern and central Asia are its natural areas of expansion, but one should 
note that China is becoming increasingly active also in Africa and the Arab 
world. Two organizations, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
and the Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum (SACOF), serve as an experimental 
field to implement Chinese strategy of world expansion through soft power, 
which regulates China’s cooperation with two large regions of the world. Ni-
cola Contessi (2009) writes that “As rules (or norms) are often epiphenomena 
of underlying interests, multilateralism has come to represent an effective 
way for China to increase her power projection in the two regions, while si-
delining direct confrontation with the superpower.” The increasing presence 
of China in various multilateral initiatives, combined with its economic 
strength, gradually changes the status of that country from ‘norm taker’ to 
‘norm broker’, even if the norms are always filtered through indigenous Chi-
nese culture.  
From the perspective of authoritarian capitalisms, US leadership is not 
only challenged but also denied. This is so not only because of natural eco-
nomic competition on the global market, but also because one of the signifi-
cant elements of American international policy is to promote world democra-
cy. Part and parcel of this package is the American lifestyle and a set of val-
ues regulating public life known as American ‘political correctness’. Need-
less to say, this element of American foreign policy produces a direct threat 
to authoritarian rule and is thus rejected by political rulers of non-democratic 
states. It also undermines any indigenous cultural identity.  
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Towards a new world order 
The present world order is unstable because of many and sometimes conflict-
ing global processes, such as climate change; ‘casino capitalism’, which 
moves huge financial resources around the world in search of the best returns 
on investments; local economic breakdowns that disturb the global financial 
system; and – last but not least – global terrorism. The remedies applied by 
international organisations and by the most powerful nation-states are limited 
and defensive. Responsibility for the global order is dispersed, which in prac-
tice means that nobody feels responsible for world affairs as long as particu-
lar national interests are not threatened. Peripheral nation-states (authoritarian 
and democratic alike) with a low level of economic development are left on 
their own and can hardly cope with the regional and local consequences of 
the global turmoil. Therefore the future is increasingly less predictable. One 
could expect that such a situation will not last long.  
According to many indicators, some of which were mentioned earlier, 
China is not only challenging the military supremacy of the US, but is also 
trying hard to fill the technological gap and take up the position of a global 
economic leader. Chinese world exports have had an impressive record over 
the past decade. According to PRC National Bureau of Statistics, China’s to-
tal volume of exports was equal to 249,2 billion US$ in 2000 and in 2009 
climbed to 1,201,7 billion US$ (an increase of 482%!). According to the US 
International Trade Commission, China’s trade with the USA alone reached 
366 billion US$, but the surplus of Chinese exports over imports grew to 
226,8 billion US$ (in 2000 the Chinese surplus was 83,7 billion US$). Ac-
cording to The Economist (31 March 2010), China, which is still seen by var-
ious rating agencies as an emerging market, is now a leading global exporter, 
with a 9,6% share in world exports, and has surpassed not only the US (8,5 
%) but also Germany (9,0 %).  
Such rapid growth has already changed the economic map of the world. 
China is becoming one of the leading global centres for investments and 
trade, and is an advertisement for the effectiveness of economic development 
in the context of authoritarian capitalism. As such it might be an appealing 
pattern for other authoritarian capitalisms to follow. Similarly, for defective 
peripheral democracies with poor economic performance such a pattern 
might also become more attractive as a potential exit route from their disad-
vantaged position. Should this be the case, the Third Wave of democratisa-
tion may not only remain stagnant but might even be reversed. All it would 
need for this to happen would be for defective democracies to abandon dem-
ocratic procedures and turn to authoritarian solutions in politics in order to 
imitate the Chinese example in economics.  
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Conclusions 
It is far from clear whether the continuing evolution of China will leave its 
internal political structure intact. There is some solid scholarship in social 
theory suggesting that the probability of social emancipation from authorita-
rian rule increases in step with economic development and growth of welfare. 
But it is equally well known that culture matters and hence that the Chinese 
culture might turn out to be a fertile ground for the emergence of a new mod-
el. In this model the harmonious development of the economy combines with 
vertical social relations that stabilise the political system, which is authorita-
rian – according to Western standards. The other scenario for China is an ac-
ceptance of Western norms of liberal democratic order, which would mean 
submission to Western soft power and in consequence the Westernisation of 
Chinese culture and a transition of social identities from indigenous to im-
ported models. And this seems rather unlikely. What is more probable is that 
China, rather than following the trends set by others, will within a decade or 
two become a trendsetter that might find followers not only among poor au-
thoritarian capitalisms but also among defective democracies. Should this be 
the case, the emergence of a new bipolar division of the world will be only a 
matter of time. 
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Chinese crisis management: consolidated 
authoritarian capitalism as a new brand of 
political regime? 
Han Sang-Jin and Lü Peng 
Introduction 
“Welcome to the People’s Republic of China,” declares a Chinese officer as 
he crisply salutes a flood of refugees from all over the world who have fled to 
Tibet as their homes were destroyed by an apocalyptic deluge. It is a line that 
thrilled thousands of Chinese filmgoers, who voted writer-director Roland 
Emmerich’s latest blockbuster 2012 the most popular Hollywood film in 
China. The plot panders to Chinese audiences: the giant arks that will save 
humanity are both made and landed in China. When the apocalypse comes, 
China will save the world. At least that’s how Chinese audiences interpret 
this movie. For the first time that anyone can remember a Hollywood disaster 
movie has cast the Chinese as a significant beneficial force. 
The aim of this chapter is to explore some salient characteristics in the 
Chinese pattern of crisis management to see why China has been so success-
ful in economic development that even a Hollywood movie alludes to the no-
tion that it might save the world from its economic woes in the wake of the 
global financial crisis; the Chinese themselves seem to be more confident af-
ter the global economic downturn. Of course, it is an exaggeration to say that 
China will save the world economy, but it seems quite certain that it is mak-
ing a significant contribution to that end. In order to discover why that is, we 
will focus on the specific rules selected for crisis management by the party-
state of China and the successful consequences of the institutionalised selec-
tivity. However, the ultimate goal of the analysis is not to simply present this 
success as a positive development but also to consider it as a possible threat 
to the future of China. In this connection we want ponder the problem of de-
mocracy1 and citizens’ participation as important issues that need to be ad-
dressed. For this purpose we shall examine the attitudes of Chinese elites to-
wards democracy before the global financial meltdown and in the course of 
the Great Recession. 
                                                                          
1  We refer here to democracy as a system where top political leaders are selected via free and 
fair elections. If one accepts this thin definition, China is definitely not a democratic re-
gime. 
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Where does China stand today? 
The 2008-2009 economic crisis, which originated in the meltdown of the fi-
nancial and housing markets of the United States, spread all over the world 
but had only a limited direct impact on China. It is true that Chinese compa-
nies with heavy investments in the West felt a massive blow, but thanks to 
the relatively slow-paced development of China’s financial system and the 
fact that foreign investment by China’s banking industry is subject to foreign 
exchange controls and regulatory approval, the banking industry’s overall 
open foreign exchange exposure has been relatively low. More importantly, 
because of its insulated banking sector that relies primarily on deposits, the 
domestic financial market in China has not experienced a cash-flow crisis. 
Furthermore, there has been almost no direct impact on small and medium-
sized banks.  
China was also spared the effects of the other ‘culprit’ of the global cri-
sis, the housing market, which despite a huge bubble did not collapse in Chi-
na as it did in many Western countries. In fact, the Chinese housing market 
has skyrocketed by almost 60% since 2008, when the financial crisis broke 
out. The price of land in and around Beijing has gone up by a factor of 9 in 
the last 6 years. Many observers believe the question is no longer whether 
there is a Chinese housing bubble, but when it will burst.  
As far as China’s real economy is concerned, the international crisis left 
its mark in several respects. To begin with, international trade was badly af-
fected. In November 2009 exports fell (for the first time since 2001) by 2.2%, 
while in December imports declined by 17.9%. Secondly, the manufacturing 
sector taking orders from the US and the EU began to feel the pinch; in early 
October 2008 the China Manufacturers Purchasing Index, based on monthly 
questionnaires sent to 400 Chinese manufacturers, indicated the steepest fall 
in the volume of foreign orders since the survey began in 2004. In addition, 
orders from the West for Christmas products made by Chinese manufacturers 
fell off the cliff in that year. It was reported that as a result 23 million migrant 
workers were laid off in major manufacturing cities and had to go back to 
their home towns in the inland provinces (Cai and Chan, 2009; Wang, 
2010b). 
Such factors as decreasing exports and increasing unemployment as well 
as the loss of Chinese banks’ foreign assets can be considered exogenous. 
And while they did affect China, they have caused a slowdown rather than a 
meltdown of the Chinese economy in terms of export growth, which in some 
respects remained booming. In the first three quarters of 2008 the country’s 
domestic consumption, another engine of the economy, still grew by 22%, 
which was 6.1% higher year-on-year. This does not mean that China’s endo-
genous economic sectors are perfectly healthy. As we will point out below, 
China has its own serious problems. Therefore the question of how to expand 
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domestic demand has become of crucial importance to prevent the exogenous 
crisis from jeopardising China’s real economy. 
 
The Chinese response may be seen as a policy of extreme Keynesianism. In 
November 2008 the Chinese government launched a swift rollout of 4 trillion 
RMB (about US$ 586 billion) as a stimulus package to be spent in the fol-
lowing 2 years. This package was the largest (as a share of GDP) in the world 
and was equivalent to 13% of GDP in 2008. Its principal aim was to spur 
domestic demand, reduce domestic savings and increase consumption to 
make up for the fall in exports. Figure 1 above shows the overall composition 
of this massive scheme. With 1 500 billion RMB (37.5%) assigned to infra-
structure, the real injection earmarked for projects related to infrastructure 
and construction amounted to about 2 900 billion RMB (74.5%). Both public 
Figure 1:  Breakdown of the 4Tn stimulus package
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housing and post-quake recovery were of use to land developers, while a total 
of 550 billion RMB was allocated to enhance China’s social welfare net to 
help increase individuals’ purchasing power in social services and rural de-
velopment. The object of the monetary element of the stimulus plan has been 
to expand the banks’ credit supply and increase existing loans. In January of 
2009 new loans reached a record of 1.62 trillion Yuan. This figure increased 
to 4.59 trillion in March (see 
Zhang et al., 2009). Seven 
months later the composition of 
the stimulus package changed 
significantly. This was in re-
sponse to wide criticism levelled 
at spending too much on infra-
structure and construction, 
which led the government to in-
crease investment on social wel-
fare. For example, 110 billion 
and 120 billion RMB went for 
social services and public hous-
ing, respectively. But heavy in-
vestment in infrastructure and 
construction is still the dominant 
feature of the package. 
To be more specific, 1 000 
billion RMB of the 4 trillion 
package, or roughly US$ 146.5 
billion, was earmarked for re-
covery after the devastating 
earthquake that occurred on 12 
May 2008 and killed 68 000 
people. Some of the investment 
had already been announced be-
fore November 2008. The extra funds might amount to less than a third of the 
announced stimulus package, but the gross amount of the stimulus package is 
still huge and promotes market confidence domestically and internationally. 
The stimulus spending was not only high, but it was also rapid. As Figure 
2 above indicates, the package was not fully financed by the central govern-
ment. About 30% of the total amount came from Beijing, while the rest was 
supposed to come from local governments and from lending by state-owned 
banks. The efficiency of the party-state was impressive. Within weeks local 
governments were meeting to compile lists of shovel-ready projects along 
guidelines set by the central government. Each provincial government an-
nounced its own parallel ‘stimulus package’ for two years, making the total 
Figure 2:  How is it financed?
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budgets amount to 10 trillion RMB. By the end of April 2009, that is six 
months after the stimulus package was announced, about 57% of the total 4 
trillion RMB budget (2.28 trillion RMB) was already allocated. Subsequently 
the central government asked its branches to spend 100 million RMB (about 
US$ 14.72 million) on large projects within 110 days. Such giant projects 
would be impossible under the conditions of a liberal-democratic political 
system, where state power is always under heavy periodic pressure to gain 
legitimacy and support from the electorate. The Chinese government, on the 
other hand, can mobilise resources across the nation and invest colossal 
amounts of money efficiently to carry out specific projects (e.g. the post-
earthquake recovery) or support specific events (e.g. the sport programmes 
for the Olympics). Some commentators see this as evidence of the “strong 
state capacity” of the Chinese government. 
Selectivity of crisis management 
How, with what purpose and to whom was the heavy stimulus package dis-
tributed? We cannot offer a definite answer to this question because of the 
confidential nature of information of this kind, but we can formulate a few 
reasonable hypotheses. First, the greater part of the package was channelled 
into infrastructure projects as they can absorb the largest number of workers 
in a short period of time. Second, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) rather than 
private enterprises benefited most from the stimulus package; the party-state 
explicitly attempted to protect the interests of SOEs since functionally they 
represent the most important sector in China. Channelling money in this way 
is meant to prevent workers from becoming a socio-political factor in an ag-
gressive challenge to the regime. In this sense the party-state is not signifi-
cantly different from a typical capitalist state in the West. The very logic of 
state activity in China is to steer the economy and to manage the society in 
such a way that enterprises make profits and workers become submissive.  
The heavy investment in infrastructure and construction is not specific to 
China. However, the need to absorb as many workers as possible is particu-
larly strong in China, where people have become accustomed to a fast-
growing economy. In order to insulate Chinese industry from the effects of 
the global downturn, the government’s most urgent priorities were to safe-
guard living standards and to contain unemployment by means of state-led 
investment and the facilitation of credit. In this process even the textile indus-
try, a labour-intensive but overgrown industry in China, became substantially 
subsidised.  
The selective preferential treatment of SOEs needs more explanation. 
First, big infrastructure projects have been dominated by SOEs and prefe-
rence for SOEs and infrastructure are just two sides of the same coin. Se-
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condly, as far as other domains are concerned (for example, energy, high 
technology, ecology industry and manufacturing), Chinese state enterprises 
are no longer the small companies they used to be in the past. Instead, they 
now send shockwaves to the business world. In the Global 500 list of the 
world’s largest companies released by Fortune in July 2009, 37 Chinese 
firms made the list and they were all state-owned. In the list of 2010, three 
Chinese state-owned companies were listed among the top ten, while 6 
American and 1 Australian company made up the remainder.  
The reason for this can be found in China’s reform of state-owned enter-
prises during the late 1990s called zhuadafangxiao (hold on to the big and let 
the small go). On the one hand, the ‘let the small go’ part soon turned into a 
chaotic wave of straightforward privatisation, often involving local govern-
ments and corrupt officials. On the other hand, after a series of restructuring 
efforts, the ‘hold on to the big’ part of the guideline generated several behe-
moths. This was somewhat similar to what had happened in Poland during 
the 1990s, when large SOEs were reorganised and upgraded under the scruti-
ny of a specific government department. But the difference was that the ‘stra-
tegic and mainstay’ Chinese enterprises were ultimately not privatised, but 
remained under the control of the government through the offices of the state-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which 
represents the state in order to ‘fulfil the duty as the investor’ of the SOEs. 
By means of robust taxation and other profits from these aircraft-carrier-like 
state firms, the state gained more economic might to invest in its social wel-
fare system. In other words, a stimulus package that selects state firms as a 
priority can be profitable in some cases, not to mention that those state enter-
prises have much stronger networks to lobby or bargain for higher budgets 
for themselves than private or foreign companies are able to do. 
The stimulus package favours state enterprises not only for economic 
reasons but also for political ones. Chinese leaders believe it is much easier to 
control labour in state-enterprises than in private or foreign companies, be-
cause managers and workers do not care much about profits as long as the 
state invests enough money to keep their payroll and welfare going. It is 
therefore not surprising that in the past 60 years employees working in state 
entities have never launched a successful national protest in China. One fac-
tor is that up until the mid-1990s, and even during the Tiananmen Event 
workers in the SOEs were the ‘privileged’. The other factors still in operation 
today that make a national strike impossible today is the lack of an indepen-
dent union, such as Solidarity in Poland, and the promise of sustained welfare 
by the state. For both the Chinese economy and politics a national labour 
strike could be a disastrous event, incomparably more serious than the heated 
debates on the exchange-rate regime. This is why the party-state is more 
keenly interested in subsidising state enterprises as ‘strategic economic do-
mains’ than in subsidising private enterprises.  
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The consequences of crisis management 
As pointed out above, the beneficiaries of the stimulus package of both the 
central government and local governments are found overwhelmingly among 
state-owned and state-controlled enterprises. Be that as it may, the result was 
that expanded investments from the state began to have a discernible impact 
on the economy from the first quarter of 2009. At least in the short term this 
‘primacy of internal investment’ strategy has achieved some positive effects. 
Three major economic indicators illustrate the strategy.  
First, economic growth in terms of GDP remained robust in the past two 
years as China’s economy expanded by 9.6% in 2008 and by 9.1% in 2009, 
by far the best performance in the G20 economies. Several prestigious in-
vestment banks estimated that the 4 trillion package contributed 2 to 3 GDP 
points to the growth, with Morgan Stanley and Citigroup estimating 2 points 
and Merrill Lynch estimating 3 points (Michael, 2009).  
Second, China’s exports have shown a strong recovery and as a result 
factories are reopening and employment is up. In the first four months of 
2010 the total value of China’s imports and exports rose by 42.7% year on 
year to US$ 855.99 billion, where the export value rose by 29.2% to US$ 
436.05 billion. Actually, as a result of the export recovery Chinese factories 
in a few coastal cities have been struggling to find workers to help fill export 
orders despite exhaustive recruiting drives.  
Third, the ratio of household consumption to GDP, the weak link of the 
Chinese economy, is not as high as expected, but it is rising rapidly. In 2009 
it accounted for 52.5% of GDP growth, up from 46% in 2008. Household 
consumption showed a corresponding rate of increase over the same period, 
accounting for about 39% of GDP growth in 2009, compared with 33% in 
2008 (Lo, 2010). 
In sum, as the international financial crisis spread from developed coun-
tries to emerging economies, and as it spilled over from the financial sector to 
the real economy, China has not remained immune to the recession in the West, 
but neither has the exogenous financial crisis caused an endogenous economic 
meltdown and/or social turmoil in the country. In some respects, as Bobo Lo 
(2010) argued, the crisis has actually turned out to be a blessing in that it re-
lieved the Chinese leaders’ previous concern of an over-heating economy and 
encouraged a reorientation of production towards the domestic market. 
Conditions for success 
To get a full picture it is not enough to describe the set of selective rules em-
ployed by the state in its intervention into the economic crisis in China. What 
is also important is to examine the conditions which allowed the party-state 
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to perform such a role with considerable success. Given the overwhelming 
importance of the role the party-state plays in the overall policy direction to 
be pursued, it is a pity that no serious debate has emerged in China to concep-
tualise the Chinese state in a manner acceptable to the international commu-
nity of social science.  
To begin with, the party-state of China differs significantly from both a 
‘totalitarian’ state conventionally used in reference to Nazism, Fascism and 
Stalinism, and from a ‘liberal-democratic’ or a ‘social-democratic’ state in 
the Western sense. The Chinese party-state lies in between these two opposite 
poles and has some general characteristics, outlined below. 
First, it has an extensively developed bureaucratic apparatus with heavy 
networks of consultation and influence over the society as a whole. This con-
dition is possible only when a country reaches a considerable degree of eco-
nomic and social modernisation. 
Second, ambitious young people with recognised educational credentials 
both at home and abroad are recruited into the state bureaucracy. In other 
words, they are protected by state power to act fairly autonomously according 
to the rules of the state’s activities. Insulated from external pressures, they are 
in a better position to pursue developmental goals than they would be if they 
were subject to external pressures.  
Third, the system of governance by this kind of bureaucracy entails a con-
siderable degree of organisational discipline, which regulates interactions. Al-
though elements of corruption, factionalism and clientalism exist, the party-
state still maintains a discipline of meritocracy, an effective ability to formulate 
and evaluate national policies of development, rules of objective testing and 
competition as well as an emphasis on public good over private interests, public 
deliberation and norms of general social welfare. Furthermore, the party-state is 
able to discipline private entrepreneurs as well as the workers. 
Fourth, a considerable degree of cohesion has emerged among the power 
elites, particularly between those who steer the economy and public security, 
that is, between socio-economic technocrats and the military. These two 
power groups are united in the belief that national wealth and military power 
ought to be increased through a state-led process of modernisation. The inter-
nal cohesion makes it possible for the state apparatus to pursue economic pol-
icies consistently. Consequently, political dissidents are effectively shut out 
of decision-making processes.  
A salient aspect of the Chinese party-state is that rather than striving to 
reach a compromise between government and enterprise, the state attempts, 
often forcefully, to induce enterprises to comply with its already established 
goals. The state uses various means to this end, among them financial in-
ducement schemes as well as fiscal and tax benefits. The secret lies in the 
state’s control of capital supply to the private sector. The state also uses such 
devices as loans, industrial subsidies and other legally stipulated means by 
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which it reduces or exempts from duties, alleviates customs taxes and defers 
debt redemption.  
In the prevailing order of things the state positions itself above the pri-
vate sector. This position is deeply anchored in the Confucian norm of public 
service and has had an enormous influence on state policy over economic en-
terprises. While the state plays a large role in developing state-owned enter-
prises, it also wants to play an important role in the private sector, which it 
tries to discipline, albeit not in the traditional way but in a capitalist way. It is 
therefore not accurate to describe the relations between the government and 
economic enterprises as symbiotic, as is often done in the case of Japanese 
capitalism. Rather, the concept of a ‘disciplinary’ regime (Amsden, 1989) is 
more applicable. The state disciplines not only the workers but also the en-
trepreneurs. We may call this type of regime a bureaucratic authoritarian state 
with a built-in emphasis on economic growth. 
However, this description involves idealisation. The fact is that although 
the Chinese state turns out to be highly successful in accelerating economic 
growth, it is undeniable that it also suffers from serious limitations and con-
tradictions. This leads us to ask whether the Chinese ruling elite are aware of 
the possibility that the Chinese pattern of crisis management described above 
could store up problems over the long term, such as large amounts of bad 
loans. We would like to tease out how such a scenario would be likely to im-
pact on the future of China, particularly with regards to democratisation.  
Political elite: consensus on stability 
In China as in other countries the paramount concern of the government is 
regime longevity. Though political factions exist and matter, a consensus 
among most Chinese leaders since the reform-and-opening-up policy of 1978 
has been to promote stable and rapid economic growth at all cost as the key 
to maintaining regime legitimacy. Any project believed to jeopardise eco-
nomic growth is to be postponed, suspended or even abandoned.  
Chinese leaders believe that the recipe for successful economic transfor-
mation is the absence of political reform. Social and political unrest in Cen-
tral and Southern Europe since 2008, along with the troubles experienced by 
America’s economy and the Congress stalemate, have only re-confirmed the 
belief in the superiority of the resilience of Chinese authoritarianism over 
Western liberal capitalism. In fact, both because of China’s success relative 
to other leading economies and because of the country’s pivotal importance 
in any global recovery, the diplomatic pressure from core democracies, espe-
cially the US, to democratise China has been largely neutralised. 
The Chinese leaders are gaining even more confidence in the authorita-
rian model when they look at their domestic ‘achievements’. Perhaps not 
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ideologically, but in practice they have so far been relatively successful in 
boosting the economy and maintaining stability. No other political crises an-
ywhere approaching the scale of the Tiananmen protests in 1989 have taken 
place since then, while the mass upheavals of the Falungong Movement in 
1998, the turmoil in Tibet in 2008 and the Xinjiang unrest in 2009 were even-
tually all managed and did not deteriorate into national political disasters. 
The conclusions the Chinese leaders drew from these experiences made 
them chose to consolidate rather than to relax the Party’s authority. Indeed, 
since the global downturn in 2008 Chinese leaders have been much more en-
gaged in maintaining social stability than in delivering democracy. The so-
called ‘Leading group to maintain social stability’, a powerful Party organ 
that supervises the police, the judiciary and other related branches, has been 
heavily funded in recent years. A research team at the prestigious Tsinghua 
University in Beijing (Sun et al., 2010) reported that for the first time ever at 
the annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2009 
the state revealed its budget to maintain public security (and social stability). 
The expected expenditure totallled 514 billion RMB (US$ 72 billion) in 
2010, up by 8.9% from 2009. This is almost equal to the central govern-
ment’s 518.6 billion RMB budget for defence. And the 8.9% growth in 
spending on public security is higher than the 7.5% increase in the defence 
budget.  
Although tough on political dissent and separatist movements, the Chi-
nese party-state has taken a surprisingly lax policy line towards the masses. 
Higher living standards, access to consumer goods and the huge expansion in 
public access to the media (as long as it does not cross certain political lines) 
proved to be effective. Jeffrey Wasserstrom, a veteran of China studies at the 
University of California, Irvine, argues that it is more helpful to think of Chi-
na in terms of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World than George Orwell’s 
1984. “Orwell emphasizes the role of fear in keeping people in line, while 
Huxley pays more attention to how needs and desires are created, manipu-
lated and satisfied” (Wasserstrom, 2010). This also falls squarely within the 
Chinese tradition of benevolent autocracy, and since the economic crisis left 
China relatively unscathed, the state has ample money to continue its pater-
nalism. 
Economic elite: Seeking interests inside the system 
Despite pessimism about the Chinese political elite, the global business 
community and a large number of political scientists share the optimistic 
view that encouraging the private sector will eventually bring about a demo-
cratic transition in China. The prospect, however, seems dim. Based on na-
tional surveys and in-depth interviews, numerous empirical studies have 
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demonstrated that members of China’s business elites show few signs of be-
coming the bearers of democracy or civil society (Pearson, 1997; Dickson, 
2003). Rather, they prefer to use adaptive informal networks such as personal 
ties to influential officials.  
Will their honeymoon end during the economic downturn? As mentioned 
above, the 4 trillion RMB stimulus package favours state-owned enterprises. 
While this favouritism is certainly not a new phenomenon, it still raises a lot 
of concerns. For example, over 70% of middle- and upper-level managers 
surveyed by the China Economic Magazine in April 2009 expressed the view 
that the stimulus plan was repressing the private sector. Their anxieties are 
not unfounded because the state-led companies that received massive stimu-
lus-related loans now have the means to buy private enterprises. For example, 
in September 2009 a consortium led by the state-owned China National Oils, 
Foodstuffs and Cereals Group, the country’s largest importer and exporter of 
food, grabbed 20 per cent of Mengniu Dairy, China’s largest milk producer, 
making the state the single largest shareholder. The state’s expansion is even 
more robust in energy industries. Given these cases, it is widely believed that 
the economic crisis exacerbated a phenomenon known as guojinmintui – the 
state advances as the private sector recedes. Some media even use a stronger 
tone about this process.  
Political leaders repeatedly deny that the government is implementing a 
policy of re-nationalising parts of the economy and most analysts agree there 
is no formal policy to support guojinmintui. But still, private entrepreneurs 
and their representatives express their anxiety and anger via business groups, 
parliament and other adversarial political bodies such as the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). They do not, of course, dare to 
criticise the party-state; instead their complaints are directed against the co-
lossal Central Enterprises, that is, the 136 large-scale SOEs controlled direct-
ly by the central government. Since government officials and the SOE ty-
coons usually compare giant state corporations to ‘the eldest son of the 
People’s Republic’, private entrepreneurs call themselves the ‘step-children’ 
or ‘servant girls’ of the state. This can be viewed as increasing the strength of 
the lobbying forces among private owners (Kennedy, 2005). 
On the one hand, a realistic businessman must be aware that complaining 
is one thing, but acting smart is another. One way to gain access to bigger deals 
and finance has been for private firms to hook up with the state-owned firms’ 
patronage system, because state-owned firms not only have the upper hand in 
bidding for stimulus-related projects, but they also hold the power to decide 
which businesses to select for supplies and sub-contracting jobs, particularly in 
the massive infrastructure construction projects. It was reported that this strate-
gy was acknowledged and even encouraged by the Chinese political leadership. 
For instance, the Chinese Vice-Premier Zhang Dejiang suggested during the 
meeting of the National People’s Congress on 5 March 2010 that private busi-
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nesses should lean on their state-owned ‘brothers’ for support in time of crisis. 
At the same occasion he advised private businesses that “if you want to grow 
big, you first need to attract the attention of state-owned firms who are stronger 
and better funded… Once you have clinched on to the big brothers, lean on 
them, co-operate with them and gain opportunities to upgrade your own busi-
ness, technology and management” (Liu et al., 2009).  
On the other hand, the state also responds. For example, in May 2010 the 
Chinese central government released a document called ‘Several opinions on 
encouraging and guiding the healthy development of private investment’. 
This document contains 36 clauses, a follow-up to the government’s policy 
released five years earlier, known as ‘36 clauses for the non-state-owned 
economy’. Some policy watchers believe that these so-called ‘new 36 claus-
es’ are meant to address the complaints of private entrepreneurs by encourag-
ing further liberalisation of transportation, telecommunications, energy and 
enabling access to large areas of a specific industry. In addition, local gov-
ernments have a strong motivation to maintain a ‘local growth coalition’; 
they allow private capital access to the financial pipeline of the state, because 
they need investment from private owners. 
In sum, the global economic crisis has to a large extent made private entre-
preneurs seek more patronage from state officials. The entrepreneurs are prag-
matic and creative, but they are not budding democrats. As long as most entre-
preneurs still think the system generally works for them (via personal or institu-
tional conduits), there seems little chance they will support democratisation. 
Cultural elite: whether democracy is good is debatable 
At the same time the global economic crisis damaged the appeal of democra-
cy itself among the Chinese cultural elite. This is evident from the increased 
influence of ‘new leftists’ and from the conservative attitudes shown by Chi-
nese intellectuals. In the 1980s almost all independent intellectuals identified 
themselves as ‘liberals’, while intellectual dissidents were considered to be 
the ‘seeds of democracy’ (Goldman, 1995). The intellectual climate changed 
dramatically when the new left came onto the scene. This group of scholars 
emerged in the 1990s in response to the fall of the Soviet Union, the harsh 
neoliberal shock therapy imposed upon Eastern Europe, the massive marketi-
sation of SOEs as well as the dismantling of social welfare in China initiated 
in 1993. The new leftists and their opponents who identify themselves as lib-
erals engage in debate on almost all issues, including democracy, and have 
divided the Chinese intelligentsia into two basic camps. 
But in China the labels ‘new left’ and ‘liberal’ produce somewhat differ-
ent associations in the popular mind to those in the West. The new left is 
striving mainly for a ‘Chinese alternative’ consisting of a state-interventionist 
Chinese crisis management 163 
economy and nationalism based on Chinese tradition, while the liberals are 
keen to promote private property and individual freedom. Both camps gener-
ally embrace ‘economic and political democracy’, but they are in sharp disa-
greement over how and when to democratise China. Liberals argue that it is 
only through democracy and direct and open elections that China could over-
come its problems with corruption and distributive inefficiency. The Chinese 
leftists by contrast criticise (liberal) democracy for having deteriorated into a 
‘money game’ in developed countries and a ‘smoke grenade’ in the develop-
ing economies, where it has often given rise to domestic unrest and/or popul-
ism, or activated regional conflict or civil war. They also argue that political 
reform in China should not come through a new political system in which 
people choose their leaders in free elections. They consider it more important 
to push party leaders to stay in touch with the people and provide a popular 
check on corruption by means of ‘mass democracy’ or ‘participatory democ-
racy’. “The people express their will and the government becomes responsive 
to it. That is what democracy is”, said Wang Shaoguang, a political scientist 
at Hong Kong Chinese University and a leading scholar of the new left Chi-
nese intellectuals (Wang, 2008).  
It is widely believed that the new left’s ideas resonate primarily with 
young people and nationalists, and are sometimes supported by the party-
state, especially under the current slogan of the Chinese administration to 
build ‘a harmonious society’ and also since the launch of a movement to res-
ist ‘universal values’, a euphemism for human rights, legal systems and de-
mocracy in China. The liberals’ discursive power has been steadily declining. 
At the same time the new leftists enjoy greater global influence than do liber-
als in international intellectual circles. This is partly because almost all mem-
bers of the Chinese new left have been either educated at prestigious Western 
universities or were invited there as visiting scholars. They are therefore 
usually theoretically inspired by – and are better connected with – their ‘men-
tors’ in Western new leftist circles. In addition, they often publish in interna-
tional journals and some even serve on the editorial boards of top English 
language journals. Most Chinese liberals, on the other hand, have been edu-
cated in China and publish mainly in Chinese. To make things even odder, 
the new leftists are not party intellectuals. Most work at prestigious universi-
ties in mainland China, Hong Kong or even Western institutions, while sev-
eral leading ‘liberals’ used to be or still are members of government/party or-
gans or think-tanks. This contributes to the rather bizarre situation in which 
Western-educated intellectuals are more likely to oppose Western-style de-
mocracy – although ‘oppose’ might be too strong a term since new leftists 
usually prefer to identify their stance with the expression ‘not to oppose, but 
to rethink’ (Mierzejewski, 2009). 
The Great Recession has apparently allowed the Chinese new left to enjoy 
more discursive power. Several leading new leftists, echoed by their even more 
164 Han Sang-Jin and Lü Peng 
influential Western mentors, vowed to construct a new authoritarian ‘political 
civilisation’, one superior to (liberal) democracy as the global financial crisis 
has discredited laissez-faire Anglo-Saxon capitalism and strengthened the case 
for greater state control. These arguments find resonance with the economic 
package and the ideological assertions of the Chinese party-state.  
Neither the liberals nor the new left constitutes a clearly defined intellec-
tual circle, and a large number of intellectuals actually do not identify them-
selves with either of these two camps. But the majority of those with clear la-
bels choose a pro-meritocracy rather than pro-democracy stance for economic 
and political – and not for intellectual – reasons. Since the 1990s talented in-
tellectuals, scientists and technocrats have been lured increasingly into the 
existing system as ‘interest shareholders’ with offers of abundant government 
funding, affluent living conditions and prestigious political/academic titles. 
To some extent this is what happened in Hungary during the reformist com-
munist era, when the Party recruited technocrats to key positions and when 
intellectuals became a class on the road to power (Szelényi and Konrad, 
1979). These are the same cultural elite who were sympathisers or even radi-
cal activists in the democratic movements of the 1980s, but who are now no 
longer involved in any radical effort to democratise China, even if they have 
still not completely lost their faith in democracy. 
The ‘crisis of crisis management’ as a new beginning? 
The political consequences of the socio-economic intervention by the state in 
response to the crisis need to be examined more carefully. If crisis management 
works, the crisis might be diminished or suspended; if it fails a ‘crisis of crisis 
management’ is likely to occur and the original crisis might then be aggravated. 
If the crisis is blamed on the regime itself, a legitimacy crisis may emerge. The 
economic crisis might then be transformed into a political issue and various 
reform-minded elites and social groups might start to mobilise for action. 
We argued above that the crisis management adopted by the Chinese 
government has worked well so far. Yet another interpretation is possible. 
One may be inclined to view China’s stimulus package as one that does not 
solve anything in the long term, but somehow exacerbates the already exist-
ing economic, social and political problems. In this context two questions de-
serve attention. First, what kind of political consequences can be anticipated 
if the current crisis management fails? Second, and conversely, what new 
possibilities could emerge if the crisis management continues to be successful 
and as a consequence the urban middle class along with the working class in-
crease not only in numbers, but also as potential voices of opposition? The 
latter option requires us to take a bottom-up perspective rather than the main-
stream view of the ruling elite. 
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Many experts on China closely monitor the frequent eruptions of public 
protest throughout the country over various issues, which involve complaints 
related to working conditions, local government corruption, land seizures and 
so on. For instance, since late May 2010 a multitude of serious strikes have 
taken place at several Honda assembly plants in the Pearl River Delta cities 
of Foshan and Zhongshan. “Chinese workers challenge Beijing’s authority,” 
cried The Wall Street Journal headline on 13 June 2010. The headline re-
flects the common perception of the international community in which mil-
lions of Chinese migrant workers could become a powerful social and politi-
cal power if they joined forces to protest against working conditions, low 
wages and possibly other sources of grievance.  
Not only the working class but other social classes have been expected 
by social scientists to become the potential actors building a civil society in 
China. Sympathetic attention has been drawn to the rising number of new 
homeowners in cities, who have formed self-managed committees to organise 
and pursue their interests and to resist the unfair treatment by local govern-
ments and government-linked property developers. These middle-class citi-
zens engaged in collective assemblies and movements are seen to represent a 
real, if tentative, manifestation of civil society.  
However, it is an open question how to interpret the meaning of these ra-
pidly increasing collective manifestations. It may be too hasty to see this po-
litical reawakening as a demand for a liberal democratic change in the West-
ern sense. Instead, participants in these activities seem to focus more on is-
sues related directly to their economic interests, property rights and social 
justice. In this sense the conflicts may be more conflicts of interests than 
class or identity conflicts.  
Therefore, the foremost question is what is new in those recent occur-
rences of collective movements? At a glance two things are new. First, the 
striking workers belong to the younger so-called ‘80s and 90s generation’. 
Second, in the Honda plant in Zhongshan workers formed a factory council, 
which a New York Times article characterised as a “sophisticated, democratic 
organization”, demanding the right to form a trade union separate from the 
government-endorsed one. These two characteristics can be viewed as a po-
litical awakening of young Chinese migrant workers (Pei, 2010). 
But a new puzzle emerges. A series of suicide attempts by migrant work-
ers shocked China: 16 young workers tried to kill themselves (resulting in 12 
deaths) in just the first five months of 2010 (three in the last ten days of May) 
in a single giant factory complex of Foxconn in Shenzhen, the world’s largest 
contract electronics manufacturer for major brand names such as Apple, Dell 
and Toshiba.  
Both the suicides and the strike events led to a rise in workers’ salaries. 
At Foxconn the company hastened to introduce damage-control measures by 
offering raises of about 25 percent to workers. In Honda the strikes ended af-
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ter three weeks with the workers winning 10 to 30 percent raises. In addition, 
the Chinese government put the motion of ‘collective bargaining over pay-
ment’ on its urgent agenda and started to modify its ‘minimum down-
payment requirements’ by asking companies to raise salaries in direct propor-
tion to the increase of their profits. Raising salaries, if truly implemented, can 
be an achievement of huge significance both economically and politically. 
Economically speaking, it has been widely accepted that the secret of the 
‘Chinese magic’ relies on cheap labour, while economists extol this model as 
‘comparative advantage’ (Lin and Chang, 2009). A critical view is that the 
increase of the ‘lowest wage standard’ is less than 40% of local average pay 
(South China Moring Post, 2010). Yet Steven N.S. Cheung, a provocative 
right-wing economist in Hong Kong, warns that “collective bargaining” will 
cause more strikes and is a bad idea for the Chinese economy (Cheung, 
2010).  
As in many other countries, competing views on democracy and its fu-
ture prospects also emerged in China, as the debate between the new left and 
the liberals indicated. While there is no one dominant official view on the 
subject, mainstream opinion tends to see the future of China from the pers-
pective of the ruling elites in politics, business and culture. Seen from that 
angle, there is no apparent reason to launch a reform toward democracy from 
the top, since the party-state is capable of managing crises and regulating and 
controlling social unrest effectively, while ordinary people want to keep so-
cial stability and economic growth and can conceive of no reasonable alterna-
tive to the current regime. The confidence generated by the so far successful 
crisis management reinforced this dominant mentality, leading to the idea of 
a consolidated bureaucratic-authoritarian state with an organic commitment 
to economic growth as a new brand of political regime.  
The feasibility and viability of this view hinges to a very great extent on 
whether the Chinese economy will continue to grow. Ruchir Sharma, head of 
the Emerging Markets Branch at Morgan Stanley, likened China’s possible 
fall below the 8 percent official growth target to the storyline of the Holly-
wood thriller Speed in which a bomb on a bus was set to detonate if the ve-
hicle slowed to below 50 miles an hour. “In China, the bomb would be trig-
gered by the slump in job creation and explode in the form of labor unrest” 
(Sharma, 2010).  
Many observers worry that despite China’s dealing well with the crisis so 
far, an economic recession has merely been delayed. From the point of view 
of structural reform, inherent problems such as weak domestic demand for 
consumer goods have not been resolved but have grown worse. As a recipe 
the Beijing government wants to gradually downsize its huge stimulus pack-
age, but that is not as easy as its launch was on 5 July 2010. On that occasion 
Premier Wen Jiabao said Chinese economic policies were set to “face in-
creasing dilemmas”, since China cannot hold back steps to “solve current 
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significant and urgent problems”, while at the same time “laying foundations 
for a stable and relatively fast economic growth in and beyond 2011” (Liu 
et.al., 2010). There is no easy way out of this dilemma. 
Conclusions 
Many observers believe that if the booming Chinese economy stopped flou-
rishing, someday radical movements would emerge and challenge the author-
ity of the party-state. A revolutionary change would then take place in re-
sponse to public demands for social justice and equality. In our opinion, 
however, it not certain that under such circumstances the possible rupture and 
antagonism would lead to the institutionalising of democracy. Historical ex-
perience shows that when threatened by radical movements from below, the 
middle class tends to support authoritarian counter-movements, thus contri-
buting to political polarisation.  
On the other hand, it is an open question whether or not the basic as-
sumption of modernisation theory could be applied to China – and, if it can, 
to what extent. To be sure, the expectation that rapid economic progress may 
help liberalise the political system still remains to be tested in China. Though 
the record of political progress lags behind expectations, it is important to 
remember that the party-state of China is not a fixed system closed to chang-
ing environments, but has evolved in a specific way, gradually enlarging the 
avenues of political consultation and participation rights. If we adopt a 
broader understanding of democracy rather than the narrow conception based 
only on electoral competition, we can perhaps better understand the political 
developments that have taken place over the past several decades in China. 
What is suggested here is that it will not be piecemeal change from the 
top but increasing demands for change from the bottom that might result in 
further political evolution. There is ample evidence to demonstrate that, con-
trary to the mainstream view of the ruling elites, the ‘grassroots segment’ of 
the Chinese middle class lacks trust in public authorities and is far more disil-
lusioned than the mainstream segment with the performance of the party-state 
of China as far as social justice and fairness are concerned (Han, 2009, 2010). 
Likewise, the grassroots segment is far more actively engaged in civil initia-
tives of various kinds and is supportive of democratic change in China. This 
amounts to saying that the potential for democratic change is developing 
from the bottom up, although it is not clear when and how such a change 
might eventually come about.  
As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argued, the landscape of democratic 
transition is shaped significantly by the relationships among political elites, 
particularly the hard-liners and the soft-liners within the ruling bloc as well as 
the radicals and moderates within the opposition camp. The best available op-
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tion is democratic transition in terms of negotiation between the reform-
oriented soft-liners of the ruling bloc and the reform-oriented moderates of 
the opposition camp. This scenario may become a more realistic proposition 
when increasing numbers of the middle class and the working class start fa-
vouring a negotiated transition to democracy rather than war-like violent con-
frontation. One may expect that China will eventually follow its own path of 
evolution along this way. 
Coinciding with the title of the movie mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, the year 2012 will be important for China as the Party’s 18th National 
Congress will be held then and a new generation of Chinese leaders will 
come to power. But the drift of mainstream thinking can perhaps already be 
gleaned from the proclamations made by Xi Jinping, the country’s current 
Vice-President, who is expected to become the next General Secretary of 
CCP in 2012, and in 2013 possibly also the next President of China. During 
his visit to Mexico on 16 February 2009 Xi proudly stated that China had al-
ready made a significant contribution towards overcoming the financial crisis 
of the world by retaining its role as an engine of the global economy. He is 
reported to have added: “… there are a few foreigners, with full bellies, who 
have nothing better to do than try point fingers at our country… China does 
not export revolution, hunger, poverty, nor does China cause you any head-
aches. So, just what else do you want?”  
The phrase “having a full stomach and nothing better to do” is meant to 
insult cynical troublemakers. Though Xi’s speech was quickly deleted from 
websites and news reports by censors inside China, some observers still feel 
anxious about this inflammatory ‘extemporaneous address’. As an alterna-
tive, one might be tempted to think that a low-level performance or even a 
collapse of the Chinese economy might provide a better chance for democrat-
ic change. Here we disagree. Although such a scenario might trigger a collec-
tive effort towards democratisation, it might also instigate a civil war. The 
question thus is not whether China will become democratic but under what 
conditions, and this requires further sober analysis and reflection. 
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PART IV 
Towards a new global configuration 
 
 
The Great Recession revealed the uncomfortable truth that both our individ-
ual and collective lives depend increasingly on factors beyond our control. 
This might be a trivial truth in academic circles, but for the wider public it 
has been a rather unpleasant revelation. This painful lesson did not spare pol-
icy makers either. Both at the global and regional (EU) level they have come 
to realise that the best they can do is to respond to the damage that has al-
ready been done. These defensive and reactive policies, which were imple-
mented to limit the disastrous effects of the crisis, placed on the agenda the 
question of the accountability of the global players both at the nation-state 
level and within transnational financial and industrial corporations. The other 
and perhaps more important question that emerged has been how to maintain 
the stability of the global financial and economic markets, which cannot be 
achieved without commonly agreed upon and globally binding rules of the 
game.  
But such globally binding rules – rules that would temper the micro-
rationalities of the individual profit-seekers, which in turn affect the stability 
of the whole global market – place on the agenda the problem of power. Who 
is to set up the rules? Who would execute them? Who could bring to book the 
violators of the rules, and how? In short, if we are to learn from the Great Re-
cession, then the problem of the elevation of legitimate power from the level 
of nation-state to the global level must be addressed seriously; what we have 
already learnt is that the ‘invisible hand’ of the market at the global level can 
and has led our world into trouble.  
The idea that we are back to ‘business as usual’ is dangerously short-
sighted: if we do not wish to be driven by the blind forces of globalisation, 
the world needs democratic control. And this is probably the biggest chal-
lenge we face in 21st century.  
 

The Great Recession and its potential impact on 
popular culture in liberal democracies 
Pierre du Toit 
Introduction 
The global political, economic and military dominance of the well-
established democracies of Western Europe, North America and the Pacific 
Rim emerged from the aftermath of World War II, and became even more 
deeply entrenched after the end of the Cold War, symbolised by the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. States located in these regions have democratic regimes and 
high-technology capitalist economies. They boast affluent societies and they 
are inclined to support social values that are expressly liberal. They also en-
gage in high levels of trade with one another and are inclined to be peaceful. 
This peace is both domestic, in the sense that these states tend to have fewer 
civil wars and, most strikingly, they rarely engage in hostilities with one 
another. And although they have been known to go to war against non-
democratic countries, they have done so with apparent reluctance. These 
countries therefore form a notable ‘liberal democratic zone of peace’ and coa-
lesce into a distinctly recognisable cluster of affluence and stability in the 
global landscape. Their distinctiveness is underscored by a dense diplomatic 
engagement with one another, bilateral and multilateral economic co-
operation, military co-ordination in alliances such as NATO, and regional in-
tegration, the epitome of which is said to be found in the European Union. 
This zone of peace is continually shifting, as new countries are drawn formal-
ly or informally into the fold, and others drop out.  
Is this admirable and enviable enclave of peaceful and prosperous demo-
cracies and the popular culture in which they are embedded under threat from 
the recent global financial crisis?  
The basic correlation 
The existence of what is termed the liberal democratic peace has been con-
firmed by many studies. B.M. Russett (1993), for example, showed there 
were no wars between democracies between 1946 and 1986; and R.J Rummel 
(1997), drawing on a data set from 1900 to 1987, found a correlation between 
democracy and domestic peace. Other studies, covering different time pe-
riods, have reached the same general conclusion. 
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But the democratic peace proposition is not without its critics. In most 
studies, according to Azar Gat (2006), the correlation between democracy 
and peace becomes more blurred the further back in time the measurement is 
applied. This is in part because not many states complied with contemporary 
benchmark definitions of democracy. What was considered democratic one 
hundred years ago hardly qualifies as such in this century. Troublesome cases 
include pre-Civil War USA, for example: was the USA liberal, given its ex-
tensive slave economy? And what about the many cases that had less than 
universal franchise, such as Britain at the start of the twentieth century? Not 
to mention Germany just before the First World War, with its universal male 
franchise, rule of law, a constitutional monarchy but with an executive re-
sponsible to the monarch instead of to parliament? Should those features 
have qualified Germany as a democracy at that time, the First World War 
would have to be seen as a glaring, even fatal, exception to the democratic 
peace proposition. If one goes back even further, the ancient Greek democra-
cies fail entirely with their limited citizenship criteria. 
The second criticism against the democratic peace proposition is that it is 
spurious. A neo-realist interpretation claims military and economic interests 
discourage war between democracies, meaning it is not so much the demo-
cratic nature of the countries involved that matters but rather the fact that 
they work together in military alliances, such as NATO, and in regional eco-
nomic organisations, such as the EU. Yet another critical interpretation holds 
that affluent peaceful democracies are grouped into a cluster in which the 
USA acts as a dominant force that more or less settles the terms of engage-
ment for other democracies both among their own ranks and in their engage-
ments with non-democracies.  
The explanation 
Given these contradictory views, the proponents of the democratic peace the-
sis are compelled to find persuasive reasons to show what it is about democ-
racy that inhibits war and facilitates peace. So far three distinct answers have 
emerged. 
The first argument is structural and points to the constraining impact that 
democratic institutions have on the exercise of public violence. Reaching 
formal decisions about going to war in democracies is more often than not a 
complicated time-consuming and protracted affair. Institutional constraints 
such as special legislative majorities, separation of powers, human rights 
charters and concerns with public finance can all slow down the process of 
deciding to go to war, or even prevent such decisions from being taken at all. 
More fundamentally, democracies may be constrained by domestic pub-
lic opinion. Popular support for war has to be obtained and the cost-benefit 
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calculation in favour of war may not be forthcoming. Citizens have to weigh 
up the obvious costs of war in the form of destruction of infrastructure, ca-
sualties and deaths, against the less obvious benefits of material gains or in-
tangible betterment. These calculations have varied hugely through various 
eras. In times when the traditional benefits in the form of loot, plunder, booty 
and land were attainable, popular support for war was indeed to be found in 
democracies. Modern ideologies of nationalism and imperialism have added 
an element of intangible reward to victory in war, and even as recently as a 
century ago public outbursts of jingoism accompanied the declaration of war 
(Gat, 2006). During the course of the twentieth century, however, the ever 
more effective technologies of war, culminating in nuclear weapons, raised 
the prospective costs of war to new levels. The structural inhibitions on war 
present in democratic regimes are therefore supported by an interest-based 
calculation in which the benefits of peace are likely to outweigh those of war. 
With nuclear war that delivers mutually assured destruction, even the most 
basic attraction that war could hold, the prospect of winning, becomes unten-
able. 
The second explanation of the liberal democratic zone of peace centres 
on civic and political culture. The explanatory argument does not rule out 
confrontational policies on the part of democracies; it merely maintains that 
such policies are unlikely. If enfranchised majorities do find reasons to en-
gage in international conflict, they are free and able to do so. Similarly, as 
Rummel (1997) noted, if resentful majorities want to act violently against 
despised minorities, they have democratic structures available to them to vote 
into power leaders with the appropriate mandate. The point is that durable 
peace requires that the citizens of democracies themselves be disposed to am-
icable relations with fellow citizens and neighbouring states. 
The values, attitudes and beliefs broadly defined as a liberal political 
culture are what is widely considered to be required for such a peaceful dis-
position. Beliefs about the essential dignity of humans and the concomitant 
rights to life, liberty and equality are taken to be the bedrock from which the 
attitudes of trust and tolerance emerge. The additional belief in the inherent 
reasonableness of humans, and the belief in their capacity for and preference 
for rational calculation over emotional and impulsive decision-making serves 
as the anchor for the liberal conviction about the superiority of bargaining, 
negotiation and compromise in the resolution of conflicts. These structural 
and cultural factors can serve as mutually reinforcing forces of moderation. 
Institutions can shape cultural dispositions, and cultural values can also im-
pact on the choice of structures and can shape how they function.  
The third explanation for the correlation between democracy and peace is 
based on the impact of modernity in general and affluence in particular. Azar 
Gat (2006) asks what it is about modern liberal societies that makes them so 
loath to engage in war. He finds the pacifying effect of modernity to lie in af-
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fluence, and in the particular way in which affluence has been acquired in 
modern high-technology urban capitalist societies. Capitalist modernity, ac-
cording to Gat, deeply affected the cost-benefit calculation in favour of peace 
and away from war. Modern industrial technology, as applied to the weapons 
of war, greatly increased the destructive effects of such confrontations, 
whether to maim or to kill, as both World Wars have shown. Modern com-
munications have further amplified the horrors of war by bringing them into 
many civilian homes, thus shaping popular culture.  
At the other end of the cost-benefit calculation, capitalist modernity has 
greatly increased the rewards of peace. Ever expanding trade and commerce 
within and between societies increased mutual prosperity between trading 
partners. Modern technology has been able to convert such wealth into a pos-
itive-sum exchange for entire regions, such as Europe after the Second World 
War, tangibly experienced by entire societies and reflected in higher life ex-
pectancy and improved living and working conditions. Trading with an op-
ponent, rather than trying to conquer him, has become a far more attractive 
and potentially more lucrative enterprise. 
Capitalist modernity also impacted on popular culture and values. Mod-
ernity has eroded many traditional values and few have been affected more 
than those associated with the ethos of the warrior elite (Gat, 2006). As Mar-
tin van Creveld (1991, 2008) explained, in the culture of war achievement in 
battle is taken as an expression of some of the very finest of human qualities: 
bravery, unconditional altruism, loyalty to comrades, the capacity to endure 
hardship, as well as a display of discipline and valour. In this glorified view 
war represents a test of both metal and mettle, where warriors have to meas-
ure up to the most acute conditions of danger, risk and uncertainty. Those 
who excel in this field are deserving of respect, honour and medals. In the ex-
treme expression of this culture war is seen as an end in itself, rather than as a 
means to an end, and the end is to achieve and express these very qualities 
regardless of the actual outcome, be that victory or defeat. 
The steady rise of liberal values in the form of the human rights doctrine 
where life, liberty, equality and human dignity are seen as supreme and in-
contestable claims that individuals can bring against state and society has, ac-
cording to Gat, contributed significantly to the decline in the social standing 
of those who excel in the kind of public violence sanctioned by war. Most 
crucial has been the impact of the right to life, which represents the idea that 
a person is entitled to devote himself/herself to the pursuit of liberty, prosper-
ity and the pursuit of happiness. This has made societies more risk averse and 
less willing to submit to military discipline with its drudgery, discomfort, 
danger and the ever present risk of having to make the ultimate sacrifice of 
one’s own life. 
What made these rights so compellingly attractive is that in the late stage 
of capitalist modernity the prospect of a life that could be enjoyed, rather than 
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just be endured, became a realistic prospect for entire societies. The wealth-
generating capacities of capitalist market economies driven by high technol-
ogy and global economies have created mass societies in which a high-
consumption materialistic consumer culture has thrived. People could now 
become prosperous without having to do so at the expense of others.  
The social and physical context in which this modern consumer-oriented 
lifestyle was achieved and has been maintained also contributed to undermin-
ing the values that legitimise the exercise of public violence. This context is 
one of urban and suburban populations working in high-technology occupa-
tions within the industrial production sector or increasingly in the service sec-
tor of the economy, with fewer and fewer found in agriculture or in primary 
production such as mining. Everywhere, even in the last two sectors, workers 
have been enduring less hardship, have found protection in highly mecha-
nised production, and have been subject to protective rules governing em-
ployment conditions; they have also benefited from a state-sponsored social 
safety net. Furthermore, these more prosperous and more protected workers 
have found pleasure in consumer lifestyles and in entertainment made availa-
ble by modern high-technology communications media. According to Gat 
(2006), these citizens are ill prepared for the discomfort, deprivation, hard-
ship and exposure to danger that confronts the average soldier during war, 
and they are highly unlikely to be attracted to military work as a career op-
tion. 
These liberal, democratic, affluent and peaceful societies have also 
achieved demographic stability, with low or even negative population growth 
rates. Smaller cohorts of young people, especially young men, are found in 
these societies. The latter group, especially when they were marginalised and 
weakly integrated into society, have historically served as the primary basis 
of recruitment into the armed forces. Within these more affluent populations 
the relationship between men and women has also changed fundamentally. In 
the ancient hierarchy war was almost exclusively the domain of men, while 
women were either innocent non-combatants, bystanders, or worse, highly 
valued objects of war. The old hierarchy has been superseded by social rela-
tions based on the norms of gender equality. 
In these societies, then, the values endorsing public violence have been 
profoundly weakened. Where the right to life and dignity prevails, war by the 
agents of the state against any cohort of its own citizens (civil war) has be-
come de-legitimised, and states have even found it hard to justify the use of 
the death penalty as a form of punishment against their own citizens. In the 
liberal imagination the notion of war as a means to an end, even against pa-
tently undemocratic countries where few if any human rights are respected, 
has come to be seen as increasingly meaningless, absurd and even unthinka-
ble, while a militaristic culture has become almost an object of ridicule and 
disgust. The pacifist values ensconced in contemporary popular culture are 
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vividly expressed in the slogan of the counter-culture of the 1960s, with its 
call to ‘Make love, not war’. 
The question of whether the longstanding peace between these rich de-
mocracies is ultimately driven by considerations of military and economic in-
terests as defined by the democratic rulers of these countries, along with the 
domineering presence of the USA, or is instead driven by the popular culture 
and sentiment of the citizens within these democracies, or by some combina-
tion of both sets of factors, is not the focus of this chapter. This question will 
be allowed to simmer. The rest of the chapter will elaborate on factors that 
have already affected the growth and contraction of this zone of peace, as 
well as those that may do so in the future. One such prospective factor is the 
Great Recession. 
Expanding the zone of peace 
The post-World War II liberal democratic zone of peace was largely framed 
by the contours of the bipolar structure of the Cold War. Liberal democracies 
coalesced around the pivotal powers of the USA and Canada in North Ameri-
ca; Britain, France, the Low Countries and Scandinavia in Europe; and coun-
tries on the Pacific Rim. Up to the early 1970s general academic opinion held 
that further democratisation would be a slow incremental process, requiring 
the fulfilment of many necessary pre-conditions (see Dahl, 1971). The subse-
quent rapid democratisation of Portugal, Greece and Spain in 1974 and 1975 
that initiated the so-called Third Wave of democratisation in many places in 
the world was therefore highly unexpected. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989 and the collapse of communism as a viable ideology and regime type, 
this wave received an additional forward thrust. The most notable endorse-
ment came from Francis Fukuyama (1989), who published his celebrated pa-
per announcing the end of ideological conflict and the global victory of liber-
al values and democratic institutions.  
But were these new democracies all respectable entrants into the zone of 
peace? Hardly so. Democratisation brought new constitutional rules and lib-
eral bills of rights, but these written rules had yet to convert into an estab-
lished liberal civic culture. And many of these societies were still very poor, 
with domestic economies hardly able to generate the affluence needed to pa-
cify domestic citizens. Finally, many of these economies were yet to be 
drawn into favourable trade relations with the countries at the centre of the 
global economy.  
On the basis of the annual ratings provided by Freedom House, Larry Di-
amond (1996) argued that many of the celebrated new democracies such as 
Turkey, Brazil, Pakistan and Nigeria were becoming ever more ‘shallow’ in 
the sense that they were losing their liberal attributes while holding onto ob-
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vious democratic procedures such as elections. Illiberal democracies were 
emerging (Zakaria, 1997). In some cases democratisation brought into power 
more radical parties, such as Hamas in the Gaza strip, which ran counter to 
the political, military and economic interests of the USA and other estab-
lished democracies. And in other cases new types of hybrid regimes contain-
ing a mix of authoritarian and democratic features were forming. These in-
cluded Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Jordan, Algeria, as well as Tanzania and 
Kenya. 
In yet other cases elections remained as ostensible expressions of the 
democratic process. But the democratic substance of these events has been 
often ‘hollowed out’ by a dominant party merging state bureaucracy with that 
of the party, in effect rigging elections to perpetuate the dominant party’s 
rule. A critical example of such a new kind of authoritarian rule, and one 
which was crucial to the expansion of the democratic zone of peace, was the 
hollowing out of the democratic regime in Russia. After a deeply flawed 
election held in Russia in 2007, the Freedom House agency downgraded the 
country from the category of “Free” to “Not Free” (Puddington, 2007). 
It is not surprising, therefore, that by 1996 questions were being asked 
about whether the Third Wave had run its course and a backwash was immi-
nent. The turn of events in Russia in 2007 is considered to effectively mark 
the end of the Third Wave of democratisation, and with this any likelihood of 
expanding the liberal democratic zone of peace in the immediate future (Di-
amond, 2008). By 2009 the number of democratic and less than fully demo-
cratic countries had seemingly stabilised. In the Freedom House ratings for 
2009, 89 countries representing 46 percent of the world’s independent states 
and 46 percent of the world’s population, were rated as Free, that is, both as 
liberal and democratic. This represents the outer limits of the possible zone of 
peace, should all these countries become wealthy, liberal and peaceful. At the 
edges of this core there is continuous movement across categories. For exam-
ple, in 2009 Montenegro moved up from Partly Free to Free and Kosovo rose 
from Not Free to Partly Free. Declines were registered in Lesotho, which was 
downgraded from Free in 2008 to Partly Free in 2009, while Bahrain, Gabon, 
Jordan, Kyrgyzstan and Yemen slipped down from Partly Free to Not Free 
(Puddington, 2010). Overall the Survey identified Central Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Arab Middle East as the most difficult regions in which to es-
tablish and consolidate democracies. Seen against this background, it is un-
certain whether the 2011 uprisings against authoritarian rule in Egypt, Tuni-
sia, Lybia, Yemen and Syria could produce liberal-democratic outcomes. The 
outcomes may be some form of renewed authoritarian rule, or dominant party 
systems that can be described as competitive authoritarian regimes, or, lastly, 
illiberal democracies. 
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Threats  
The expansion of the liberal democratic zone of peace can be taken as prob-
lematic, given that many of the preconditions for establishing and securing 
democratic regimes are not adequately met on the periphery of semi-
democratic regimes. There are a number of states along the periphery with 
the ability to modernise without having to become more liberal or democrat-
ic. Russia and China are the pre-eminent cases, along with India, which is 
still generally considered to be democratic, but has dubious liberal attributes 
given the persistent status inequalities that follow from the caste system. 
What is not always brought into the discussion is that the threat to de-
mocracy exists not just at the edges but also at the very core of the liberal 
democratic zone of peace. Maintenance of this core could be endangered by a 
variety of forces (Gat, 2006).  
First, the most direct and immediate threat is the use of weapons of mass 
destruction. The conventional logic of defence is that based on deterrence, at 
any level of technology. But when biological or nuclear weapons are dep-
loyed by terrorists, deterrence fails since the terrorists are likely to be su-
premely motivated to do damage at any expense, even the loss of their own 
lives. The use of weapons of mass destruction by states cannot be ruled out 
either. And an effective defence against nuclear and biological weapons, once 
they have been deployed, has yet to be devised. 
Second, ethnic nationalism remains a volatile ingredient in the politics of 
multicultural societies, and with larger migrations of people as a result of 
globalised capitalism, the multicultural character of many urban concentra-
tions both in the centre and on the periphery is set to increase. A number of 
states have suffered disintegration or partition since the end of the Cold War 
with adverse consequences for liberalism and for democracy in many cases.  
Third, there is the phenomenon of state collapse with regional ramifica-
tions, especially in the Horn of Africa. Somalia, for example, returned to a 
‘state of nature’ that is closer to the one envisioned by Hobbes than the one 
imagined by Rousseau, and it would be more accurate to describe it as a 
realm rather than as a state. The actions of stakeholders in this realm have 
thus far been entirely hostile to the democratic zone of peace, and Somalia 
has emerged as the centre of international marine piracy. 
Fourth, the prospect of the re-emergence of a bipolar global structure has 
a bearing on the above set of factors. It remains to be seen whether the three 
major modernising giants of Russia, India and China are going to democra-
tise, let alone become more liberal. Conceivably they could consolidate into 
authoritarian capitalist regimes, as Russia has already started to do. The Great 
Recession, with its shift of economic power to the developing world, could 
accelerate such a trend. Hassner predicts that Russia will join China in counter-
ing Western efforts to export liberal democracy:  
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Russia and China jointly are able to use their indifference to human rights to block Western at-
tempts to sanction rogue states, from Uzbekistan and Burma to Sudan and Zimbabwe, and in-
stead to deal with these countries in purely economic and strategic terms. In this Russia and Chi-
na are at one with almost all the countries of the global South, including India, for whom nation-
al sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs trump democracy promotion and the de-
fence of human rights (Hassner 2008: 14). 
Fifth, the role of scarce resources and demography deserves consideration in 
the wider context. With the notable exception of the USA, many if not most 
of the established democracies in the core have very low population growth 
rates, with some showing negative growth rates. This is especially noticeable 
in the post-communist democracies, some of which (Poland, for example) 
have become staunch members of the liberal democratic core. Long-term 
demographic decline in the form of aging populations and labour forces, with 
the concomitant demand for labour that can only be met by in-migration from 
other regions, can impact negatively on these democracies. Likewise, explo-
sive growth on the periphery, especially sub-Saharan Africa, is likely to in-
crease pressure on elected governments to deliver public goods, and to ex-
pand social and physical infrastructure (Goldstone, 2010). Relative and abso-
lute resource scarcities are likely to increase social tensions and competition 
both in the democratic centre and on the periphery. Rapid global climate 
change is likely to further induce increased migration, as well as local and re-
gional resource scarcities (Schwartz and Randall, 2003). 
The Great Recession and liberal popular culture  
The sixth and last significant destabilising factor is the Great Recession, in evi-
dence since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. In the interpretation of the 
impact of capitalist modernity and prosperity on liberal values and the ap-
peasement of such societies, a central focus is placed on the role of popular cul-
ture. This refers to the culture that was formed predominantly after World War 
II and was most thoroughly shaped by the ‘baby boom’ generation of the post-
war period. The values of this generation were deeply influenced by, and found 
expression in, the counter-culture movement of the 1960s. This counter-culture 
entailed the deliberate rejection of established cultural norms and was a rebel-
lion against most, if not all, norms of restraint and forms that prescribed actions 
relating to sexual conduct, the use of intoxicating substances, and in the case of 
the USA, loyalty to the so-called military-industrial complex (Mills, 1965). The 
general preference was for ‘sex, drugs and rock & roll’, embodying a hedonis-
tic, materialistic lifestyle of instant gratification and a rejection of establishment 
authority. A particular focus of dissent was the Vietnam War and the involve-
ment of the USA in this war. A rejection of war in any form came to be the 
cornerstone of this youthful generation and this value has been carried over to 
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subsequent generations in the established liberal democracies. And, as has been 
argued, all of this has been buoyed by the wave of prosperity that swept 
through these very societies in the last 50 years.  
The 1960s generation reshaped some core liberal values. Equality was 
extended from a criterion applicable largely to political rights to such areas as 
sexual orientation and gender relations. Third-generation rights, bearing on 
environmental quality, gained acceptance. And progress came to be inter-
preted in post-materialist and post-industrialist terms as a matter of increased 
‘quality of life’. Again, these values found expression in societies that expe-
rienced ever higher standards of living. 
How is the Great Recession that produced a sustained decline in this tra-
jectory of affluence likely to affect these more recently re-shaped as well as 
the older liberal values such as trust and tolerance? The latter are values cru-
cial to the maintenance of civility in domestic politics. Under conditions of 
economic (and other forms) of hardship, out-groups are prone to be singled 
out as the cause of calamities. Such scapegoats are often identified in ideolo-
gies of exclusive ethnic nationalism and in attitudes of prejudice, racism and 
xenophobia. Should acute economic decline undermine liberal values, demo-
cratic regimes may persist but most likely as highly illiberal democracies, as 
envisioned by Fareed Zakaria (1997). And these would be present in the cen-
tre of the democratic zone, not at the edges. At worst, democracy itself may 
give way to more extremist regimes and ideologies. The demise of the Wei-
mar Republic comes to mind as an instructive example. 
In Europe, at the very centre of this zone, an emerging issue likely to test 
the resilience of liberal values in popular culture is that relating to immigra-
tion. At the time of writing, data from surveys on public attitudes in Europe 
about migration issues mostly pre-date the Great Recession. Yet much of the 
data reveal sentiments that express unease, if not enmity, towards migrants 
from outside the EU region. At the start of this century about 5 percent, just 
on 56 million, of the population of the EU were listed as non-European im-
migrants. To this must be added millions of second- and third-generation mi-
grants who continue to be considered as ‘guest workers’ of a temporary na-
ture. These communities are not all welcomed. 
One survey, undertaken in 2008, for example, found that 50 percent of 
respondents in Germany, Italy, Holland and France endorsed the view that 
Western and Muslim ways of life are irreconcilable (Petrou, 2010). Already 
in 1997 the Eurobarometer Survey registered that 45 percent of Europeans 
thought there were too many foreigners living in their respective countries. A 
general overview of survey research on this topic concludes that “the rejec-
tion of ethnic and social groups is approaching dangerously high levels in 
both Western and Eastern Europe” (Zick, Pettigrew & Wagner, 2008: 244).  
The perceived sense of threat presented by Muslim culture, in particular, 
appears to exaggerate the presence of migrants and their culture. In Switzer-
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land the building of minarets on mosques was banned in response to the pres-
ence of only four such minarets in the entire country. Fifty-seven percent of 
participating voters approved of the banning of what they perceived as a 
threatening piece of architecture, and majorities in 22 of the 26 cantons sup-
ported a constitutional amendment to this effect (Petrou, 2010). 
One conceivable trend in public opinion is that such expressions of pub-
lic intolerance could escalate in the medium and longer term within an envi-
ronment of persistent economic and financial instability, and the liberal cha-
racter of the established European democracies could decline accordingly. It 
is still too early to identify persistent trends that relate the effects of the Great 
Recession to anti-immigrant hostility, and at the time of writing systematic 
research on such trends has yet to appear. 
Conclusions 
Liberal democracies emerged in tandem with the benefits of capitalist mod-
ernity. The affluence generated by the economic system, along with many of 
the other features of modern life, tilted the cost-benefit calculation away from 
domestic and foreign belligerence towards tolerance, civility and pacific rela-
tions. This rising affluence converted the structure of conflict over prosperity 
into one where entire societies could raise their standards of living without 
dispossessing others. These conditions favoured a popular culture in which 
liberal values could flourish. But what happens when these conditions 
change? The proposition one can offer is that a deep and sustained decline in 
material prosperity, which effects a return to zero-sum politics, can contribute 
to the unravelling of such a pacific popular culture. 
This proposition also raises the question about the prospects for popular 
culture in undemocratic or semi-democratic regimes. They have also become 
infused with the materialistic high-consumption culture that typifies late 
modernity, and these countries have also engaged less in war. The obvious 
reason is that the cost-benefit analysis favouring peace over war applies to 
them as much as it does to affluent democracies. What is crucial, and subject 
to empirical investigation, is the extent to which liberal values conducive to 
peaceful dispositions have been also established in the rise to modernity in 
such authoritarian regimes among both the general public and among the rul-
ing elites. The cases of Russia and China are again of decisive importance.  
If both elites and the general public in such authoritarian regimes sub-
scribe to values conducive to aggression, such as a fundamentalist version 
(either secular or religious) of the ideology of nationalism, rather than liberal 
values, a sustained period of decline in affluence, coupled to an existing or 
emerging conflict over resources, may also facilitate the growth of aggressive 
popular dispositions towards perceived opponents. Should authoritarian lead-
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ers/elites choose to enter into forceful aggression, then the absence of the 
constraining forces of liberal constitutionalism on those regimes will be tell-
ing.  
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Global solutions? Searching for democratic 
approaches to a new world order 
Christer Jönsson 
Introduction 
Four times in modern history statesmen and diplomats have convened to 
create a new world order: at the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, 
after the Thirty Years War; at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, following the 
Napoleonic Wars; in Paris in 1919, in the wake of World War I; and in San 
Francisco in 1945, at the end of World War II (John Keegan in Schlesinger, 
2003: xv). The Peace of Westphalia established a European system of secular 
authority that laid the foundations for the modern state, while the Congress of 
Vienna produced the Concert of Europe, a club of great powers dedicated to 
preventing the emergence of revolutionary states. The legacy of Westphalia 
left us with a system of states that spread beyond Europe to the rest of the 
world; the legacy of Vienna has been the club model, whose current global 
applications are the G8 or G20. 
Only at the Paris and San Francisco conferences did the word ‘democra-
cy’ enter into the discussions of a future world order. The League of Nations, 
in the words of Inis Claude (1964: 47), 
rested upon two assumptions: that the age of democracy had arrived, providing a sufficient num-
ber of soundly democratic states to unite in an organization for maintaining world peace; and that 
the democratic method of arriving at agreement by civilized discussion rather than coercive dic-
tation could be applied to the relations of democratic states as well as to those of individuals. 
[US President Woodrow] Wilson had fought his war to make the world safe for democracy; he 
created his League to make the world safe by democracy. 
For Wilson national self-determination was an essential corollary of democ-
racy. “Just as the people had the right to govern themselves within the na-
tional system, so the nations had a right to govern themselves within the 
global system” (Claude, 1964: 47). 
Despite the failure of the League of Nations, similar ideas guided the 
creation of the United Nations at San Francisco, with two noteworthy addi-
tions. First, the UN Charter set forth special responsibilities and privileges for 
the Big Five, in line with the club model. Second, the Charter starts by refer-
ring to “we the peoples” and Article 71 empowers the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) to grant consultative status to non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs) on issues in which they have competence. Thus, somewhat 
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paradoxically, the reversion to great power politics was combined with the 
potential for broadened participation beyond states. 
The recent global financial and economic crisis did not give rise to a new 
assembly of statesmen and diplomats to deliberate on a new world order. One 
reason is that the previous reordering attempts all came in the wake of major 
wars. The financial crisis, by contrast, did not threaten world peace, even if it 
has had grave worldwide effects. But the contemporary situation differs from 
the previous four in at least two other, more profound, ways. First, today 
government representatives would not be able to chart a new global order 
even if they had the political will do so, because states are no longer the sole 
sovereign arbiters of world affairs. Second, the present disorder concerns 
global flows rather than the redrawing of territorial boundaries that preoccu-
pied the previous reordering attempts. 
The fact that new actors have entered the international arena along with 
states means that traditional multilateralism in terms of interstate collabora-
tion is insufficient to offer viable solutions to pressing global problems. Dif-
ferent labels have been suggested to capture the new reality: “multiple multi-
lateralisms”, “new multilateralism”, “complex multilateralism”, “polylateral-
ism” and “plurilateralism” (cf. Weiss et al., 2009: 204; Tallberg and Jönsson, 
2010). In the end the concept of global governance has become the favoured 
umbrella term of both social scientists and policymakers for denoting the new 
and complex patterns of authority in world politics that involve a variety of 
actors and networks along with states and international institutions. 
Today various actors from the economic sphere and civil society claim, 
and are increasingly granted, the right of access to various national and inter-
national forums. This means that any assessment of viable democratic fea-
tures in future global governance arrangements must take into account the 
broader set of transnational actors. These are individuals and groups who act 
beyond national borders yet are not controlled by governments. In fact, sev-
eral transnational actors already lay claim to enhancing democracy at the 
global level, which means that it is no longer possible to limit the perspective 
to states and citizens by arguing that only assemblies of democratic states 
with electoral support from their respective demoi constitute democracy at 
the global level. While controversial, the claims of the transnational actors 
are widely acknowledged. 
Furthermore, the financial crisis demonstrates another crucial feature of 
contemporary international affairs: the growing importance of flows across 
national borders beyond the control of individual governments. It has been 
suggested that the historically rooted spatial organisation, the ‘space of plac-
es’, is being superseded by the space of flows: it is the flows and transactions, 
rather than physical territory and places, that shape the significant spatial pat-
terns in a globalising world (Castells, 1996). We have become increasingly 
dependent on flows across geographical boundaries, and our security is today 
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more dependent on defending these flows than on defending territory. Our 
welfare has become increasingly dependent on undisturbed air, sea and land 
transport of goods and people as well as uninterrupted flows of communica-
tion via the internet. 
Global finance is a case in point. Capital market liberalisation in the 
1990s opened up markets to the free flow of short-term, hot, speculative 
money. In a few decades the financial market grew out of proportion. As we 
entered a new millennium, the daily turnover in the international currency 
trade exceeded the reserves of the largest central banks, outstripped all World 
Bank loans throughout its existence, and amounted to around forty times the 
value of the daily production of merchandise in the world. These flows of 
money of an almost unimaginable magnitude were, by and large, beyond the 
effective control of governments or intergovernmental organisations. 
This chapter will first review the existing formal and informal mechan-
isms of ‘complex multilateralism’ in the contemporary world by assessing 
their democratic qualities and probing their applicability to the realm of 
finance. It will then discuss two popular theories of global democracy which 
address the ‘deterritorialization’ of contemporary politics – ‘the all-affected 
principle’ and ‘discursive representation’ – with a view to establishing their 
practical feasibility. Whereas the first section offers a normative appraisal of 
real-world arrangements, the second section evaluates the realism of preva-
lent normative ideas. 
Managing complex multilateralism 
One may distinguish three principal types of regulatory arrangements in to-
day’s world: markets, hierarchies and networks (cf. Thompson et al., 1991). 
Within each category there is a considerable variety of institutions and in-
struments. 
Markets presuppose a large number of autonomous actors with little in-
terdependence. Their independent decisions, based on self-interest, lead to 
mutually advantageous exchanges and efficient allocations of resources. Con-
trol is decentralised and regulation is the result of ‘the invisible hand’. Eco-
nomic actors – buyers and sellers, firms and consumers – populate markets.  
Hierarchies consist of vertical chains of authority and delegation between 
superordinate principals and subordinate agents. The exercise of control is 
overt and centralised. This provides the foundation of states and interstate fo-
rums. Hierarchies imply bureaucratic actors within a framework of formal 
rules. 
Networks, finally, rest on the coexistence of autonomy and interdepen-
dence. They involve informal relationships between essentially equal actors. 
Networks tend to be inclusive, providing meeting places for government, 
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market and civil society actors. In contrast to markets, networks presuppose 
interaction between autonomous actors; in contrast to hierarchies, networks 
are relatively flat with no formal ranks of authority. 
The typical output of global markets is equilibrium between supply and 
demand; global hierarchies produce international law and conventions; and 
global networks usually initiate ‘soft law’, standards and codes of conduct. 
The questions here are : What is the nature of each of the three types of regu-
latory arrangements in general, and how do they relate to finance in particu-
lar? And more specifically: What are the democratic qualities of the various 
regulatory arrangements in terms of three basic dimensions of democratic 
governance: transparency, accountability and inclusion? 
Transparency is a democratic prerequisite. In order to have a say on 
global policy issues, affected individuals need to be informed of the decision-
making process. At the national level accountability is a straightforward con-
cept: it is the touchstone of representative democracy as it holds the govern-
ment accountable for its actions before the people in elections at regular in-
tervals. In global governance, however, the question of who is accountable to 
whom? is far less clear-cut. Inclusion means that affected communities – ei-
ther directly or indirectly, through representatives  can meaningfully partic-
ipate in negotiations and deliberations. 
A self-regulating financial market? 
In theory markets have certain democratic qualities as they generate out-
comes that are the results of autonomous individual choices. All actors are 
assumed to be free to pursue their self-interest. In practice, however, market 
failures  situations in which the outcomes of market-mediated interactions 
prove to be suboptimal – frequently occur. The financial market is a case in 
point, as demonstrated in the chapter by Stan du Plessis in this volume. 
Economists tell us that market self-regulation does not work in markets 
where a small group is well informed and the vast majority are ill informed or 
ignorant. Such information asymmetries are glaring in the financial market. It 
is hard to imagine any other field where the market requirement of informa-
tion symmetry is so far removed from reality. Alan Greenspan, for instance, 
after he stepped down as Chairman of the Federal Reserve, admitted that the 
complexity of some of the new instruments in the financial market were hard 
to comprehend, even for him: “And I figured if I didn’t understand it and I 
had access to a couple hundred PhDs, how the rest of the world is going to 
understand it sort of bewildered me” (quoted in Sorkin, 2009: 90). Without 
appropriate government regulation and intervention, such a market does not 
lead to economic efficiency (Stiglitz ,2006: xiv). 
As du Plessis in this volume points out, the financial market illustrates 
the dangers of ‘moral hazard’, situations in which one party makes the deci-
sion about how much risk to take, whereas another party bears the cost if 
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things go wrong. If those who take risks believe they will not carry the full 
burden of losses, their propensity to take greater risks to gain potentially 
higher returns increases. Thus, lending institutions extend risky loans because 
they believe they will be bailed out by governments, central banks or other 
institutions should they become unable to meet their liabilities. And the fi-
nancial market in recent decades created increasingly complex products 
many levels removed from the underlying assets, entailing extraordinary de-
grees of risk.  
As the problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard demon-
strate, the global financial market does not fulfil any of the three democratic 
criteria. There is minimal transparency as transactions of enormous sums of 
money, which have significant repercussions for individuals around the 
world, take place without broader insight into the processes and actors in-
volved. There is no mechanism through which ordinary citizens can find out 
who is responsible and who should be held accountable. And important mar-
ket transactions take place within exclusive cabals bereft of any popular re-
presentation. 
Hierarchy through international organisations? 
International or intergovernmental governance structures rest on the sanctity 
of state sovereignty. States are the principals delegating functions and condi-
tional authority to international organisations as agents. To the extent that the 
principals – member states – are democratic, international organisations can 
be said to have democratic qualities indirectly. For instance, a democratic 
constitution is a prerequisite for membership in the Council of Europe. But 
for the most part intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) are characterised by 
a ‘democratic deficit’: universal or near-universal membership shows a mix 
of authoritarian and democratic states, and powerful states tend to predomi-
nate in international organisations, whether membership is restricted or uni-
versal. 
The international financial architecture created after the end of World 
War II was US-centred. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (originally known as the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, IBRD) have been premised on leadership by the United 
States and other advanced industrial countries, as reflected in their ‘club’ 
rules. The head of the IMF is a European, with a US representative in the 
number two position; the US President appoints the head of the World Bank. 
The voting power of member states in the policymaking bodies of both orga-
nisations is weighted according to their financial contributions. The United 
States, with around 17 percent of the votes in both, dwarfs all other member 
states, while developing countries have marginal, if any, influence.  
But since the turn of the millennium a series of reforms have made this 
architecture gradually more inclusive. The IMF established a new Interna-
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tional Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), which enabled all IMF 
members to debate and influence the role of the organisation beyond what 
was previously possible. A new regulatory initiative – the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) – was founded in 1999 to promote financial stability by bring-
ing together key regulators from about a dozen states and several internation-
al economic organisations (Germain, 2002). 
The FSF was the result of discussions among finance ministers and cen-
tral bank officials of the G7 countries. This group of seven industrialised 
states, formed in 1976, assumed an increasingly important but largely infor-
mal position in global finance. In response to the contagion effects of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 a larger grouping of countries, known as the 
G20, was established in September 1999. It provides a mechanism for bring-
ing the emerging market economies into the decision-making structure of the 
global financial system. Originally a forum of ministers of finance, the G20 
was upgraded to a venue for heads of state as a result of the global financial 
crisis. The G20 summit in November 2008 agreed to expand the membership 
of the FSF to include China and other emerging economies; and the 2009 
summit decided to establish a successor to the FSF, the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), including all G20 members. 
Discussions in the G20 also resulted in certain adjustments of the voting 
power in the World Bank and the IMF. The World Bank decided to grant 
another seat on its board to Africa south of the Sahara and to increase the vot-
ing share of developing and transition countries by three percent to 47.19 
percent. The reform gave China a larger voting share than Germany, the UK 
or France. A reshuffle of the IMF’s 24-member Executive Board, initiated in 
March 2011, increases the representation of emerging markets and develop-
ing countries, while Europe loses two seats. 
Thus, the financial crisis has entailed important efforts to redress the im-
balances in favour of the US and Europe in relevant international organisa-
tions. Representing two-thirds of the population and accounting for 87 per-
cent of the total GNP of the world, the G20 emerged as the most inclusive in-
ternational body to date. Yet the G20 remains a club of the economically 
most powerful states, while poor countries in the developing world continue 
to be excluded. And even if their voting share has increased marginally in the 
World Bank and the IMF, the United States and Europe remain in control.  
The G20 has established itself as the foundation of the new international 
financial architecture. Yet it is noteworthy that this is an organisation without 
a permanent secretariat, a necessary component if the G20 is to develop into 
an ‘economic security council’, as many hope. It has been suggested that the 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) might 
formally assume that role, as it has been trying to do informally thus far. 
However, that would once again underscore the leading role of the rich de-
veloped countries in the North. 
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The ‘transnational turn’ in global governance opened up several IGOs to 
participation by transnational actors such as NGOs, advocacy networks, party 
associations and multinational corporations (cf. Jönsson and Tallberg, 2010). 
However, this general trend does not apply fully to international finance bo-
dies. Whereas the IMF has been reluctant to let transnational actors in, the 
World Bank draws on the expertise of NGOs in the formulation of country 
reports, engages in operational collaboration with civil society actors in the 
field, and conducts policy dialogue through the NGO-World Bank Commit-
tee. The G20 allows in only government representatives, with other groups 
typically organising protests in the streets. 
Intergovernmental organisations in the financial sector are not only less 
than inclusive, but they also score low on transparency, even if some recent 
improvements have been made. The IMF, for instance, by helping develop 
Special Data Dissemination Standards (SDDS), enabled market participants 
to make sounder investment decisions based on the best available informa-
tion. In addition, both the IMF and the World Bank initiated an information 
disclosure policy, while the well-publicised agendas, meetings and working 
groups of the G20 are now open to public scrutiny. Yet the inner workings of 
these organisations remain inaccessible to the general public. 
Accountability is equally problematic. This is partly related to poor 
transparency. Lacking knowledge of the policy process makes it difficult to 
hold the organisations accountable. Whereas both the IMF and the World 
Bank are formally accountable to all member states, effective accountability 
is limited to the great powers led by the United States. The G20 has broa-
dened accountability to twenty states but, unlike the IMF and the World 
Bank, does not grant even formal accountability to the governments of devel-
oping countries. 
The financial crisis has indeed led to a notable expansion of international 
initiatives, and the G20 initially managed to agree on measures to avoid a 
full-scale depression. Yet national responses to the crisis have been varied 
and largely insufficient, and no global consensus around regulatory counter-
measures has emerged. The revelation that not only banks and traders but al-
so states are guilty of irresponsible financial behaviour has spawned conflicts 
rather than occasioning concerted action. The first prominent example, 
Greece, was soon joined by Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy  together they 
represent the so-called PIIGS group. 
What kind of global regulation, then, can IGOs produce? Two types, in 
particular, have been discussed at recent G20 meetings and elsewhere: transac-
tion fees in the financial market and fiscal consolidation plans among states. 
Taxing financial transactions has been suggested as one way of achieving fi-
nancial stability. A so-called Tobin tax, suggested originally by Nobel laureate 
James Tobin, is an internationally agreed uniform tax on currency transactions. 
Variants of this have long been on the global agenda, but no consensus seems 
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in sight. Fiscal consolidation plans setting a cap on budget deficits as initiated 
in the European Union and suggested globally by the G20 have proven to be 
ineffectual. The gap between states with large deficits (such as the United 
States) and those with large surpluses (such as China) is too wide to expect any 
global consensus. What G20 and other IGOs can realistically accomplish is not 
so much to eliminate existing imbalances, but to contain them at a sustainable 
level and to reduce the volatility of exchange rates. 
Flexible transnational networks? 
Transnational networks may take many different shapes. They may be exclu-
sive, promoting the specific interests of a specialised group, or inclusive, en-
compassing various types of actors in a specific issue area. They may be 
more or less institutionalised and may range from temporary loose coalitions 
formed around a specific issue to long-standing tightly knit groupings within 
a given field. Their common denominator is that they include groups that are 
not governmental actors, which is not to say that they necessarily exclude 
governmental actors. 
In global finance exclusive networks predominate. A central node in the 
fairly institutionalised network is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (BCBS) established in 1974 at the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), itself a forum for central bankers created after World War I. Up until 
2009 the Committee consisted of representatives of central banks as well as 
the authorities responsible for domestic banking supervision in twelve coun-
tries. Since then the Committee has expanded its membership to include all 
G20 countries. Another key player is the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF), a consultative group of major US and European banks, which has long 
enjoyed a close relationship with the BCBS based on its personal contacts in 
national regulatory agencies. Other important actors include the International 
Swaps and Derivative Association (ISDA) representing over 860 institutions 
in the privately negotiated derivatives industry, and the Group of Thirty, a 
Washington-based association of senior bankers. 
The regulatory authority of the BCBS was vested in the so-called Basel 
process. Its aim has been to set prudential standards for the international 
banking system via the rule of capital adequacy requirements that are to pro-
vide a buffer against unexpected losses and allow banks to continue to oper-
ate during periods of stress. In 1988 the Basel I Accord set minimum capital 
requirements for internationally active banks, but by the late 1990s the Ac-
cord came to be viewed as inadequate and in June 1999 the BCBS proposed a 
new framework. After five years of negotiations the Basel Committee agreed 
on Basel II, a new capital adequacy framework, which in addition to specify-
ing minimum capital requirements also provided guidelines for regulatory in-
tervention and information disclosure standards for banks. However, the final 
accord fell short of the initial aims expressed by the BCBS and by mid-2007 
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only the European Union had adopted the Accord. Basel II came to be 
viewed as a failure, with some analysts going as far as to see it as one of the 
underlying causes of the recent financial crisis. In their view the dispropor-
tionate influence of large international banks over the Basel process resulted 
in an Accord allowing the institutions that pose the greatest threat to the sta-
bility of the financial system to hold the least capital. 
Since 2008 there has been a strong demand for regulatory change at the 
same time as the G20 emerged as a regulatory authority to rival the BCBS. In 
September 2009 the G20 requested the BCBS to formulate a new set of rules 
and set a deadline for the end of 2010. In December 2009 the Basel Commit-
tee issued a set of preliminary proposals to guide subsequent negotiations, 
and at its Seoul summit in November 2010 the G20 endorsed the Basel III 
rules proposed by the BCBS in September. The speed is unprecedented. By 
comparison, it took a decade to negotiate Basel II. 
Basel III more than triples the amount of capital that banks will have to 
hold in reserve. Moreover, the capital has to be of better quality than before. 
It also introduces capital buffers above the minimum requirements that can 
be drawn upon in bad times. The toughest set of global banking regulations 
ever formulated, Basel III is to be gradually implemented starting on 1 Janu-
ary, 2013, and to be fully phased in by 1 January, 2019. 
While welcomed by many, Basel III also has its critics. Some in the 
banking sector argue that the banking system is too broken and the world 
economy too fragile to support more onerous regulation. Sceptics suspect that 
Basel III might fall short of expectations for exactly the same reasons that 
Basel II had failed, namely for being equally prone to ‘regulatory capture’, 
that is, de facto control of regulatory agencies by the regulated interests (Lall, 
2010). The slow pace of implementation reinforces such suspicions. Conti-
nuous lobbying by banks or an eventual economic recovery could blunt the 
will to enforce Basel III. Finally, capital requirements are not sufficient to 
solve the problems of global finance. Other necessary measures include more 
effective supervision, more transparent derivatives markets and improved 
global accounting rules (cf. Reuter, 2010). 
In short, the most important networks in international finance lack basic 
democratic qualities, especially transparency. The Bank for International Set-
tlements in fact has one of the lowest scores on the index of transparency 
published in the Global Accountability Report by One World Trust. Accoun-
tability is equally low. Ruling standards are the result of protracted discus-
sions between unelected regulators with a high degree of operational inde-
pendence, on the one hand, and representatives of influential financial institu-
tions with privileged access to information, on the other. And networks re-
main exclusive rather than inclusive. 
One particular form of formalised inclusive networks that is becoming 
increasingly common in global governance in several issue areas is the so-
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called public-private partnerships (PPP). Such partnerships are voluntary co-
operative arrangements between actors from two or more societal spheres 
(state, market, civil society) with non-hierarchical decision-making proce-
dures (cf. Bexell and Mörth, 2010). The idea is to include relevant stakehold-
ers in a specific issue area in what is often termed ‘stakeholder democracy’. 
The exclusive and opaque settings in which global finance is discussed 
are a far cry from this form of partnership. Nor do any reform proposals in-
clude any significant civil society involvement. Global networks typically 
produce ‘soft law’, which are rules of conduct that in principle have no legal-
ly binding force, but which nevertheless have regulatory effects and may eli-
cit significant degrees of compliance. In contrast to hard law, which can have 
virtually immediate effects, soft law is more closely related to long-term so-
cialisation (cf. Mörth, 2004). The Basel Accords are examples of soft law. 
The first two have proven to be too soft, encouraging circumvention rather 
than compliance. Whether Basel III will deviate from that pattern remains to 
be seen. 
Global democracy: from practice to theory 
Having concluded that existing global governance practice falls short of basic 
democratic criteria, we need to raise the hypothetical question of what global 
democracy might look like in general, and how this might relate to global 
finance in particular. Global democracy has recently become a prominent 
theme among political theorists. While agreeing that traditional models origi-
nally developed for the national context are not directly transferable to the 
global arena – for instance, representative democracy as we know it domesti-
cally is hardly realisable on a global scale – they have advanced varying blu-
eprints for reforming global governance to meet standards of democratic de-
cision-making. 
Two recent attempts to envisage the democratisation of global gover-
nance in the absence of a well-defined global demos have received consider-
able attention among political theorists: the all-affected principle and discur-
sive representation (Näsström, 2010). The all-affected principle asserts that 
the ‘people’ cannot be defined in advance, but are those who are affected by 
the decisions of a certain agency. According to the concept of discursive re-
presentation, discourses rather than peoples are what should be represented. 
The all-affected principle 
Most theories of democracy presuppose a given people (demos). Only after 
defining the demos is it possible to discuss the proper domain of democratic 
rule as compared to more private concerns. The all-affected principle turns 
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the argument around by determining the delimitation of the people on the ba-
sis of the scope of political decision-making. In each individual instance the 
people are those affected by the decision in question. Thus, the all-affected 
principle suggests a way to democratise global governance without having to 
fall back upon a pre-constituted people (see Shapiro, 1999). 
In democratic elections all votes count as equal. All citizens have an 
equal say regardless of inequalities in wealth, power and skills. By contrast, 
the all-affected principle implies that the democratic principle of counting 
each equally is replaced by one which says that we need to count each diffe-
rently. Those whose basic interests are at stake in a particular decision are 
seen to have a stronger claim to inclusion in the demos than others. Thus the 
franchise is defined activity by activity, decision by decision. Votes, then, are 
proportional rather than equal: everyone should have an influence propor-
tional to the stakes that one has in a question. Thus parents of young children 
should have a proportionally greater say on questions of schooling; HIV-
infected individuals should have a greater say on AIDS policy; investors and 
borrowers should have a greater say in global finance. 
The all-affected principle calls attention to how the ideal of ‘one person, 
one vote’ has become perverted under present political conditions where na-
tional borders do not coincide with existing power structures. We are all af-
fected by decisions taken elsewhere. For example, decisions taken in Wash-
ington and Beijing, or by the World Bank and the G20, may affect individu-
als in remote corners of the world without them having any possibility to in-
fluence them. If the all-affected principle is to remedy this contemporary pre-
dicament, it needs to address two crucial questions: Who is affected and to 
what degree by a particular decision? And who is to determine which claims 
about being affected should be accepted? As it is unable to provide satisfacto-
ry answers to these questions, the all-affected principle cannot be said to of-
fer a realistic model for global democracy. 
Discursive representation 
In democratic theory there is a deliberative tradition claiming that it is not 
sufficient that citizens are given the right to rule, whether directly or indirect-
ly. In addition, there has to be free and open discussion, based on information 
from independent sources, before they go to the polls. What distinguishes 
discursive representation from other varieties of deliberative democracy is 
that it sidesteps the decision-making moment of the people. Citizens do not 
first deliberate and then cast their vote. In discursive representation delibera-
tion replaces voting as the democratic mechanism of authorisation. 
Discursive representation is based on the idea that representatives should 
represent discourses – written or spoken exchanges of political ideas or de-
bates  rather than peoples. The point of departure is that citizens are not dis-
tinct wholes. What is actually represented in a democracy are not the individ-
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uals themselves but their varying values and interests. Modern individuals are 
divided and they take part in a number of discourses which, in turn, take 
place at different institutional and geographical levels. When citizens vote 
they are able to represent only some of the discourses, but have to exclude 
others. Rather than treating individuals as ‘unproblematic wholes’, we should 
therefore make sure that the multiple discourses individuals engage in will be 
represented. All relevant discourses ought to be represented, regardless of 
how many people subscribe to each one (see Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). 
But how can discourses be represented in practice? Proponents of discur-
sive representation suggest that a global Chamber of Discourses be created, 
but its members should not be elected as that would presume constituencies 
of individuals, which is precisely what discursive representation is meant to 
eschew. How, then, is one to select the ‘relevant’ discourses and the persons 
able to represent them? One answer that has been suggested is that ‘science’ 
replace the people as the proper source of authorisation in global politics. Ar-
guably it would be possible for social scientists to select and identify both the 
relevant discourses and the people who could represent them. For example, 
they would point out that the only discourses ‘represented’ in the field of 
global finance until the recent crisis have been the specialised discourses of a 
numerically limited cabal of experts. By various methods they might then 
identify other relevant discourses that ought to be represented in the global 
Chamber of Discourses. 
The all-affected principle and discursive representation both seek to ac-
count for the excluded, the voiceless and the poor in global politics. Both 
claim that in order to speak for the people, we need to construct a theory of 
democracy without authorisation vested in the people. Both call attention to 
the limits of the nation-state system and explain why we need to go beyond it 
in order to give the excluded and the silenced a political voice.  
However, the solutions they suggest appear unrealistic and challenge 
deeply ingrained conceptions of democracy. Rather than working for the nu-
merous and voiceless, they end up abolishing the authority of the people in 
elections, which makes politics indeterminable rather than pre-determined.. 
The democratic principle of counting each individual equally is replaced by 
either counting each differently or not counting anybody at all. 
Conclusions 
To recap, the present crisis has to do with flows rather than territory, and it 
involves transnational actors in addition to states. This makes the contempo-
rary situation different from previous attempts to create a new world order. 
The global flow of money beyond adequate government control is the result 
of national deregulation in the 1990s. Today national efforts to re-regulate are 
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insufficient; the crisis calls for measures on a global scale. Thus when the 
global market fails, politicians have turned to international organisations and 
networks for solutions. The financial crisis has entailed a certain degree of 
democratisation: the G20 is more inclusive than its predecessors, and the 
World Bank and the IMF have yielded to pressures for broader representa-
tion. 
Global finance is exemplary of transnational actors and processes. How-
ever, networks in this field tend to be exclusive. The present crisis has illu-
strated graphically that affected groups, such as home owners unable to pay 
their mortgages or other borrowers, are not organised or mobilized transna-
tionally. Therefore they remain unrepresented in international organisations 
and networks. The absence of civil society organisations in deliberations 
concerning the financial crisis is conspicuous. 
The link between civil society and democracy, highlighted by many 
scholars in local settings, is less self-evident in the global context. Civil so-
ciety organisations may provide a foundation for democratic states, but they 
are not the representative or electoral institutions of democracy. Yet the term 
global civil society is often used by social movements and NGOs to inflate 
and legitimise their roles. Their claims to represent and speak on behalf of the 
people of the world in global governance go far beyond the more modest role 
of civil society organisations in national democratic settings. 
One could make a distinction between interest articulation and interest 
aggregation (Almond and Powell, 1966). Interest articulation refers to the 
process by which individuals and groups make demands upon political deci-
sion-makers. Interest aggregation involves the conversion of these demands 
into general policy alternatives. In domestic settings political parties aggre-
gate interests articulated by various interest groups. In the global setting there 
are no specific agencies for interest aggregation, with the possible exception 
of the secretariats of international organisations. Whereas transnational actors 
legitimately articulate interests in global governance, their claim to be aggre-
gating interests lacks legitimacy. 
There are two specific problems in the field of global finance. First, only 
a limited subset of interests is being articulated, and second, there is no forum 
in which these interests are weighed against others. In other words, interest 
articulation is truncated and there is a relative lack of interest aggregation. 
As we have seen, there is no perfect formula for global democracy either 
in practice or in theory. Global governance arrangements in general, and 
those in global finance in particular, rate low on basic democratic criteria. 
The best we can hope for in the short to medium run seems to be incremental 
steps in a democratising direction. In the field of finance even small steps in 
that direction would constitute a significant improvement. 
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Values, interests, power and democracy at a 
time of crisis 
Bernard Lategan 
Introduction 
In the wake of the momentous events of 1989 and the subsequent collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the free-market system and a capitalist economy seemed to 
be ‘the only game in town’. But less than two decades later, with the onset of 
the sub-prime mortgage delinquencies and the subsequent financial crisis of 
2008-2009, the free-market system has come in for criticism. And as fears 
about the effects of the crisis on the stability of democracy began to mount, 
so the values underlying capitalism were placed under the spotlight. At the 
same time the question of how to deal with crises of this nature and with the 
conflicts they produce has come to the fore.  
The recent crisis has been inevitably also a crisis of values, above all about 
values that underpin financial systems. But given the nature of democracy, or 
any other type of government for that matter, the issue is never about values in 
the abstract, but about their interplay with power and interests. While in a pure 
sense values express norms such as freedom, truth or equality, the business of 
government consists of making choices, of prioritising, of balancing conflicting 
interests and often also of a pragmatic opting for less than ideal solutions.  
The tension arising from the need for order and governance, on the one 
hand, and the desires, interests and wellbeing of people, on the other, is inhe-
rent to democracy in any setting, but is exacerbated in contexts of plurality and 
complexity, especially at times of economic stress. The following analysis fo-
cuses on the role of values in situations of diversity to explore the possibility of 
developing common values across cultural boundaries. 
From conflict to values  
One approach to the study of the close correlation that exists between power, 
interests, values and rights is conflict theory. This theory sees democracy not 
as a means by which to eradicate conflict, but rather as a way in which to 
channel or structure it. Exponents of this theory1 proceed from the realistic, 
                                                                          
1  They include, among others, Coser, 1956; Dahrendorf, 1959; Diamond & Marks,1992; Al-
lan, 2007.  
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some might even say cynical, perception of reality that conflict is a natural 
state of human affairs and does not necessarily rip a society apart, but might 
in fact be one of the most important ways by which to hold it together. They 
claim that conflict is instinctive in human beings and therefore an essential 
element of group formation and group life. Jointly they make an important 
contribution to our understanding of the formation of social dynamics and 
social movements. This in turn, helps to anticipate social change, as Randall 
Collins, one of the leading conflict theorists, famously did when he foresaw 
the impending demise of Soviet Russia some years before the event (Collins, 
1986). A more recent example is the growing tension within the European 
Union as a direct consequence of the economic crisis that is threatening the 
existence of the once highly prized ideal of European unity. 
Conflict theory is based on the principle of binary opposition, which can 
be very productive in some fields, as demonstrated, for example, by the asto-
nishing expansion of the digital world. This world relies on the simple binary 
opposition of positive and negative electronic impulses. But in the case of so-
cial theory, the scope of a binary approach is simply too limited to deal with 
the growing complexity of our world. Collins (1993) himself was aware of 
this concern when he defended conflict theory against the criticism that it was 
one-sided and did not take social solidarity seriously. Yet he still preferred to 
explain solidarity in terms of conflict as a fundamental starting point.  
The binary approach is also unhelpful for dealing with the complex so-
cial reality of today in the area of international law. In an era where the na-
tion state is under growing threat, legal boundaries are becoming increasingly 
problematic. Lindahl (2010) talks in this regard of the emergence of ‘a-
legality’, by which he means that law has become more global, more local 
and more transversal than the nation-state. Legal orders increasingly overlap. 
The World Trade Organisation claims to be global in scope; the informal le-
gal orders of squatter settlements develop without recourse to the state order; 
and multinationals act as if there is a transnational legal order. The same 
fragmentation is evident in the content of legal orders. We are witnessing the 
emergence of a variety of more or less autonomous cross-border legal orders 
which claim to address specific kinds of human activity: self-regulation by 
various professional bodies, technical standardisation, indigenous law inside 
and across countries, laws pertaining to migration and various stages of polit-
ical integration. 
The oppositional framework of conflict theory pays little heed to the 
forms of communality, solidarity and cross-cutting relations that arise from 
the fact that individuals belong to more than one group, which results in their 
participating in multiple group conflicts. One of the most prominent social 
scientists of our era, Seymour Martin Lipset, stressed the role of cross-cutting 
cleavages in reducing the intensity of political conflicts. He also fore-
shadowed the idea of multiple identities and their role in ameliorating con-
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flict. Quoting empirical studies, Lipset maintained that isolated communities 
who did not readily develop such cross-cutting relations were more prone to 
extremist behaviour. In his book Political Man (1960), he popularised the no-
tion that cross-cutting cleavages contribute to promoting democratic stability. 
In his view the chances for stable democracy were enhanced when groups 
and individuals had cross-cutting political affiliations. Although Lipset ac-
knowledged the role of cross-cutting cleavages, or multiple identities, he paid 
little attention to the content of these commonalities. Nonetheless, he ended 
the fixation on conflict and opened the way to move beyond it to also study 
communalities, shared values and common goals.  
The need to broaden the understanding of the interrelatedness of values, 
power, interests and democracy was dramatically illustrated by a series of 
developments during the past two decades which substantially changed the 
context in which modern-day democracies have to function. Three such inter-
related phenomena are of interest: culture, religion and economy. 
Culture 
The growing effect of globalisation has spawned a series of social move-
ments as a reaction against the new global order. Religious fundamentalism, 
cultural nationalism and territorially defined communities can basically be in-
terpreted as defensive strategies. These counter-movements take the form of 
local identities, which rely for their specific identity on distinct markers, most 
of them of a cultural nature. These movements against the global order range 
from small, often extremist, groups to nation states, which are reluctant to re-
linquish their national sovereignty. In the early 21st century a growing dis-
junction can be observed between the “globalization of issues, the self-
identification of people, and the affirmation of national interests in the reluc-
tantly shared ground of the informal network state” (Castells 2004: 364). 
The point of interest here is the role that cultural values can play in the 
process of differentiation even within one and the same state. A case in point 
was the reunification of Germany. The single unifying Basic Law was differ-
ent from the lived reality in the two former states; life experience in the for-
mer DDR in particular was far removed from its tenets. In the minds of the 
citizens the Basic Law is the ‘explicit constitution’ that exists alongside the 
‘implicit constitution’, which is based on the opinions, feelings and values of 
ordinary people, whatever the legal order prescribes. To achieve reunification 
in the full sense of the word, these value systems have to be taken into ac-
count (Meulemann, 1996).  
At a national level the integration of Europe provides another example. 
The difficulties posed by the political integration of new member states are 
directly related to real or perceived cultural diversity. The same applies to the 
integration of migrant populations into existing societies. The furore sur-
rounding the book by Thilo Sarrazin (2010), the remarks of the Turkish 
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Prime Minster during his recent visit to Germany (Andrews, 2011), and the 
influence of Wilders in the Netherlands are just random examples of how the 
question of European unity is perceived as, and expressed in terms of, cultur-
al differences. The difficulties experienced in these basically mono-cultural 
environments are even more complex in multicultural societies. 
As far as the field of economic activity is concerned, the role of corpo-
rate culture is of particular significance, especially in transnational compa-
nies. When these companies begin to trade in countries other than their 
home country, or when mergers between companies from different coun-
tries take place, paying attention to corporate culture can be crucial for the 
success of the undertaking. In many of the unsuccessful cases the inability 
to adapt the existing corporate culture or to merge two different cultures 
plays a significant role. One such high-profile example was the Daimler-
Chrysler merger, where the apparent inattention to proactively combining 
the Stuttgart way of doing things with the corporate culture of Detroit con-
tributed towards the poor results that in the end led to the disintegration of 
the merger.  
At the global level there is homogenisation whereby consumer products, 
fashion, music, films and art are aimed at a global audience. But this masks 
the differences in culture and value systems that exist and even thrive below 
the radar of global culture. The new environment is characterised by com-
plexity and turbulence. This makes it imperative to pay renewed attention to 
organisational values, as these are bound to be out of sync with the changed 
context. A value system based on the premise of stability cannot support 
strategies that are designed to deal with turbulence and complexity. This in-
volves at least four types of values discourse: business ethics related to beha-
viour in the workplace but also in the wider social context; the values that in-
dividuals bring to an organisation by virtue of their cultural and social identi-
ties; the values of the organisation as a whole, expressed in its mission and 
reason for existence; and finally the values that flow from the political and 
economic system within which these organisations operate, be that of a capi-
talist or socialist nature (Castells, 2004; Müller, 2010).  
Religion2  
One of the surprising developments in recent years has been the return of re-
ligion in various forms, despite the predictions of so-called secularisation 
theory. According to this theory, the need for religion would diminish and 
would eventually cease altogether as the process of modernisation unfolded. 
The theory provided a convincing explanation of some aspects of the process 
                                                                          
2  The main sources consulted for this section include: Berger, 1969; Berger & Luckmann, 
1966; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Graf, 2004; Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2009; Müller 
2009; Meulemann, 2009.  
Values, interests, power and democracy at a time of crisis 205 
of modernisation, especially in its more sophisticated form that recognises 
differences in the role of religion in advanced industrial societies and socie-
ties where traditional religious views are dominant. But the situation has be-
come much more differentiated and complex. While both the influence and 
public role of organised religion have indeed declined, during the last decade 
there has also been a concurrent and dramatic rise in religiosity in both deve-
loped and developing societies. Although the picture differs considerably 
from country to country, with Europe and the United States representing two 
contrasting stories, the tenacity of religion has been clearly underestimated. 
Secularisation theory has therefore come under pressure. On the one hand, 
the adequacy of using church attendance and prayer, the traditional forms of 
religious expression, as indicators of religiosity can be questioned in postmo-
dern societies where the quest for normativity and meaning takes different 
forms. On the other hand, the link between religion and economic prosperity 
in rising Asian communities needs further investigation. 
Values are of course a fundamental aspect of religion – in terms of 
worldview, morality, commitment, action and the like – and the ‘return of 
God’ has placed the issue of values squarely back on the agenda. This does 
not imply that the matter has become easier. If anything, it has become more 
complicated. Just two examples will illustrate the point. 
The power of religious beliefs was demonstrated dramatically in the at-
tacks of September 2001. The global audience witnessed through their own 
eyes that beliefs can have consequences and that these consequences can be 
destructive in the extreme. The counter-reaction from America was likewise 
couched in religious imagery and terminology. Not only was there an outcry 
of moral indignation, but the response to terrorism was understood as a ‘call-
ing’, or a ‘mission’ against the forces of evil. Despite the fact that technocrats 
such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld ran the war, it was religious rhe-
toric that dominated the discourse. This was as much a war of beliefs and 
values as it was a military operation. Apart from the actual struggle, the 
events raised much more fundamental issues about war and peace, violence 
and the response to violence, the implications of a multi-religious world and 
the possibility (or impossibility) of ever finding a common ground. 
The second example of the growth of religion is the remarkable expan-
sion of Christianity in Africa, Latin-America and especially Asia. Driven 
mainly by American evangelical/pentecostal energy, Christianity in the ‘new’ 
world is now outstripping Christianity in the ‘old’ world. America has always 
engaged in exporting religion, starting with the wild lands of the American 
West and eventually expanding to all the corners of the earth to the extent 
that the export of religion has assumed global dimensions. The main carriers 
of the religious message have been ‘pastorpreneurs‘, philanthropists as well 
as Christian media and missionaries. Whereas in 1950 only 2.4 percent of the 
population in South Korea was Protestant, the figure now is close to 20 per-
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cent, while Christians as a whole amount to 30 percent of the population. The 
latest focus of missionary efforts is China, where house-churches, especially 
among the upwardly mobile, are on the increase. Often, in the true spirit of 
the American gospel of prosperity, Christianity is ‘sold’ as a necessary pre-
condition for personal and professional success. While official figures show 
an increase from fourteen million Christians in 1997 to twenty-one million in 
2006, some estimates put the figure as high as seventy-seven million (Mick-
lethwait and Wooldrige 2009). 
The export of Christianity is driven by powerful values. One of these 
values is religious freedom. For the first generation of pilgrims to America 
the lack of religious freedom in their home countries was one of the major 
reasons why they plunged into an uncertain world, looking for a place where 
they would be free of restraint and could practice their beliefs unhindered. 
The recent discovery by Americans that religious persecution still exists in 
many countries became an important motivating factor and a central issue on 
the agenda for the missionary effort. 
However, religion always comes in a specific cultural guise and brings 
with it a mixture of religious and cultural values. As with the spread of Chris-
tianity in Africa during the nineteenth century, the more recent expansion of 
American Christianity brings with it not only the gospel, but also a very spe-
cific way of life. Central to this life is the symbiosis between religion and ca-
pitalism and their mutual reinforcement flowing from this relationship. Mick-
lethwait and Wooldridge (2009: 244) come to the harsh conclusion: “Ameri-
ca is thus contributing not once but twice to the global revival of religion – as 
the world’s leading exporter of religion and as the world’s leading supplier of 
the capitalism that increases demand for religion. In Marx’s terms, they are 
both exporting opium and stoking the demand for opiates.” 
Economy  
One of the remarkable features of the debate following the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis was the moralistic discourse that accompanied the more technical analys-
es of the debacle. Popular discourse abounded in emotive treatments of the is-
sue. The anger of disillusioned investors and ordinary members of the public 
whose financial position was directly affected by the crisis was often expressed 
in the form of moral indignation. This indignation was directed at the greed of 
Wall Street investors; the irresponsible agencies who receive fees but are una-
ble to give an unbiased assessment of risk; the reckless behaviour of homebuy-
ers making aggressive purchases at high risk; the unethical conduct of auditors 
by not disclosing the real situation of companies; the unjustifiably high salaries 
of top executives and the immoral practice of continuing to give bonuses to the 
management of failing or bailed-out companies (Petroff, 2011). 
Whether the blame allocated in each of these cases is justified or not is 
an open question. What is clear is the moral tone of the discourse, which 
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points to the underlying value substratum of any economic system. The 
economy, whether of an individual or a collective such as the state, is after all 
about the regulation and the ordering of domestic arrangements. Economy is 
in essence about priorities, about choices and about the allocation of (scarce) 
resources. All of these inevitably involve value judgements. The setting and 
implementation of economic measures by definition presuppose values and 
ethical decisions. 
In a democracy the value dimension of the economic system with which it 
is associated is even more prominent. This prominence is largely due to the 
convergence of the moral and the rational trajectories of the post-1948 human-
ist tradition. The embracing of basic human rights, including economic rights, 
meant that the values of liberty and equality became the common currency in 
economic discourse from both a capitalist and socialist perspective, giving rise 
to the obligation not only to do what is right but also what is good (Joas, 2000).  
In the corporate sphere the increasing emphasis on values took the form 
of explicit codes of conduct for companies. In South Africa, for example, the 
three reports of the King Commission (King 1994, King 2002, King 2009) 
covered all possible aspects of corporate and governance behaviour. The val-
ues discourse has been explicit in the insistence on fairness, responsibility, 
transparency and accountability. 
More than the accountable conduct of role players, the respective merits 
and demerits of financial systems themselves came under the spotlight. One 
such issue has been the ‘moral hazard’, discussed in this volume by Stan du 
Plessis, which was engendered by the custom of bailing out failing banks, 
with the result that banks became less prudent than they should have been, 
while creditors became less concerned about the imprudence of the banks to 
which they were lending. And there were other incentives working in the 
same direction, not least among them the culture of high salaries and bonuses 
on Wall Street, which seem to continue despite the crisis (Morgenson, 2011). 
The debate about the most equitable and responsible economic system is 
of course an old one. It dates back to Adam Smith and has undergone count-
less iterations, including Marxist and capitalist versions. In the current eco-
nomic climate informed by the crisis the debate has assumed a new urgency. 
The traditional approach is in turmoil as new uncertainties emerge, a situation 
in which value considerations again play, or at least should play, an important 
role so as to open up new possibilities. 
How realistic is the quest for common values? 
The present circumstances, in short, demand that more attention be accorded 
to the role of values and, more specifically, to the ways and means by which 
to move towards shared values. But is the quest for common values attain-
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able? It seems that plurality, the increasing complexity of society, the ongo-
ing processes of fragmentation and the appearance of new types of conflicts 
rule out any form of communality across cultures on convictions, beliefs and 
values.  
This pessimistic conclusion, however, can be qualified by saying that it 
holds only as long as there is no change in thinking about values. The basic 
problem is the common assumption that diverse values cannot be bridged. 
But what is usually perceived as a conflict of values as such is actually a con-
flict at the level of their application, which has to do with needs that embody 
values. It is in the application of values where a measure of communality can 
be found and can help solve problems, especially in societies that are cultu-
rally diverse and are under considerable economic stress.  
Two examples illustrate the point, one at the macro the other at the micro 
level. In the first instance, one can look at constitutions as an expression of 
common values, helpful especially at a time of consolidating a democracy. 
Constitutions are historical documents that carry the scars of their own gene-
sis. They disclose some of the tensions surrounding their conception and 
birth, and they often reflect the Zeitgeist in which they had come into being. 
In this sense they serve as memorials to the past. But they also act as com-
passes by which to steer the ship of state through troubled waters. This is es-
pecially true in their description of the basic values on which the particular 
democracy rests, often expressed in the form of a bill of human rights. One 
cannot but be struck by the obvious similarities in formulation in the constitu-
tions of democracies that came into being after 1989. The influence of the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations is evi-
dent, but there is also a certain amount of ‘borrowing’ among the constitu-
tions. This is indicative of a communality of values shared by a diverse group 
of democracies, and of a certain standardisation of what a democratic state 
entails. 
Of course, the values encapsulated in a constitution are the result of ne-
gotiations, compromises and unresolved problems. In this sense, despite their 
foundational appearance, they are work in progress. Often they are phrased in 
an idealist and poetic language far removed from the realities of everyday 
life. Nonetheless, they symbolise a workable consensus that is supported by 
often deeply divided sectors of the population. A striking example is the con-
stitution of Poland, where the set of basic values is explicitly underwritten 
both by “those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and 
beauty, as well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal 
values as arising from other sources”.  
Everything depends on how these lofty ideals are implemented. In this 
regard constitutional courts carry a heavy responsibility to apply the agreed 
upon values in an independent and even-handed way, regardless of who the 
parties involved are. Overall, the record of constitutional courts across vari-
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ous democratic nations has been encouraging. One instructive example is the 
judgement by the South African Constitutional Court that declared as uncons-
titutional the legislation enabling the establishment of the ‘Hawks’, a specia-
lised investigation unit of the police. In a detailed and precedence-setting 
verdict the Court argued on the basis of the separation of powers, the inde-
pendence of the juridical process and the obligation to combat corruption, 
reaching the conclusion that the act seriously undermined respect for human 
rights. This shows that despite a very diverse society, fractured by deeply 
conflicting interests, it is possible to implement an agreed set of common 
values in a way that strengthens a given society. Extrapolating this point, it is 
not unreasonable to suggest that a similar mechanism could work not only 
within but also across nations. 
But can what happens at the macro level also hold for processes at the 
micro level? Is it really possible to generate common values through a parti-
cipative process in situations of intense conflict?  
One positive example was the successful consultative process developed 
for a large South African mining company. The process was initiated at a 
time of high levels of political volatility that had intensified just before the 
release of Nelson Mandela. The period was characterised by deep fears 
among the white citizens and the unrealistically high expectations of their 
black counterparts. There was also financial uncertainty ensuing from dimi-
nishing production and a falling gold price, as well as cultural diversity of the 
many racial groups, many languages and contrasting political affiliations, la-
bour unrest due to disputes between management and union, all of which 
were further compounded by pressure from the international community.  
Initially, the probability of achieving common values in such a situation 
seemed remote. However, the level at which conflict manifested itself was an 
important guiding factor. One vignette: a white mine manager enters his of-
fice where a black miner is waiting for him, sitting in a chair. The miner does 
not stand up, does not greet the manager and averts his eyes. The manager, 
who comes from a culture where one greets one’s superior first, stands up in 
their presence and looks them straight in the eye, regards this behaviour as 
very disrespectful. The miner, who comes from a culture where one tries to 
appear smaller than a superior, does not speak until spoken to, and considers 
looking somebody straight in the eye as disrespectful, is only trying to show 
his respect. For both, respect is a very important value, but they show and 
perceive it in very different ways. Not knowing any better, they take offence 
where respect was intended. Such cultural differences are of course common-
place. The important point is that underneath the differences there may be 
more communality than we normally assume. 
An idea helpful for bridging diverse values was developed by Manfred 
Max-Neef (1991), a Chilean developmental economist. Intended as an ‘alter-
native’ theory of development, his hypothesis has important implications for 
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thinking about and dealing with diversity. The main objective is to broaden 
and deepen the conventional growth-centred approach to development, which 
restricts human needs to the desire for objects, particularly material goods 
and services. This is a narrow view that fails to include such vital non-
material features as the need for an identity, participation and freedom. In the 
theory a critical distinction is made between ‘needs’ and ‘satisfiers’. A fun-
damental need, such as the need for freedom, can be satisfied in a variety of 
ways. These satisfiers can be either positive or negative in their effect on the 
quality of life. Examples of negative satisfiers for freedom would be inhibit-
ing satisfiers, such as paternalism, which is rooted in customs and habits; per-
suasion-induced pseudo-satisfiers such as indoctrination; or destructive satis-
fiers imposed on people such as authoritarianism or censorship. Positive sa-
tisfiers can be either singular like the right to freedom of expression, or syn-
ergetic, satisfying more than one need at the same time, for example, partici-
pating in democratic structures and processes. 
The distinction between positive and negative satisfiers was very impor-
tant for the process followed at the gold mine. The distinction made clear that 
there are a number of ways in which the same basic need can be satisfied. It 
is immaterial whether members of a diverse group satisfy their need for lei-
sure by playing or watching soccer or rugby. These positive forms of diversi-
ty are not only admissible; they should in fact be encouraged. In the same 
vein members of a team need not sacrifice their identities in order to com-
plete a task successfully. But alongside the harmless satisfiers, there are also 
the destructive satisfiers, and these are the ones that require attention. A de-
structive satisfier is one where a person’s own need is met at the expense of 
another’s; stealing the week’s wages from a team member, for example, may 
be a very effective way to satisfy one’s own need for subsistence, but it is de-
structive for the other person.  
The concept of needs and satisfiers was used as the framework for more 
than a hundred representative workshops stretching over a period of four 
years. The workshops were designed to take participants through specific 
phases. The first step was to create a climate where people were willing to 
share their perceptions of the country, the company and of the ‘other’ in their 
direct work environment. From the perspective of diversity, this was poten-
tially the most explosive phase. Careful facilitation was required to create a 
climate of openness, and it was crucial that stereotypes were articulated and 
experienced in the presence of the ‘other’. In this way, submerged tensions, 
‘hidden transcripts’ and the stereotypes people have of each other were 
brought into the open.  
The second step was to shift attention from present perceptions to the fu-
ture. By asking about hopes and fears, it usually became clear that the same 
fears (increased violence, crime) and the same hopes (economic security, 
good education, stability) were shared across the lines of diversity. Some 
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sense of communality started to emerge at this stage. To reinforce this ten-
dency, participants were asked in the next phase what they expected of their 
supervisors, colleagues and subordinates. Starting with the role of supervi-
sors, it was not difficult to compile a long list of desiderata: fairness, empa-
thy, decisiveness, respect, good communication, leadership. When the lists of 
expectations for colleagues and for subordinates were compiled, the commo-
nalties also immediately became evident.  
It was critical, first, to translate these expectations into needs, for exam-
ple, the need for respect and safety, and then to recognise these needs as val-
ues. In this way the dynamic nature of values was accentuated in the spirit of 
the beatitude: ‘Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness’. In 
this way a list of shared values emerged, whatever other diversities existed 
within the group. A typical set would include values such as teamwork, 
communication, respect, trust and honesty, fairness, education and training, 
responsibility, leadership, safety and health, profitability. These became the 
building blocks from which a final set of values was compiled for the mine as 
a whole.  
It is important to keep in mind that these were values and satisfiers appli-
cable to a specific work situation. The teams were not trying to solve the 
county’s problems as a whole. The object was to find a workable code and a 
set of practices that would enable people to operate constructively and effec-
tively in their specific context. This ‘piecemeal approach’ made the task more 
achievable. Of course, wider issues did impact on their thinking and their ‘lo-
cal’ solutions no doubt had wider ramifications for society at large, but in or-
der to get a very complicated and difficult process off the ground, this initial 
narrower focus proved to be a productive strategy.  
Apart from being dynamic, this type of discourse is also self-regulating. 
One of the practical results of the values process was the establishment of 
representative work place forums at the various shafts, which used the com-
mon values as basis for their planning and operations. It also became the 
framework for decisions on future developments and for the solving of new 
problems. The success of the forums as examples of effective worker partici-
pation and joint decision-making was such that it subsequently affected la-
bour legislation. It so happened that one of the participants in the process was 
the regional representative of the National Mineworkers Union, who was lat-
er elected Member of Parliament for the African National Congress (ANC) 
and subsequently became a member of the drafting committee for the new 
Labour Relations Act. The Act made the formation of workplace forums a 
legal requirement. The process of developing shared values was then applied 
in a wide variety of companies and organisations – noticeably in the field of 
agriculture and forestry, state and semi-state departments, institutions of 
higher education, community organisations and other institutions as part of 
the much wider process of social transformation. 
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The process of developing common values at the micro level has since 
been implemented not only in a variety of contexts but also at other levels. 
For example, the approach proved useful as part of a critical re-examination 
at the national level of the state of human society in South Africa, and for re-
defining the contours of an inclusive and participating democracy. A similar 
approach is now also being implemented as part of the UN programme ‘Al-
liance of Civilizations’ as a conscious alternative to the ‘Clash of Civiliza-
tions’ paradigm.  
Conclusion 
Four conclusions flow from the preceding discussion. 
First, the debate about values cannot but intensify in the foreseeable fu-
ture. This is not only because of the uncertainty of the present harsh econom-
ic climate, but also because of the growing complexity of relations at the in-
dividual, national and international levels. It is likely that there will be an in-
crease in the appeal to values in all kinds of discourses, as we are already 
witnessing in the condemnation of individual and corporate greed in the fi-
nancial crisis; in the calls for freedom echoing in the streets of Cairo and Tri-
poli and in the rest of the Arab world; in the astonishingly composed attitude 
of the victims of the earthquake in Japan and its aftermath; and in the recon-
figuration of international relations. The ability to deal with values and the 
conflicting claims based on values is likely to be in high demand. 
Secondly, despite this growing plurality and complexity at all levels of 
society, the prospect of finding common ground has increased. The disinte-
gration of monolithic power blocks, the new forms of cross-cutting cleavag-
es, the embracing of multiple identities, the discovery that in both the West 
and in the Arab world the urge for freedom and the determination to achieve 
it are unstoppable – these have all contributed to a new atmosphere where 
communality has once again become a possibility. However, the precondition 
for any success in this regard is the willingness to move deeper than the ob-
vious conflict at the level of satisfiers and to make the underlying communal-
ity of universal needs or values the point of departure. The proposal for the 
alliance of civilisations as an alternative to the paradigm of a clash of civili-
sations will only be feasible if this basic precondition is met. 
Thirdly, opportunities for participation and representation should be ex-
ploited to the maximum in all spheres of society (cultural, political, econom-
ic). The concept of consensus democracy proposed by Lijphart (1999) has re-
tained its relevance. Whether in the form of electoral systems aimed at pro-
portional representation, bipartisan parliamentary and public committees, 
coalitions, governments of national unity, structures for enabling and sanc-
tioning negotiation, arbitration and reconciliation – all practical possibilities 
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should be harnessed. This is needed not only to ensure that the ‘other side’ is 
being heard, but to create a context in which it becomes possible to penetrate 
the secondary level of conflict in order to discover underlying communality. 
The gold mine experience proved that this is not merely an idealistic dream, 
but a concrete and practical way to arrive at common values in extremely ad-
verse conditions.  
Finally, the situation arising from the Great Recession offers a unique 
opportunity to move beyond the stalemate of sterile and outdated oppositions. 
Both the West and the East are experiencing a crisis of their embedded value 
systems. Paradoxically, this is generated by contrasting considerations. The 
West is experiencing a crisis of many of its liberal values; the East has 
mounted the tiger of the market system, while it wants to retain its nationalis-
tic ethic. As China, severely constricted by its domestic society, is trying to 
adapt to the liberal world order, this very order is undergoing serious re-
examination. The uneven record of liberal foreign policies in delivering a 
more secure and just world order has challenged the key liberal values of 
freedom and prevented the liberal world order from living up to expectations. 
As a result, that world is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. In looking for 
ways to re-gain legitimacy, values and their bridging power need to be taken 
into serious consideration.  
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The consequences of the Great Recession: 
hypotheses and scenarios 
Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski 
Over eighty years ago the world was shattered by the Great Depression. 
When the recent crisis hit the US economy, and later the rest of the world, the 
spectre of the Great Depression immediately returned as a relevant point of 
reference to help us grasp the magnitude and the range of the unfolding tur-
bulence. Analysts and politicians were concerned not only with the grim im-
plications for the global economy, but also with the social and political con-
sequences of protracted negative trends in the financial and industrial sectors 
of the global market. Following the Great Depression a number of parliamen-
tary democracies suffered serious legitimacy problems and some were re-
placed by autocratic regimes. The most spectacular collapse was that of the 
Weimar Republic, with consequences for the world that we all know only too 
well. No wonder then that this time round much of the attention was focused 
on the remedies that would not only limit the damage to the world market, 
but that would also safeguard the stability of democratic regimes, particularly 
those of the young democracies that emerged over two decades ago.  
However, a comparison between the Great Recession and the Great De-
pression reveals a number of significant differences, as highlighted by Dirk 
Berg-Schlosser in this opus. To begin with, the recent crisis was not nearly as 
severe as the crisis of the 1930s if one compares the GDP, industrial produc-
tion, exports and unemployment rates. And even though the range and mag-
nitude of the 2008-2009 financial crunch were considerable and there are in-
dications that some countries, such as Greece for example, are facing a rather 
painful process of cuts in public spending with the associated local social un-
rest, the term ‘recession’ rather than ‘depression’ seems more accurate and 
has been used throughout this volume. Secondly, the Great Depression was 
basically limited to the Western world. Today, owing to the advanced stage 
of globalisation, the world is incomparably more interlinked than it was in 
the 1930s, particularly in the economic sector. Two other important differ-
ences in comparison to the Great Depression can be noted. The one is that na-
tional egotisms, though certainly in evidence, have been far more tempered 
this time round, and the coordination at the supranational level in search of 
remedies that would limit the damage was much more efficient; the G8 and 
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G20 summits as well as EU internal policies are among the most striking ex-
amples.  
Additionally, and in contrast to the 1930s, the Great Recession has not 
produced any significant extremist political responses as was the case during 
in the 1930s and as Dirk Berg-Schlosser has explained in his chapter. As he 
noted, “there are now better informed insights into the causes and mechan-
isms of the crisis; neo-Keynesianism has been accepted again on a much 
greater international scale. Nevertheless, effective international controls to 
avoid similar bubbles and excesses are still lacking”. Social unrest, visible 
here and there, has been induced not so much by the crisis as by austerity 
measures implemented to limit the adverse economic consequences. And so 
far the Third Wave of democratisation has not been reversed as an immediate 
consequence of the crisis. Meanwhile, the ongoing ‘Arab Spring’ creates 
hope for the democratisation of the Islamic world, although the final outcome 
is far from clear. The young democracies that have emerged from the ruins of 
the Soviet bloc have not been seriously shaken by the crisis. Even in coun-
tries where severe counter-measures were implemented, including cuts in sal-
aries as was the case in Estonia, for example, the democratic order has not 
shown any symptoms of destabilisation, nor has it been challenged by anti-
democratic forces,  
In short, at least so far the Great Recession has not had any fundamental 
political consequences on the global scale. However, as noted by Stan du 
Plessis and Philip Mohr in this volume, for a variety of reasons large emerg-
ing markets have been visibly less affected by the crisis than the old well-
established capitalist democracies were. Brazil, India and especially authori-
tarian China managed to cope surprisingly well, implying that the crisis could 
undermine the trend-setting role that the developed capitalist democracies 
had played in the past.  
The crisis also brought into sharp focus the issue of global governance, 
and above all, the issue of accountability, or more precisely the severe deficit 
in democratic accountability of policymakers whose decisions have global 
consequences. Christer Jönsson argued in his chapter that in the globalised 
world “we are all affected by decisions taken elsewhere”. The Great Reces-
sion revealed this truth with striking clarity. And most of these decisions 
“taken elsewhere” suffer not only from the deficit of democratic legitimacy, 
but also from the lack of transparency, especially in the financial and military 
arenas. Jönsson writes that “the all-affected principle calls attention to how 
the ideal of ‘one person, one vote’ has become perverted under present politi-
cal conditions where national borders do not coincide with existing power 
structures”. This view is shared here along with the pessimistic assessment of 
the various attempts to introduce more democratic control over decisions that 
have global consequences. Giddens, Held, McGrew and many others noticed 
the problem years ago, but their proposed remedies were rather utopian. 
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Democratic control over global governance is impossible without a global 
polity, and global polity needs a common normative basis as a foundation. 
Our world, however, is multicultural and to create a common set of global 
values is truly a Herculean task, which brings us back to the starting point. 
Bernard Lategan notes that “on one level there is homogenisation in the way 
consumer products, fashion, music, films and art are aimed at a global au-
dience. But this masks the differences in culture and value systems that exist 
and even thrive below the radar of global culture”. This dialectics of the ho-
mogenising effect of globally distributed goods and services, and the diversi-
fying effect of local cultures and value systems, which shape local identities 
of individuals and give them a sense of belonging and security, is not only a 
source of growing tensions, but sometimes also diffuse violence.  
Even if we refer only to the superficial press coverage of the crisis, one 
fact remains beyond question: some countries have been more affected than 
others. Philip Mohr, in his review of the various economic models that oper-
ate on the global market, formulated the following explanation: “the level of 
financial development and integration in the more advanced economies made 
them much more vulnerable to the crisis than developing countries with less 
developed financial sectors. As a result, the crisis has been labelled a rich 
world’s crisis.” China and India (and to some extent Brazil) may serve here 
as model examples of countries able to maintain a relatively high economic 
growth in the face of the global crisis. Contrastingly, China is an authorita-
rian country, whereas India is often labelled the largest democracy in the 
world. And they reacted to the crisis in different ways. As Sang-jin Han and 
Peng Lu put it: “as the international financial crisis spread from developed 
countries to emerging economies and as it spilled over from the financial sec-
tor to the real economy, China has not remained immune to the recession in 
the West, but neither has the exogenous financial crisis caused an endogen-
ous economic meltdown and/or social turmoil in the country. In some re-
spects: “the crisis has actually turned out to be a blessing in that it relieved 
the Chinese leaders’ previous concern of an over-heating economy and en-
couraged a reorientation of production to the domestic market”. Heavy state 
intervention and, particularly, extensive investments in infrastructure and 
hidden subsidies of export, maintain high economic growth in spite of the ex-
ternal crisis. Philip Mohr argues that “a key factor in Chinese economic 
growth has been, and remains, the massive amount of unemployed, underem-
ployed or unproductive labour in the rural areas available for productive em-
ployment at low wages in the cities. The Chinese miracle is first and foremost 
a labour story. Without the availability of unlimited supplies of labour it 
would not have occurred”. The so-called ‘Chinese model’ is in fact, says 
Mohr, “a unique combination of state control and rampant free-market capi-
talism” that can hardly be imitated elsewhere.  
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India, on the other hand, has chosen the opposite strategy: deregulation 
and market-oriented economic reforms. Yet both the Chinese and Indian 
strategies proved effective in combating the possibly negative consequences 
of the global financial crisis. The logical conclusion one can draw is that the 
determinants of success are located elsewhere and reside in the relative 
backwardness of the financial system, a massive population with an extensive 
reservoir of cheap labour and a huge domestic market that can play the role 
of a buffer in case of turbulences on the global market. In short, both demo-
cratic India and autocratic China proved relatively immune to the Great Re-
cession. But this was not necessarily the case with poor Third Wave demo-
cracies or authoritarian systems showing poor economic performance.  
In the first case, as Ursula Hoffmann-Lange observed, “those Third 
Wave democracies that have been hardest hit by the global recession have 
shown a remarkable resilience. Rather than turning against democracy, voters 
in these countries have instead tended to punish incumbent governments and 
to vote new – and frequently even rightist rather than leftist – governments 
into power”. In the case of autocracies with poor economic performance, the 
already weak political legitimacy has been weakened even further. Hoffman-
Lange argues that the recent massive unrest in the Arab world strongly sup-
ports this thesis. The unrest may be interpreted as a withdrawal of legitimacy 
from authoritarian regimes as a result of the fall in economic output, which 
had acted as a substitute for procedural democratic legitimacy.  
Does this mean that all democratic regimes are flexible enough to absorb 
the shockwaves of the Great Recession without any threat to their system’s sta-
bility? Much depends on the level of systemic consolidation and the efficiency 
of democratic procedures. As Laurence Whitehead observes in this volume: 
“democratic procedures have offered a safety valve for citizen discontent, an 
opportunity for the peaceful renewal of political authorities, and perhaps even 
some scope for the termination of failed strategies of economic management, 
and their replacement by more promising approaches. National democracies 
seem to provide some structural opportunities for collective deliberation and 
lesson-learning that might be harder to achieve under alternative political dis-
pensations”. In his view democracies in general and consolidated democracies 
in particular work as relatively effective “error-correction” mechanisms. And 
indeed, such an “error-correction” mechanism apparently worked in the United 
States, where in November 2008 the Americans transferred legislative and ex-
ecutive power from the Republicans to the Democrats; some two years later 
this mechanism also worked in the United Kingdom, where a Conservative-
Liberal coalition replaced the Labour Party and formed a government united 
around the idea of repairing the damage, predominantly in an economic arena. 
Whitehead concludes that “at least in the core established democracies most re-
sponsible for the crisis, democratic alternation intervened as a powerful me-
chanism of political accountability and (perhaps even) ‘error correction’.”  
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The problem, however, remains in young and peripheral democracies, 
where the consolidation of the regime is rather weak and where democratic 
institutions and habits are not rooted deeply enough in all the segments of 
the society. In this particular context the recent crisis may be interpreted as 
the “broken promise” of democracy, to use Bobbio’s (1987) expression, 
where there is uncertainty instead of stability, regression instead of devel-
opment, chaos instead of order, and marginalisation instead of civic eman-
cipation. For weakly consolidated democracies the crisis and its conse-
quences have been a demanding test. Under trying circumstances it is natu-
ral for people to look for political alternation so as to ease economic hard-
ships. The habitual attitude in well-established democracies, as Whitehead 
indicates, is the search for alternation within the democratic order. In young 
democracies, however, the search for alternation may also include an au-
thoritarian alternative, which could be seen be as a radical exit from an un-
bearable situation.  
As mentioned, we have not yet seen any indication of a reversal of the 
Third Wave of democratisation. Quite the opposite: the ‘Arab Spring’ illu-
strates a search for alternatives under authoritarian regimes that include popu-
lar demands for the liberalisation of the regime and for civic emancipation. 
Nonetheless, the search for alternatives at present represents rather a general 
sentiment, both in the democratic and authoritarian parts of the world. The 
global crisis revealed the simple truth that a serious economic downturn af-
fecting one of the major global players exposes other global players to a simi-
lar threat, while actors along the periphery also suffer but have little say in 
global economic affairs.  
One may formulate the hypothesis that in order to deal with the conse-
quences of a crisis, global economic players implement both short-term and 
long-term strategies that fit in with the logic of their own particular socio-
political system. As Laurence Whitehead observes, democracies put into mo-
tion corrective procedures, of which the most common is a democratic alter-
nation that allows for the electoral ousting of a national political leadership 
held responsible for the economic debacle. But major authoritarian players do 
not remain passive either. They switch priorities in their centralised resource 
redistribution system to areas that require intervention and where these re-
sources are most needed.  
However, the expectation is that the less consolidated the system, wheth-
er authoritarian or democratic, and at the same time the greater its economic 
distance from the major players of the global core, the more likely it is that 
the array of alternatives that exists within a given system will not suffice and 
that anti-systemic alternatives might be contemplated for implementation. 
The likely scenario for peripheral autocracies would include more liberalisa-
tion of the rules of the game, more accountability from those in power and 
more civic emancipation. Young peripheral democracies, on the other hand, 
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might well entertain radical authoritarian solutions, which in the popular per-
ception would be the better way to restore order and stability.  
In other words, the hypothesis assumes that the Great Recession will im-
pact on the global balance of power, especially if the global economy is 
headed for a second dip. The consequent shifts may run both ways, either 
from authoritarian regimes to democracy, or from ‘defective’ democracies to 
autocracy. The next decade or so will show the direction of the change. For 
the moment the Third Wave of democracy is at a crossroads. It might actually 
gain new momentum should the ‘Arab Spring’ place the countries of the re-
gion on a path leading to a transition to democracy; should the ‘Arab Spring’ 
fail to initiate such a transition in the region, the Third Wave will regress. 
The latter option cannot be dismissed lightly and has been pondered in this 
volume by a number of authors. Dirk Berg-Schlosser pointed out that “for 
some countries China might possibly serve as a new model combining a con-
trolled market economy with authoritarian rule. This also provides more lee-
way for other authoritarian or rogue states, such as Angola or Sudan. Similar-
ly, a new national-authoritarian model in Russia and other CIS and neigh-
bouring countries may follow this route”.  
The arguments presented in this volume by Pierre du Toit and Edmund 
Wnuk-Lipinski run along similar lines. Du Toit focuses attention on some 
additional aspects of the expected shifts in the global balance of power. He 
argues that both authoritarian and democratic global players are deeply inter-
ested in maintaining a global peace, because only in such a context will they 
be able to pursue their main goals, which are modernisation and technologi-
cal progress. Of course, this does not mean that local military conflicts will 
have been eradicated and that mankind will have reached Kant’s famous 
eternal peace. What it means is that global military confrontations will be un-
likely and that violent conflicts will be diffused and will not accumulate 
along the territorial borders of nation-states. Conflicts will be less territorially 
based than value-based, and while rivalry between global players will still ex-
ist, it will take place elsewhere, namely in the arenas of economic growth, 
technological innovation and cyberspace domination.  
During the first phase of the Third Wave up until about the collapse of 
the Soviet bloc, the unassailable assumption held that the best and most effi-
cient – if not the only – route to economic development and technological 
advancement was through a combination of liberal democracy and a capitalist 
economy. The assumption was consistently supported by empirical studies in 
different regions of the world and the disintegration of the communist system 
further reinforced this widespread conviction.  
Since then the stunning economic and technological progress of authori-
tarian China coupled with the relatively rapid eradication of poverty for hun-
dreds of millions of people has made the proposition more problematic. 
Moreover, the effectual eradication of poverty among vast segments of Chi-
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nese society did not evoke – at least not yet – any popular aspirations for 
more liberty and human rights, as might have been expected. Instead it whet 
the appetite for greater consumption. As Han and Lu noted, the liberalisation 
and democratisation of the system is more a subject of discussion among 
Chinese intellectual elites than a focus for the public demands of the masses. 
In other words, economic growth did not convert ordinary people into citi-
zens demanding their rights, but rather turned them into consumers, or ‘ac-
quiescent subjects’, who are predominantly interested in social stability and 
the improvement of their individual wellbeing. 
Is this only because China happened to be organised as an authoritarian 
state? A positive answer to such a question would be superficial for, as our 
analyses show, the reasons run deeper. The specific Chinese culture and phi-
losophy that inform everyday relations between the Chinese people is what 
makes a significant difference. As Ursula van Beek observes, the recent work 
of the ruling elite and many Chinese intellectuals has been “to weave the 
threads of Confucian tradition into the fabric of Marxism by emphasising 
elements the two are said to have in common, such as strong leadership, so-
cial justice and harmony…. The core values of thrift, diligence and an ethic 
of hard work encourage dedication and commitment as a way to contribute 
by the individual to the development of a harmonious society”. The norma-
tive code specific to China is also shared by the majority of the intellectual 
elite, who for pragmatic reasons tend to choose adaptation over non-
conformism, and cooperation with the power elite over conflict, and who fa-
vour meritocracy over democracy. According to Han and Lu, “Since the 
1990s talented intellectuals, scientists and technocrats are lured increasingly 
into the existing system as ‘interested shareholders’ with offers of abundant 
government funding, affluent living conditions and prestigious politi-
cal/academic titles”. In consequence, in China the Great Recession confirmed 
rather than undermined the significance of patronage by officials of the vast 
number of private entrepreneurs who believe that harmonious relations with 
the power elite and the institutions of the centralised state are the more effi-
cient strategy to secure their group interest than any other alternative, and es-
pecially a democratic transition. The two authors conclude that “as long as 
most entrepreneurs still think the system generally works for them (via per-
sonal or institutional conduits) there seems little chance they will support 
democratisation”. In short, the Chinese economic elite will probably be satis-
fied with their status of producers and consumers, and will most likely not 
seek the conversion of this status into free citizenship, as this is understood in 
the West.  
China must undoubtedly be seen as a key factor in developing any global 
scenarios for the next decade or two – not because of the massive size of its 
population, but because of its successful pursuit of economic and technologi-
cal leadership on the world scene. In the coming years China may enter a 
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transition to democracy, however specifically defined this might be in the 
Chinese cultural context, or it may remain an economically and technologi-
cally successful authoritarian capitalist state. In the first case the Third Wave 
would get a tremendous new impetus, and in the latter and more likely case, 
China may become a trendsetter for the less successful authoritarian systems 
and ‘defective democracies’ on the world’s periphery. 
The Great Recession proved that the present-day world is not immune to 
severe economic crises, which put a question mark over the steady improve-
ment of life conditions for people in different corners of the globe. It has also 
shown that economic difficulties in one area are quickly felt in other parts of 
the world. And the spill-over effect is nowadays not only faster but also dee-
per, if compared with the time of the Great Depression. This is simply be-
cause the world is now more globalised than ever before. There are two poss-
ible responses to the global spill-over effect. The one calls for an equally 
global solution; the other for a retreat to the idea of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ to 
salvage whatever possible at the local level of the nation-state. Of course, 
there is an obvious implication to the latter response: the stronger nation-
states survive at the expense of the weaker nation-states, which ultimately 
pay the price for the crisis. The first option needs stronger cooperation in the 
global economic arena and the establishment of binding rules of the game 
that would increase the accountability of the economic policymakers towards 
those who may potentially be affected by their decisions. However, this is 
hardly viable without a deep reform of global institutions, including the UN. 
What these institutions need is more executive power and having at their dis-
posal effective law-enforcement instruments. In the absence of reform, even 
the commonly agreed upon rules of the game will be devoid of meaning. But 
executive power and law-enforcement instruments need democratic control 
over the process of decision-making. Democratic control, in turn, needs 
commonly adopted procedures and, above all, the development of a civil so-
ciety that transcends the traditional boundaries of the nation-state.  
In order to prevent further economic turmoil global players, such as the 
G20, will have to choose from the whole range of possible alternatives and 
their choices will determine the most likely short-term scenario for the world 
order. It will be of crucial importance whether the choices made by the most 
powerful nation-states will be aimed at universal or particular solutions, and 
whether the choices will be inclusive or exclusive on the global scale.  
Theoretically, one can distinguish four possible scenarios that may be the 
outcome of the choices made, as shown in the Table below. 
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Table 1 
Actions taken by the  
global players  
Universal Particular 
Inclusive Multi-polar world order 
based on a global social con-
tract  
Bi-polar world: competition be-
tween democratic and authoritarian 
capitalisms 
 
Exclusive 
Multi- polar world order 
based on the isolation of 
poor peripheries 
Return to the Westphalian type of 
world order: national egotisms pre-
vail over supra-national regulations 
 
Universal and inclusive solutions would entail at least two fundamental 
changes in comparison to the past. First, liberal democracy and the obser-
vance of human rights cease to play a role as the entry ticket to the core of 
globalisation since authoritarian China has to be included. Secondly, the new 
world order has several ‘centres of gravity’. In theory the centres are compet-
ing with each other by means of commonly agreed upon rules of the game, 
but in practice the giant emerging markets of Brazil, India and China have a 
much stronger voice in global affairs than ever before. In this model every-
body is included, but economically the strongest players set up the rules of 
the game that the weaker ones have to follow. 
Particular and inclusive solutions produce an entirely different world or-
der. Liberal democracy and the preservation of human rights are retained as a 
specific ideological criterion, which block access to the core of globalisation 
by undemocratic economic global players as long as these economic giants 
(first of all China, but also Russia and some Arab countries with rich oil re-
sources) remain authoritarian or even not fully democratic. In this scenario 
one may expect the gradual re-emergence of a bi-polar world order with ag-
gregate economic and technological competition between authoritarian and 
democratic capitalisms.  
Exclusive and universal solutions would result in the emergence of a 
multi-polar world of successful economies, which isolate themselves from 
poor and inefficient economies. This model implies an increase in global in-
equalities and the isolation of the world’s enclaves of poverty executed by 
means of strict anti-immigration laws which protect the enclaves of wealth.  
Exclusive and particular solutions would mean that consensus at the 
global level is not possible and the particular nation-states adopt individual 
strategies to cope with possible threats to their economic growth. In this 
model competition and conflict prevail (including various military conflicts 
over access to scarce resources) and co-operation according to common rules 
of the game is reduced to a minimum.  
Which of these scenarios is the most likely to be realised? Probably none, 
since international relations at the global level are far too complex and diver-
sified to fit any single one of the above four simple models. Nonetheless, ex-
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clusive and particular solutions seem rather unlikely, given the fact that glo-
balisation is so far advanced that a retreat to the Westphalian model would 
produce even more serious troubles than another global recession. The most 
likely projection is a mixture of inclusive universal and particular solutions, 
which would secure the interests of the major global players and would create 
an international context conducive to their further economic and technologi-
cal development. The lesson learnt from the Great Recession leads to the 
conclusion that neither the Washington Consensus nor the Beijing Consensus 
is likely to play the role of the new global contract, which should be both 
universal and inclusive. The advancement of globalisation calls for new initi-
atives which would adjust obsolete institutional arrangements to the needs of 
the interconnected world of today.  
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